SEC v. Comcoa Ltd.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4391.
David LEVINE, Receiver-Appellee,
Securities Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COMCOA LTD., a/k/a Comcoa Ltd., Thomas W. Berger, Defendants,
J.B. Grossman, Law Practice, Movant-Appellant,
Sun-Sentinel Company, Mobitel Services Corp., a Delaware
Corporation, et al., Claimants.
Dec. 1, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-8256-CIV-SH), Shelby Highsmith, Judge.
Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MILLS*, District Judge.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
Law Practice of J.B. Grossman, P.A., appeals the district
court's finding of contempt for its transfer of funds from the
trust account of its client, Comcoa Ltd. ("Comcoa"), to the law
firm's operating account in violation of a court order. We affirm.
Before January 1994, Comcoa retained J.B. Grossman as
counsel.1 In mid-January 1994, Grossman told Comcoa to establish
a large retainer fee to assure Grossman's availability in the event
of an asset-freezing action. This retainer was placed in a trust
*
Honorable Richard Mills, U.S. District Judge for the
Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
1
While it is appellant Law Practice of J.B. Grossman, P.A.
which was held in contempt below, the law firm's sole involvement
in this case was through the actions of J.B. Grossman, a lawyer.
As such, this opinion will describe the behavior in this case as
being that of Mr. Grossman rather than that of the law firm.
account maintained by Grossman on behalf of Comcoa. Before April
1994, the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("Division") began an informal inquiry into the business
activities of Comcoa.
On 5 May 1994, the Division filed an ex parte Motion for Order
to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Be Granted,
Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), Order Freezing Assets, Order
Appointing Receiver, Order for an Accounting, Order Prohibiting
Destruction of Documents and an Order Expediting Discovery. On 6
May 1994, at 9:25 AM, a United States District Judge entered an
order, among other things, granting a TRO and freezing Comcoa's
assets, appointing a Receiver, and notifying the parties of a
hearing on 16 May to consider a preliminary injunction.2
On 11 May Comcoa filed, among other things, an Emergency
Motion to Vacate the TRO, a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction and a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On 16 and 17 May the district court did hold a preliminary
injunction hearing and also heard Defendants on their Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Grossman was
attorney of record for Comcoa at this hearing. Over the two days,
the district judge heard argument from counsel and received
3
testimony from seven witnesses; the hearing was completed. At
2
The May 6 order stated that the hearing on May 16 was to
show cause "why a Preliminary Injunction ... should not be
granted...."
3
Mr. Grossman makes no contention that he was unable at this
hearing to set forth fully the reasons for which he and Comcoa
believed no preliminary injunction should issue.
the end of the hearing on 17 May, the district court told both
parties that it was extending the 6 May order until the court ruled
on the substantive motions by Defendants. The district court said
the order would be extended in all respects and specifically said
the order included the asset freeze. The district court then asked
if either party had anything further or any questions. Grossman
replied, "No, sir."
On 6 June 1994, Grossman called the district court to find out
if an order had been issued. At first, Grossman was told a
preliminary injunction had been issued; but later the district
court's assistant said a preliminary injunction had not been
issued. Grossman considered the court's order to have expired.
And he, on 6 June, transferred from Comcoa's trust account about
$92,000 of the retainer funds into his law firm's operating
account.4 About this same time, he filed for Comcoa an Emergency
Motion for Release of Assets, based on the expiration of the TRO.5
4
The order stated that Comcoa and their "attorneys ... are [
] restrained from, directly or indirectly, transferring ... any
assets or property owned by, controlled by, or in the possession
of [Comcoa]". In the contempt proceeding the court below
concluded that the asset freeze extended to the trust account,
and this determination is not in dispute. Never does Grossman
contend that he was unaware that the order of the court, if still
in force, prohibited this conduct.
5
Some confusion exists on the precise sequence of events on
June 6 and 7. The district court appears to have found that
Grossman first filed the motion for release of funds and
then—before the motion could be decided—transferred the money.
Grossman's initial brief says that he transferred the funds on 6
June and filed the motion for release of assets the next day.
His reply brief says that the motion was filed 6 June, the same
day that he transferred the funds, but later in the day. And,
the docket sheet indicates the motion was not filed until 7 June.
In any event, what is undisputed is that Grossman's transfer of
funds was a unilateral act done without the approval of any
court.
Also on 7 June, the district court entered an Order of Preliminary
Injunction nunc pro tunc to June 3, 1994; and, the district court
denied Defendants' Emergency Motion.
