Michael Joel Pennington v. City of Huntsville

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-12757 AUGUST 17, 2001
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 98-02026-CV-H-NE
MICHAEL JOEL PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF HUNTSVILLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 17, 2001)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Michael Pennington appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendant City of Huntsville ("City") on his employment
discrimination and retaliation claims. Pennington alleged discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983. Because we find that the district court properly granted summary
judgment, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
As part of a pretrial order, the parties submitted an agreed summary of the
facts of the case. Below we set forth a condensed version of the facts relevant to
the issues we discuss. Beginning in 1988, Pennington worked as a Recreational
Aide for the City at the Scruggs Center. In 1994, he filed a grievance with the
City, seeking a religious accommodation. Following the grievance, Pennington
was transferred to the Westside Center as a Recreational Aide.
Pennington applied for a promotion to the position of Neighborhood
Services Programmer ("Programmer") in March of 1996. The City's personnel
department selected five people, including Pennington, for interviews. After the
interviews, Joey Flanders was selected for the position. Pennington then filed a
grievance with the City, alleging that he was denied the promotion because of
2
retaliation and race discrimination. Mia Puckett, the City’s Equal Employment
Officer, determined that Pennington's prior religious accommodation may have
been considered in the selection process. The record indicates that Puckett sent a
memorandum to Richard Liles, the head of the Department of Parks and
Recreation, stating:
In this selection process, the initial recommendation was biased. The
Zone Coordinator [Hughes] was heavily involved in the religious
accommodation of Mr. Pennington. It is my opinion that the Zone
Coordinator was unable to separate the emotions and events
surrounding the religious accommodation in late 1994/early 1995 and
the qualifications of Mr. Pennington for the position.
(Puckett Mem. (Doc. 002179-80).) She concluded that the selection process
"resulted in retaliation against Mr. Pennington." (Id.)
Following this finding, the City rescinded Flanders' job offer. Liles
conducted new interviews and, according to the record, evaluated the candidates'
writing samples. After the new interviews and writing evaluations, Flanders was
again selected as a Programmer for the Scruggs Center. However, this time
Pennington was offered the Programmer position at the Calvary Hills Center. In
addition, Pennington's offer was subject to conditions that were not imposed on
Flanders.
Although not mentioned in the parties' summary of the facts, our review of
the record indicates the following facts are undisputed. Pennington's promotion
3
was premised on two conditions: (1) participation in a writing skills program and
(2) agreeing to additional evaluations at three months and six months after the
promotion. Liles explained that the additional performance evaluations were
necessary because Pennington had never worked at the Calvary Hills facility
before and he was concerned about Pennington's familiarity with other community
activities there. Liles also indicated that he wanted to personally conduct these
evaluations himself to make sure that Pennington did not receive any retaliation for
his past religious accommodation from his supervisors. The writing skills were
necessary because Liles found that Pennington's writing lacked detail.
Pennington claims that he communicated his acceptance to Liles both
verbally and in writing, even though it was not required to be in writing. The City
asserts that Pennington would one day verbally accept and another day deny
acceptance of the promotion. It is undisputed that Liles then wrote a memo to
Pennington, requesting that he respond in writing that he was accepting the
promotion and all its conditions. Pennington responded that he would submit a
written acceptance when the City placed its conditions in writing. Liles did not put
the conditions in writing, and Pennington never accepted in writing.
4
Pennington filed this retaliation lawsuit1 in 1998, claiming that the City
retaliated against him for his prior request for religious accommodation. The
district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Pennington had not established a prima facie case of retaliation and that
Pennington had not refuted the City's legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its
decisions. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (N.D. Ala.
2000). Throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, Pennington has remained in his
position as a Recreational Aide.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court's order granting summary judgment.
See Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, we review the facts and all
1
Pennington also sued for race discrimination. Pennington adduced no evidence of race
discrimination, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City
without need for further discussion. Thus, the only claims warranting discussion are claims that
the City retaliated against Pennington.
