Allie Bell Snowden Moody v. Commonwealth Land

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 03, 2008
No. 07-14999 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00137-CV-CG
ALLIE BELL SNOWDEN MOODY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ANCHOR TITLE, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 3, 2008)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Allie Bell Snowden Moody appeals from the district court’s order
dismissing her complaint against Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
and Anchor Title, L.L.C., based on her failure to state a claim under § 8 of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2607.1 Moody
was charged a $555 fee for a title insurance policy issued by Anchor through
Commonwealth. She alleges that because the title insurance premium was only
$284.50 under Alabama law, the remaining $270.50 “surcharge” constituted a fee
for something “other than services actually performed” within the meaning of §
8(b) of RESPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b).
Moody’s claim that the $555 title insurance premium exceeded the
maximum amount authorized by Alabama law is not actionable under RESPA. We
have recently joined the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eight Circuits in
holding that § 8(b) of RESPA “does not govern excessive fees because it is not a
price control provision.” Friedman v. Market Street Mortgage Corp. (Friedman II),
520 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008). We have rejected the notion that courts
should break single fees into various “components” for evaluation, as Moody
would have us do here with the allegedly “earned” versus “unearned” portions of
1
We review de novo a “district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland Security, 472 F.3d
1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).
2
the fee. Id. at 1297. Moreover, we have held that “subsection 8(b) requires a
plaintiff to allege that no services were rendered in exchange for a settlement fee.”
Id. at 1298 (emphasis added). Moody merely claims that she was charged an
inflated fee for a service that was indisputably provided by Anchor through
Commonwealth: the issuance of the title insurance policy.2 Moody’s claim is
barred by our prior precedent, and the district court rightly found that such a claim
is beyond the purview of RESPA.
AFFIRMED.
2
Moody alleges that Anchor and Commonwealth split the fee, though she does not allege
that the fee was split with the lender. Moody concedes, however, that she was “charged $555.00
for the ‘Lender’s Policy’ . . . issued by Anchor thru (sic) Commonwealth.” Thus, Moody has not
alleged that Anchor and Commonwealth “performed no services that would justify its retention
of a portion of the fee.” Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 348 F.3d 979 (11th Cir.
2003).
3