In August 1994, the Division filed a Motion for an Order to
Show Cause to hold Grossman in contempt for violating the district
court orders when he transferred the retainer funds. The district
court entered an order holding Grossman in contempt of court for
his transferring of the funds into his own account. He now appeals
this ruling.
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a
TRO can last only 10 days, unless extended, and cannot be extended
beyond 20 days without the consent of the restrained party.6
Grossman says that he never consented to an extension; and for the
sake of our discussion, we accept that he did not consent.
The Supreme Court has said a TRO that is continued beyond the
time permissible under Rule 65 should be treated as a preliminary
injunction. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87, 94 S. Ct. 937,
951, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974) (stating "[w]here an adversary hearing
has been held, and the court's basis for issuing the order strongly
challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited order as a
temporary restraining order seems particularly unjustified"). This
6
The parties argue whether the initial 10 days and the 20
day extension should be calculated by excluding weekends and
holidays. This argument is largely irrelevant because even if we
take the calculation which excludes weekends and holidays, the
TRO would expire at 9:25 AM on June 6. And, because the district
court did not enter the written preliminary injunction order
until June 7 (although it was entered nunc pro tunc to June 3),
the TRO would have expired unless consent were given. We do note
that even under the calendar day approach, continuing the hearing
into the second day constituted a for-cause extension of the
initial 10 day period.
treatment is especially appropriate where, as in this case, there
has been notice to the parties, a full hearing on a preliminary
injunction, and then a stated and clear decision from the bench to
extend the terms of the restraining order indefinitely, that is,
until the court notified the parties otherwise.7
Very likely, Grossman's client, Comcoa along with its agents
and attorneys, was under a preliminary injunction once the judge
spoke at the end of the hearing; but we need not go that far. If
the TRO had not become a preliminary injunction before, it became
a preliminary injunction when the TRO, as orally extended by the
district court, went beyond the time permissible under Rule 65.
Thus, the proper course of conduct for Grossman was to treat the
TRO as an erroneously granted preliminary injunction and to
appeal.8 See Clements Wire & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 894, 896
7
We accept that, where there has been no notice to the
parties and no hearing on the various factors involved in
considering a preliminary injunction, a TRO continued past the
Rule 65 limit falls of its own weight. See Granny Goose v.
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 94
S. Ct. 1113, 39 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1974); Hudson v. Barr, 3 F.3d 970
(10th Cir.1993). In Granny Goose, the district court "did not
indicate that it was undertaking a hearing on a preliminary
injunction." Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 1125.
And, neither party made an attempt to present its position on
whether a preliminary injunction should issue. Id.
8
That a hearing on a preliminary injunction had been held
and that appellate review was, therefore, available under
Sampson, makes this case materially different from Granny Goose.
Even in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers'
Int'l Assn., 306 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1962), the Second Circuit
treated a TRO extended following the commencement of a hearing on
the merits as a preliminary injunction for purposes of appeal.
No good reason exists to limit this rule to one of appellate
jurisdiction only: a preliminary injunction is a preliminary
injunction.
Two concerns about TROs are reflected in the case law
and in Rule 65. First, restrained parties often have no
(5th Cir.1979).
We believe the instances when lawyers can be told by the
district court in no uncertain terms not to do "X" and, yet, the
lawyer can go on to do "X" with impunity are (and ought to be) few
and far between, especially where the appellate courts—as in this
case—are open to the lawyer to settle the matter in an orderly way,
but the lawyer pursues no appeal. In these circumstances, for
Grossman just to disregard the district court's clear order, based
on his personal belief that it was invalid, was not merely bold;
it was bad. We conclude his conduct warrants a determination of
contempt.9 The district court was within its discretion to hold
opportunity for a hearing and may not know precisely what
conduct is prohibited. Second, a restrained party may not
obtain appellate review of a TRO.
Our holding respects both these concerns; Grossman and
Grossman's client had the opportunity to contest the
preliminary injunction (and had precise notice of the
enjoined conduct) and also could have obtained appellate
review of the injunction.
9
Although we decide this case under Rule 65, we do not
decide that all of the district courts' powers to give binding
orders to a lawyer and all of a lawyer's legal duties to obey the
orders of a court with subject-matter jurisdiction over the
controversy in which the lawyer appears as counsel of record flow
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only.
We are heartsick when we observe that Mr. Grossman, an
officer of the United States' Courts, acted personally and
directly in disobeying the straightforward instruction of a
United States District Judge and did so just for money, his
fee.
