United States v. Eubanks

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-8732 02/08/99
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:97-MCR-19-WDO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES R. EUBANKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 8, 1999)
Before RONEY, HILL and KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James R. Eubanks, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) action to recover $34,166.00 forfeited to the United States. The background
facts show that on January 26, 1992, Eubanks and two other individuals were driving
southbound on Interstate 75 in the Middle District of Georgia when a state trooper stopped them
for speeding. During a consensual search of the car, the officer found $34,166.00 in a gray
suitcase in the trunk. Eubanks claimed ownership of the suitcase. When asked about the cash,
Eubanks stated he was in the business of selling jogging suits and was headed to Florida to buy
some wholesale. Eubanks’ companion, Kyle Tatum, was charged and convicted for being a
felon in possession of a firearm also found in the car.
The money found in the car was administratively seized and forfeited by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (the "DEA"). As required by statute, the DEA sent Eubanks a written
notice of seizure by certified mail, and the receipt returned with Eubanks’ signature. Notices
were also sent to James Eubanks at a different address. Additionally, the DEA published notices
in a national newspaper. All notices contained instructions on contesting a forfeiture action and
stated the last date to file a claim was April 14, 1992. After receiving no claim contesting
forfeiture, the DEA administratively forfeited the entire sum to the United States on April 27,
1992. On April 16, 1997, five years after the forfeiture, Eubanks filed a motion for return of the
forfeited money.
The district court denied Eubanks' motion because (1) Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e) did not authorize the return of civilly forfeited property; (2) the motion was
untimely; and (3) the currency was lawfully and properly forfeited.
On appeal, Eubanks argues that (1) he did not receive proper notice of the forfeiture, (2)
no probable cause existed to connect the currency with drug transactions, and (3) the district
court did not liberally construe his motion.
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Rule 41(e) provides that a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move
the district court for return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful
possession of the property. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e). A Rule 41(e) motion is unavailable, however,
when property is retained pursuant to civil forfeiture instead of for use as evidence. See United
States v. Watkins, 120 F.3d 254, 255 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1407 (1998).
Consequently, Eubanks' claim was not raised properly under Rule 41(e).
Even liberally construing Eubanks' complaint, the district court could only exercise
jurisdiction over Eubanks' claim under two narrow circumstances, neither of which is applicable
here. See Matter of Sixty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Dollars ($67,470.00), 901
F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990)(federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the merits of a
forfeiture decision made by the DEA). First, a federal court may have jurisdiction when the
agency refuses to consider a request that it exercise its discretion. See 901 F.2d at 1543. Here,
nothing in the record indicates that Eubanks ever requested that the DEA exercise its discretion
not to forfeit the currency. Consequently, this exception does not apply.
Second, federal courts under limited circumstances may exercise equitable jurisdiction
over agency forfeiture decisions. See 901 F.2d at 1543. The decision to exercise equitable
jurisdiction is highly discretionary and must be exercised with caution and restraint. See 901
F.2d at 1543. In other words, jurisdiction is appropriate only when the petitioner's conduct and
the merits of his petition require judicial review to prevent manifest injustice. See 901 F.2d. at
1543. Here, despite Eubanks' bare allegations to the contrary, the record shows that Eubanks
received lawful notice that the currency was subject to forfeiture through both certified mail and
publication. 19 U.S.C. § 1607. In fact, Eubanks' signature on his pleading is identical to that on
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the return receipt for the mailed notice. It is inappropriate for a court to exercise equitable
jurisdiction to review the merits of a forfeiture matter when the petitioner elected to forego the
procedures for pursuing an adequate remedy at law. See $67,400.00, 901 F.2d at 1545. Because
Eubanks had the opportunity to dispute the basis for the forfeiture in 1992 and waited five years
to do so with no explanation for the delay, the district court could not exercise its equitable
jurisdiction to hear his petition at such a late date. The district court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain Eubanks' petition.
AFFIRMED.
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