A plaintiff cannot make a claim of retaliation based on religion under § 1981. See Saint
Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2028 (1987). Thus, to the
extent that Pennington's complaint can be construed as raising a § 1981 retaliation claim, it is
without merit.
5
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Whatley, 189 F.3d at 1313.
All of Pennington's claims relate to two incidents in 1996: Hughes' initial
decision to promote Flanders instead of Pennington to Programmer at the Scruggs
Center; and Liles' decision to offer Pennington a conditional promotion at the
Calvary Hills Center.2 Because Pennington's claims under § 1983 and Title VII
generally have the same elements of proof and use the same analytical framework,
we will only explicitly address the Title VII claims unless otherwise noted. See
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998);
Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1995).
Pennington has not challenged the district court's finding that no direct
evidence of retaliation exists. Hence, the only dispute on appeal is whether
Pennington presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to avoid summary
judgment. We address Pennington's claims in reverse chronological order, starting
with the conditional promotion decision.
A. Conditional Promotion
2
Pennington also argues that he was discriminated against because the City did not
process his promotion. Based on Pennington's admission that he was aware of the conditions on
his promotion, we find that the City's refusal to accede to Pennington's unauthorized demand that
the City put the conditions in writing is not evidence of discrimination or retaliation. Pennington
could have accepted the promotion with these conditions at any time. He failed to do so, and
thus this claim has no merit.
6
Pennington argues that the City retaliated against him by placing conditions
on his promotion to the Calvary Hills position.3 "To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily
protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there
is some causal relation between the two events.” Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141
F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Meeks v. Computer Associates Int'l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994)). The causal link element is construed broadly so
that "'a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative
employment action are not completely unrelated.'" Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir.
1993)). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer then has
an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged
employment action. Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460; Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1021. The
ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason
provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct remains on
the plaintiff. Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460.
3
To the extent that Pennington argues retaliation based on promotion to the Calvary Hills
position rather than the Scruggs position, we reject such argument as meritless and warranting no
discussion.
7
Although we have considerable doubt about whether Pennington can satisfy
the elements of a prima facie case, particularly the adverse employment action
prong,4 we assume arguendo that Pennington has established a prima facie case,
because we find the City's legitimate reasons for the decision are dispositive.
Richard Liles decided that two conditions should be attached to Pennington's
promotion at Calvary Hills--participation in a writing program, and agreeing to
evaluations after three and six months as a Programmer. As to both of these
conditions, Liles proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. On the first
condition, Liles stated that his review of Pennington's writing sample indicated that
his writing lacked detail. As to the additional performance evaluations, Liles
explained that he had concerns about Pennington's ability to handle community-
based programming at Calvary Hills because plaintiff had been exposed to mostly
4
Indeed, the district court found that Pennington had failed to establish an adverse
employment action. See Pennington, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1214. The court noted that the crucial
question was whether the conditions imposed amounted to an adverse employment action, and it
found that neither of these conditions were objectively adverse. See id. at 1214-15.
Additionally, on the causal link prong of the prima facie case, the mere fact that
Pennington had two years earlier requested and was granted an accommodation for his religious
beliefs, is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that there was a causal relationship
between Liles' decision and Pennington's previous request for religious accommodation. In
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999), we noted that gaps of 15 and 21
months between the employee's and employer's respective actions were too great to support a
causal nexus. Here, the two year break between Pennington's grievance and Liles' decision
probably would prevent a court from finding a causal nexus as well. However, we assume
arguendo not only the adverse employment prong, but also the causal link prong.
8
athletic programming previously; and he also explained that he wanted to make
sure that Pennington would not experience retaliation from his supervisors.
The City having proffered legitimate reasons, Pennington has the burden of
establishing that the City's reasons are pretextual. Pennington is not able to do so.
Pennington points out that in his interview Liles mentioned the prior interview and
the possible bias that was involved, but nothing in the depositions suggests that
these remarks were evidence of a retaliatory motive toward Pennington. Rather,
the record indicates that Liles raised these issues to explain the need for the re-
interview.