This case is not one in which a lawyer's client acted,
and because the lawyer did not stop his client, the lawyer
is facing contempt. Mr. Grossman, himself, acted contrary
to plain instructions given to him when he was face-to-face
with the court. In such circumstances, the power of
district courts to discipline their officers may possibly be
considerably broader-based than that granted by Rule 65 or
even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally. Put
Grossman in contempt of court for violating its order.
The order of contempt against the Law Practice of J.B.
Grossman, P.A., is AFFIRMED.
HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring, dubitante:
The court today affirms contempt sanctions against a lawyer
for doing what he knew the judge had ordered him not to do. I am
not attracted to this lawyer's conduct. The problem arose,
however, because the party who petitioned for and obtained the TRO
stood silent while the order inadvertently expired without
counselling the court of the requirements for its extension. One
would expect more from the agency appearing here. It has obtained
temporary restraint before.1 I am not pleased with the performance
of any of our cast of characters.
An ex parte temporary restraining order is an extreme remedy
to be used only with the utmost caution. Rule 65(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure imposes strict restrictions on its scope
and specific time constraints for its duration:
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice ...
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to
differently, whether or not the client Comcoa was still
validly restrained about its funds, perhaps Mr. Grossman, as
an officer of the court, remained under a valid restraint.
But given the way this controversy was decided by the
district court and has been briefed and argued to us, we
will pass over the question of Mr. Grossman's professional
responsibilities and of the district court's inherent powers
to supervise and to discipline its subordinate officers.
1
An electronic search using only the words "Securities and
Exchange Commission" and "temporary restraining order" or "TRO"
yielded 11,541 cases. We are not suggesting that all these cases
are similar to the instant situation, nor are we implying we have
read each case. We would suggest that counsel representing the
SEC are likely to have explored the requirements for effective
extension of TROs from time to time.
exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like
period or unless the party against whom the order is directed
consents that it may be extended for a longer period.2
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b).
The importance of these restrictions was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of
Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 94
S. Ct. 1113, 39 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1974). In Granny Goose, a state court
issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the local union from
striking. Two days later, the case was removed to federal court.
The union moved to dissolve the restraining order. After a
hearing, the court denied the union's motion. The union went on
strike some months later. The district court held the union in
contempt for violating the TRO. The Ninth Circuit reversed, and
the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.
The Court held that the union violated no order when it
resumed its strike because no order was in effect at that time.
The Court rejected the employer's argument that the district
court's hearing on the union's motion to dissolve the restraining
order was a hearing on a preliminary injunction, or that its order
denying the motion should be construed as a grant of a preliminary
injunction. Regardless of the district court's intent in the
hearing, the TRO did not survive the expiration of the Rule 65(b)
2
The district court found that Grossman consented to the
extension of the TRO. The majority opinion, however, accepts
without comment Grossman's contention that he did not. I concur
in this conclusion and note that, if Grossman had consented to
the extension, the TRO would have remained an unappealable
interlocutory order. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 430
(11th Cir.1982).
time limits because the district court did not follow the
appropriate procedure. The Supreme Court held:
Where a hearing on a preliminary injunction has been held
after issuance of a temporary restraining order, and where the
District Court decides to grant the preliminary injunction,
the appropriate procedure is not simply to continue in effect
the temporary restraining order, but rather to issue a
preliminary injunction, accompanied by the necessary findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
415 U.S. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 1126 (emphasis added); see also
Hudson v. Barr, 3 F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir.1993) (indefinite
continuation of TRO held improper; government's consent to TRO,
pending hearing on motion for preliminary injunction, ended on day
hearing was supposed to occur); Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) ("... and in
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action.").
Our panel's opinion today purports to accept Granny Goose but
characterizes its holding as "... where there has been no notice to
the parties and no hearing on the various factors involved in
considering a preliminary injunction, a TRO continued past the Rule
65 limit falls of its own weight." This interpretation reads out
of Rule 65(b) any requirement for consent to validate any extension
of a TRO beyond the twenty-day limit. See Connell v. Dulien Steel
Products, Inc., 240 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir.1957). Under the Rules,
it is not just notice and a hearing that allows a TRO to become a
preliminary injunction, but findings of fact and conclusions of law
which adjudicate the property right involved thereby satisfying due
process.
Granny Goose also emphasizes the safeguards built into Rule 65
to prevent the serious penalties imposed when one is found to be in
contempt for violating court injunctions:
[O]ne basic principle built into Rule 65 is that those against
whom an injunction is issued should receive fair and precisely
drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits.