Pennington next argues that the writing program was not necessary because
Liles stated that he had passed the writing test and because Liles had no specialized
training in the area to enable him to discern which employees needed additional
writing training. These objections are insufficient because "a plaintiff employee
may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by
questioning the wisdom of the employer's reason" as long as "the reason is one that
might motivate a reasonable employer." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[F]ederal courts do not sit to second-guess the
business judgment of employers."). A reasonable employer might be motivated by
a perceived lack of detail in an employee's writing to require that employee to
9
undergo additional training. Significantly, Pennington, when pressed in
deposition, could not say that the two conditions were unreasonable.
Pennington also complains that no other employee was subjected to
additional evaluations at three and six months. However, these evaluations were
justified by Pennington's inexperience with community-based programming.
Pennington does not deny his lack of experience; instead, he argues that such
conditions would not have been necessary if he was promoted at Scruggs. This is a
challenge to the City's business judgment in deciding to promote him at Calvary
Hills rather than Scruggs.
For the foregoing reasons, and because Pennington has failed to show any
causal connection between Liles' decision and Hughes' prior decision, see infra
Part II.B., we conclude that Pennington has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of fact that Liles' reasons for the conditions imposed were
not the real reasons. Therefore, Pennington has not met his burden to show that the
City had a retaliatory intent when it promoted him at Calvary Hills, and the district
court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.
B. Initial Promotion Decision
We now turn to the initial decision by Hughes to promote Flanders instead
of Pennington. As to this decision, we assume arguendo that Pennington has
10
adduced sufficient evidence to establish the elements of a prima facie case. The
first element is not in dispute: Pennington filed a grievance seeking a religious
accommodation.
With respect to the second element, generally the denial of a promotion is an
adverse employment action. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1187 (11th
Cir. 1998). However, the district court found that Pennington suffered no adverse
employment action because Hughes' decision was quickly reversed by Liles who
offered Pennington the desired promotion. The caselaw in this area indicates that
the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee, if rescinded before the
employee suffers a tangible harm, is not an adverse employment action. See
Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 2000); Dennis v. County of
Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995); Blalock v. Dale County Bd. of Educ., 84
F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 1999). But when an employee loses pay or an
employment benefit from a delayed promotion, courts have held that the
employment action is not adverse only when the action is rescinded and backpay is
awarded. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University, 185 F.3d 542, 544 (6th
Cir. 1999); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also Miller v. Federal Express Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 955, 960 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)
(rescinding termination did not render action non-adverse in part because plaintiff
11
lost five days of pay and bonuses). Whether the City has offered Pennington
backpay to the date of Hughes' decision to deny his promotion is not clear from the
record, and indeed we would not expect such backpay to be awarded until
Pennington accepts his new position, which it does not appear that he has done.
For the purpose of our analysis here, we will assume arguendo, but expressly do
not decide, that his initial denial of a promotion was an adverse employment
action.
With respect to the causal link element, Pennington has adduced evidence
sufficient to create an inference that Hughes' decision not to promote Pennington
was influenced in part by Pennington's filing of a religious accommodation
grievance. The best evidence was supplied by Mia Puckett's memorandum to Liles
and her notes on her meeting with Hughes. Puckett's memorandum to Liles stated
that Hughes' promotion decision was probably biased by his being involved in
Pennington's religious accommodation. The basis for this opinion is not clear.
During a meeting with Hughes, Puckett wrote that Hughes had relied upon
"negative info" although the meaning of her notation is ambiguous. (Puckett Notes
(Doc. 000782).) At one point she wrote, "Michael's File--Negative info--grievance
2 yrs ago--Tony's notes in Mike's file," and at another point, "Negative--way Mr.
Pennington reacted to the transfer from Scruggs based on religious
12
accommodation." (Puckett Notes (Doc. 000782-83).) In her deposition, Puckett
was not able to clarify the meaning of "negative info" in her notes. It is possible
that Hughes relied upon a legitimate reason (Pennington's negative reaction to
being transferred), or that he relied in part on an illegal consideration (the fact that
Pennington filed a religious accommodation grievance). Because the basis for
Puckett's opinion that Hughes' decision was biased is not clear from the record, a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Pennington can establish the
causal link element.
In light of Pennington's satisfaction of the first prong (protected expression)
and our assumption without decision of the second prong (adverse employment
action), and the genuine issue of fact with respect to the third prong (a causal link),
we assume arguendo the prima facie case, and we examine the legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons offered by Hughes for his selection of Flanders instead of
Hughes. He states that he relied on his limited personal knowledge of the
candidates, their responses to interview questions, and contents of their personnel
files, including evaluations and attendance records. He also noted that he was
particularly impressed with Flanders having received highly favorable evaluations
from two supervisors.
13
In light of Puckett's report, however, we assume arguendo that Pennnington
has created a genuine issue of fact that Hughes' decision was motivated in part by
retaliation. Thus, we turn to the City's mixed-motive defense--i.e., the question of
whether the City has established that it would have made the same decision
without an illegal motive. We conclude that the record is clear that the City would
have made the same decision. See Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d
1078, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996) (assuming that plaintiff could establish a prima facie
case, but finding the evidence overwhelming that defendant would have made the
same decision); Marshall v. City of Cape Coral, 797 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir.
1986) (same); see also Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1293-94 (11th
Cir. 2000) (refusing to grant judgment as a matter of law where issue remained as
to whether employer would have made the same decision).
In both Title VII and § 1983 lawsuits, the Supreme Court has recognized
that an employer can avoid liability if it can prove that it would have made the
same disputed employment decision in the absence of the alleged bias. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989) (Title
VII); Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct.
568, 576 (1977) (§ 1983). It is clear that this mixed-motive defense remains good
law in § 1983 cases. See Harris, 99 F.3d at 1085. But with the Civil Rights Act of
14
1991, Congress overruled in part the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins holding
regarding the mixed-motive defense in Title VII cases. The Act did so by
reinstating limited damages for discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex
and national origin . . . , even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42
U.S.C. § 2000-2(m). Although the 1991 Act overruled in part the mixed-motive
defense with respect to discrimination suits based on race, color, sex, and national
origin, this circuit and other circuits have held that the mixed-motive defense is
still available in retaliation cases. In Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 208
F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000), we held that the relevant sections of the 1991
Act did not apply to mixed-motive retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA"). We stated that the 1991 Act overruled and limited
the mixed-motive defense only in discrimination cases based on race, color,
religion, sex and national origin, but left the defense intact for retaliation cases. Id.It is true that Lewis was a retaliation case in the context of an ADEA claim,
whereas the instant case is a retaliation case brought under TitleVII. However, the
reasoning of Lewis applies with equal force in this context. Moreover, we
typically apply legal standards developed in Title VII and ADEA cases
interchangeably. See, e.g., Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (applying framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
15
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), a Title VII case, to the ADEA).
Therefore, we hold that the mixed-motive defense remains good law not only with
respect to Pennington's § 1983 retaliation claim, but also with respect to his Title
VII retaliation claim. On this point, we are in agreement with all other circuits that
have considered this issue. See Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that the Price Waterhouse analysis applies to retaliation claims under Title
VII); Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000)
(same); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999)
(same); McNutt, 141 F.3d at 709 (same); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 935 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684 (1st Cir.
1996) (same). Thus, the City may prevail on both the Title VII and § 1983
retaliation claims if it proves that it would have made the same decision absent
Hughes' alleged bias. We now turn to that inquiry.
Even assuming that Hughes was also influenced in part by retaliatory
animus, Liles' actions confirm that the City would have made the same decision
regarding the promotion. After Puckett reported that Hughes' decision may have
been tainted, Liles rescinded the initial promotion of Flanders, and personally
conducted a fresh set of writing tests and interviews of Flanders and Pennington.
No one who had participated in the previous, now rescinded, selection of Flanders
16
participated in Liles' decisionmaking. Liles independently reached the decision
that Flanders, rather than Pennington, should be promoted to the Programmer
position at the Scruggs Center. Liles decision to offer Pennington the Programmer
position at the Calvary Hills Center is additional evidence that Liles harbored no
retaliatory motive toward Pennington.