* * * * * *
It would be inconsistent with this basic principle to
countenance procedures whereby parties against whom an
injunction is directed are left to guess about its intended
duration. Rule 65(b) provides that temporary restraining
orders expire by their own terms within 10 days of their
issuance. Where a court intends to supplant such an order
with a preliminary injunction of unlimited duration pending a
final decision on the merits or further order of the court, it
should issue an order clearly saying so. And where it has not
done so, a party against whom a temporary restraining order
has issued may reasonably assume that the order has expired
within the time limits imposed by Rule 65(b).
415 U.S. at 444-45, 94 S.Ct. at 1126-27 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
No case is cited to us in which the imposition of contempt for
violation of an indefinitely-extended TRO has been upheld.
Nevertheless, we hold today that "[f]or Grossman just to disregard
the district court's order based on his personal belief that it was
invalid, is conduct that warrants a determination of contempt." I
do not concur in this, but I do not view it as a basis for the
judgment. The opinion seems to say that, notwithstanding Granny
Goose, it was not "reasonable" for Grossman to assume that the TRO
had expired as Rule 65(b) prescribes.3
3
I believe that this conclusion denies Grossman the benefit
of that to which he is entitled under Granny Goose. Rule 65(b)
is clear that no TRO may be extended beyond the twenty days
without the consent of the party restrained. On May 27, 1994,
after the expiration of twenty calendar days, Grossman requested
the return of some of his client's funds from the Receiver who
had custody of them. The Receiver disagreed about the
calculation of time, stating that the time would expire on June
This holding is based upon Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94
S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974). In Sampson, a government
employee sought a temporary injunction against her dismissal from
employment as a probationary employee. The district court granted
a temporary restraining order. Later, after an adversary hearing
at which the government declined to produce the discharging
official as a witness to testify as to the reasons for the
dismissal, the district court ordered the temporary restraint
continued until the witness appeared. In considering the issue of
appellate jurisdiction over the order the Supreme Court wrote:
A district court, if it were able to shield its orders from
appellate review merely by designating them as temporary
restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions
would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in
an injunctive proceeding. In this case, where an adversary
hearing has been held, and the court's basis for issuing the
order strongly challenged, classification of the potentially
unlimited order as a temporary restraining order seems
particularly unjustified. Therefore, we view the order at
issue here as a preliminary injunction.
Id. at 87-88, 94 S.Ct. at 951-52.
An order extending a TRO beyond the statutory twenty-day
limit, therefore, is treated as a preliminary injunction. One
might well conclude that the conversion of an indefinitely-extended
TRO into a preliminary injunction would be for purposes of appeal
only, conferring jurisdiction on the court of appeals for the sole
1. On June 3, Grossman inquired of the district court whether a
preliminary injunction had issued. The staff advised that no
order had been issued. On June 6, Grossman again inquired of the
Clerk of Court and of the district court's chambers whether any
injunction had issued. Informed that no order had issued nor was
any order forthcoming, Grossman transferred his client's retainer
from a trust fund to Grossman's law firm operating account in
partial payment of his fees. As far as the record reveals,
Grossman did what Rule 65(b) permitted him to do, and as his
client instructed him to do with the client's funds.
purpose of voiding the invalidly extended TRO.4
This was exactly the approach of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in National Mediation Bd. v. Air Line
Pilots Association, Int., 323 F.2d 305 (D.C.Cir.1963). In that
pre-Sampson case, the Court of Appeals held that an order extending
a TRO beyond the twenty days allowed by Rule 65(b) is tantamount to
the grant of a preliminary injunction, thus conferring jurisdiction
on the court of appeals. The court further held, however, that
since the restraining order was not supported by findings of fact
and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a), it was not a
valid preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district
court with directions to dissolve the void order. Id. at 305-06.5
This result was later endorsed by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in Sampson. In Sampson, the Supreme Court went beyond the
mere exercise of appellate jurisdiction and considered the merits
of the application for a preliminary injunction. This appeared to
be a significant extension to Justice Marshall who wrote:
4
As noted earlier, until today there has never been a case
affirming sanctions for contempt for violation of an
indefinitely-extended TRO.
5
An earlier approach adopted by two circuits upon finding
that temporary restraining orders had expired by virtue of the
Rule 65(b) limitations, was to hold that there was no existing
order to review and dismiss the appeals as moot. Benitez v.
Anciani, 127 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 699,
63 S. Ct. 439, 87 L. Ed. 559 (1943) and Southard & Co. v. Salinger,
117 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.1941). Subsequent courts have
distinguished these cases where, as here, a district court has
ordered an indefinite extension of the TRO. See Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers' Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d
840, 842 (2d Cir.1962) ("In the present case, because the
district judge extended the order beyond the twenty day period,
we consider that the temporary restraining order became an
appealable preliminary injunction.").