Upon a thorough review of the record, we find no evidence that suggests that
Liles' decision was tainted either by the previous Hughes' decision or by any other
retaliatory animus towards Pennington. Where a decisionmaker conducts his own
evaluation and makes an independent decision, his decision is free of the taint of a
biased subordinate employee. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287,
1304 n.20 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that biased employee did not manipulate the
final decisionmaker); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249
(11th Cir. 1998) (finding that decisionmaker's employment decision was not
causally related to a subordinate's discriminatory animus); Willis v. Marion County
Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[W]hen the causal
relationship between the subordinate's illicit motive and the employer's ultimate
decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and
a legally permissive basis, the bias of the subordinate is not relevant.").
Pennington adduced no evidence that Liles' decision was tainted by Hughes'
17
decision or the retaliatory animus which we assume with respect to Hughes. The
record indicates that Liles ' decision was completely independent of Hughes'
decision, and therefore untainted. Liles' untainted decision indicates that the City
would have made the same decision regarding Pennington's promotion in the
absence of any retaliatory bias harbored by Hughes.5 Because the City would have
5
The Ninth Circuit in Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 854-55 (9th Cir.
1999), recognized that an employer may assert a mixed-motive defense when a decisionmaker
with legitimate motives makes a redetermination of a challenged adverse employment action.
However, that court found that under the facts presented the subordinate decisionmakers set in
motion events that ultimately led to the adverse employment actions, and therefore it concluded
that the employer would not have made the same decision in the absence of the subordinates'
illegitimate motivations. See id. The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Professional
Ass'n of Coll. Educators v. El Paso County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1984),
where it considered a mixed-motive defense based on a college board of trustees' decision to
terminate an employee. The board had relied on the recommendation of the college's biased
president, and the court refused to grant a judgment as a matter of law because the jury could
have concluded that the board never would have considered dismissing the employee if the
president had not brought charges in reprisal for protected activity. See id.While not mentioning a mixed-motive defense, other courts have explained that a
subsequent untainted and independent decision can break the chain of causation of a disputed
employment action made by a subordinate and therefore absolve the employer of liability. See
English v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001); Eiland v. Trinity
Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1998); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147
F.3d 718, 725 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992);
DeHorney v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1989).
But courts have also noted that causation is not broken when the ultimate decisionmaker never
would have made the decision in the absence of the actions of the biased employee, or was
influenced by the bias. See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 228-29 (5th Cir.
2000); Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 620, 624-25 (8th Cir. 1998); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 785 F.2d
862, 867-68 (10th Cir. 1985); Hickman v. Valley Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 619 F.2d 606,
610 (6th Cir. 1980).
We are not faced with a concern here, similar to that in Gilbrook, that Hughes set in
motion events that led to Pennington being denied the promotion at the Scruggs Center, because
Pennington himself set in motion the events by applying for the promotion. Liles' independent
evaluation of the candidates breaks the causal chain of events from Hughes' decision, and it
establishes that Flanders would have received that promotion in the absence of any retaliatory
18
made the same decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation
claims.
The availability of the mixed-motive defense is particularly apt here because
the City heeded the advice of its Equal Employment Officer and took corrective
action. Liles, conducting an independent evaluation of the candidates in the face of
discrimination charges, ensured that Pennington's civil rights were protected.
Moreover, allowing Liles' actions to support the City's mixed-motive defense
effectuates the policy expressly called for by Congress--to encourage alternative
dispute resolution of employment discrimination charges. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1981) ("the use of alternative means of dispute resolution . . . is encouraged"); see
also Dennis, 55 F.3d at 154 ("Encouraging non-judicial resolution of workplace
grievances is thus an important part of the statutory scheme that Congress
enacted.").
Having concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of the City, both with respect to the initial failure to promote Pennington
and the subsequent conditional promotion, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
bias harbored by Hughes.
19