It is suggested that if an indefinitely extended
temporary restraining order remained unappealable, the
District Court would have virtually unlimited authority over
the parties in an injunctive action. At the outset, this
cannot justify this Court's reaching the merits of Mrs.
Murray's claim for a preliminary injunction. Even if the
order entered by the District Court is appealable, it should
be appealable only for the purposes of holding it invalid for
failure to comply with Rule 52(a). This was the precise
course taken by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in National Mediation Board, supra, on which
the majority relies.
* * * * * *
Here, instead, we find the Supreme Court determining that
although the District Court had jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief, the equities of Mrs. Murray's case did not
support a preliminary injunction, when neither the District
Court nor the Court of Appeals has yet confronted the latter
issue. I do not believe this makes for sound law.
Sampson, 415 U.S. at 98, 94 S.Ct. at 957 (footnote omitted).
I recognize that this reasoning was rejected by the Court in
Sampson. Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, wrote:
Our Brother Marshall, in his dissenting opinion,
nevertheless suggests that a district court can totally or
partially impede review of an indefinite injunctive order by
failing to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law.
It would seem to be a consequence of this reasoning that an
order which neglects to comply with one rule may be saved from
the normal appellate review by its failure to comply with
still another rule. We do not find this logic convincing.
Admittedly, the District Court did not comply with Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 52(a), but we do not think that we are thereby
foreclosed from examining the record to determine if
sufficient allegations or sufficient evidence supports the
issuance of injunctive relief.
Id. at 88 n. 58, 94 S. Ct. at 951 n. 58.
By reviewing the merits, the Supreme Court appears to have
held that the TRO cum preliminary injunction is a valid restraining
order. Otherwise, the review on the merits would be a mere
intellectual exercise which the Court is not wont to do.6 So, I am
instructed by the Court that the indefinite extension of a TRO not
only transforms the TRO into a preliminary injunction for purposes
of appeal, but also into a valid injunction.7
Clearly, some problems emerge. We uphold the contempt imposed
for violation of an expired TRO in this case at the expense of
making unclear the duration of emergency orders that deprive a
party of the free use of his or her property. This is not
appealing in a free society. Furthermore, we eviscerate the
protection afforded by Rule 65(b). If a TRO can metamorphose into
a preliminary injunction by the expiration of the very time limits
imposed as safeguards against the indefinite restraint over one's
6
Upon review of the merits, the Court analyzed whether
petitioner had adequately demonstrated the irreparable harm
necessary to secure injunctive relief, concluded that she had not
done so. Therefore, although valid, the Court found the TRO
unlawful in that it was incorrectly granted. The Court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals which had upheld the
district court's grant of the TRO.
7
This determination is part of what is required in order for
this court to uphold the contempt imposed upon Grossman in this
case. Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt may be upheld
only if the disobeyed order was valid and lawful. Smith v.
Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1050, 1052-54 (5th Cir.1980).
Having been persuaded that the indefinitely extended
TRO becomes a valid preliminary injunction, the second step
would be to consider the injunction on the merits to
determine whether it was granted according to law, i.e.,
whether the applicant demonstrated the requisite irreparable
harm and inadequate legal remedies.
In this case, however, Grossman does not appear to
challenge the injunction on its merits, choosing to argue
only that the TRO was void after the expiration of the
statutory time limits. Therefore, my inquiry is limited to
the validity of the order disobeyed.
property, then Rule 65(b) provides no protection at all. 8 As the
Second Circuit has observed:
It is because the remedy is so drastic and may have such
adverse consequences that the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders is carefully hedged in Rule 65(b) by
protective provisions. And the most important of these
protective provisions is the limitation on the time during
which such an order can continue to be effective.
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers' Int'l Ass'n,
306 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir.1962) (holding, however, that a TRO
indefinitely extended by a district court becomes a preliminary
injunction so that it may be reviewed).
I confess to a temptation to conclude that Sampson is
overruled by Granny Goose, or that, at least, because the restraint
imposed in Sampson was found to be unlawful, the implications from
the merits review are dicta. I do not undertake, however, to limit
Supreme Court precedent. If our reading of Sampson is correct, it
requires that, for the first time, we affirm a contempt imposed for
violating a TRO extended beyond the statute's limit.
Not without doubt as to this conclusion, I CONCUR.
8
This approach does, however, have the virtue of easing the
burden on over-worked district judges. It appears that now they
may avoid the time-consuming chore of finding facts and making
conclusions of law, and simply allow the passage of time to
accomplish what many cases say they may not do—turn a TRO into a
preliminary injunction without going to this trouble.