Villarreal v. Woodham

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-2146.
Frutoso VILLARREAL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
William A. WOODMAN, Sheriff, Gadsden County, Gadsden County,
Defendants-Appellees.
May 29, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. 94-CV-40583-WS), William Stafford, Judge.
Before DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and COHILL*, Senior
District Judge.
DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Frutoso Villarreal ("Villarreal") appeals the
district court's order dismissing his complaint for failure to
state a claim under either the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Villarreal alleges that
when he was a pretrial detainee in the Gadsden County Correctional
Facility ("GCCF"), Sheriff Woodham required him to perform
translation services for other inmates, medical personnel, and
court personnel. Villarreal contends that Sheriff Woodham told him
that the Sheriff's Department would compensate him for his
services, but he never received any compensation. In an issue of
first impression for our circuit, we hold that pretrial detainees
who perform services at the direction of correction officials and
for the benefit of the correctional facility are not covered under
*
Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior U.S. District
Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
the FLSA. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
DISCUSSION
This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim, accepting all allegations in the
complaint as true and construing the facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Harper v. Thomas, 988 F.2d 101, 103
(11th Cir.1993). A district court may not dismiss a complaint
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Pataula Elec. Membership Corp. v. Whitworth, 951 F.2d
1238, 1240 (11th Cir.1992) (quotations omitted). Additionally,
"[a] determination of employment status under the FLSA ... is a
question of law subject to de novo review." Antenor v. D & S
Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1996).1
FLSA Claim
Congress enacted the FLSA to eliminate "in industries engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, ... labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being
1
After hearing oral argument, we raised sua sponte the
question of whether we had jurisdiction over this appeal. See
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir.1986). We
specifically questioned our jurisdiction over the County and the
sheriff in his individual capacity. After requesting
supplemental briefing by the parties, we are convinced that we
have jurisdiction. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S. Ct. 568, 572-73, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977)
(jurisdiction over the County); Hufford v. Rodgers, 912 F.2d
1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir.1990) (jurisdiction over the sheriff);
and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-85, 106
S. Ct. 1292, 1298-1301, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986) (jurisdiction over
the parties with respect to Villarreal's § 1983 claim).
of workers" because such conditions "constitute[ ] an unfair method
of competition in commerce[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). In general,
work constitutes employment when there is an expectation of in-kind
benefits in exchange for services. See Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 & 303-04, 105
S. Ct. 1953, 1961 & 1962-63, 85 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1985).
The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA apply only to workers
who are "employees" within the meaning of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
206(a)(1). Under the FLSA, an "employee" is defined as "any
individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An
"employer" includes "any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes
a public agency,...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). To "employ" is defined
as to "suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Supreme
Court has held that courts should apply these terms in light of the
"economic reality" of the relationship between the parties.
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S. Ct.
933, 936-37, 6 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1961).
The economic reality test includes inquiries into:
whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and
fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee
work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the
rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment
records.
Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470
(9th Cir.1983). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015-16, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016
(1985), the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2474, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245
(1976), which had erected a bar to the application of the federal
minimum wage to state employees. In overruling Usery, the Court
opened the possibility that prison authorities might be deemed FLSA
employers if the Bonnette factors were literally applied. The
first post-Garcia court of appeals decision addressing the
relationship between prison labor and the FLSA applied an economic
reality test to the facts of its case in light of the policies
behind the FLSA and held that the labor in question was covered by
the Act. See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554 (5th Cir.1990).
In Watson, inmates in a sheriff's custody were assigned to
work for a construction company owned by the sheriff's daughter and
son-in-law. The construction company used inmate labor and
subcontractors to perform the work. The inmates were paid twenty
dollars a day. The district court applied theBonnette factors and
concluded that the inmates were not employees under the FLSA. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, concentrating on the economic reality of
the relationship in light of the policies underlying the FLSA. The
court noted that the construction company received the benefit of
the labor in the private economy without having to pay FLSA wages.
The court found that such competition tended to undermine
compliance with the FLSA. "Such a situation is fraught with the
very problems that FLSA was drafted to prevent—grossly unfair
competition among employers and employees alike." Watson, 909 F.2d
at 1555.
Decisions subsequent to Watson universally have denied FLSA
wages to prisoners, although the factual contexts of those
decisions differ from that in Watson. These cases generally have
involved inmates working for prison authorities or for private
employers within the prison compound. See, e.g., Gambetta v.
Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc.,
No. 96-4253 ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir., May 15, 1997); Danneskjold v.
Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2nd Cir.1996); Reimonenq v. Foti, 72
F.3d 472, 475 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996); Henthorn v. Department of Navy,
29 F.3d 682, 684-87 (D.C.Cir.1994); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d
976, 980 (8th Cir.1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392-98
(9th Cir.1993) (en banc); Franks v. Oklahoma State Indus., 7 F.3d
971, 972 (10th Cir.1993); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d
131, 133 (4th Cir.1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st
Cir.1992); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th
Cir.1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320,
1325 (9th Cir.1991).
Our sister circuits have concluded that the underlying
policies of the FLSA mandate that prisoners not be included as
"employees" under the FLSA. Moreover, these decisions recognize
that, although prisoners do not fall within the FLSA's list of
exempted workers,2 there is no evidence of Congressional intent to
include prisoners as employees. Finally, these decisions note that
the "economic reality" test does not apply in the inmate-jailer
context because the FLSA presupposes a free-labor situation
constrained by the Thirteenth Amendment, which does not apply to
convicted inmates. By so holding, our sister circuits have adopted
a broader approach to situations involving the FLSA and prisoners.
This approach focuses on the economic reality of the situation as
2
See 29 U.S.C. § 213.
a whole. We agree with this approach and adopt the reasoning
articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809-12,
in rejecting the Bonnette four factor standard in the prison
context.
Thus, numerous courts have addressed the issue of whether a
convicted prisoner is an "employee" under the FLSA. However, no
court of appeals has addressed the specific issue with which we are
presented: whether a pretrial detainee is an "employee" under the
FLSA. Nevertheless, we find these cases helpful because pretrial
detainees are similar to convicted prisoners in that they are
incarcerated and are under the supervision and control of a
governmental entity. Alvarado Guevara v. I.N.S., 902 F.2d 394, 396
(5th Cir.1990). Clearly, pretrial detainees are in a custodial
relationship like convicted prisoners. Correctional facilities
provide pretrial detainees with their everyday needs such as food,
shelter, and clothing. Convicted prisoners are likewise provided
these same basic needs. Additionally, like convicted prisoners,
pretrial detainees suffer from loss of freedom of choice and
privacy due to the nature of their confinement. In light of these
similarities, we deem persuasive the cases addressing the
applicability of the FLSA to convicted inmates.
One case which is analogous to the present one is Danneskjold,
82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.1996). In that case, a consortium hired inmate
Danneskjold to tutor other inmates. For his work, the correctional
facility paid Danneskjold between $.95 and $1.45 per day in
accordance with the facility's inmate wage system. Danneskjold
filed suit alleging that he was a FLSA employee and was entitled to
receive the federal minimum wage. The district court granted the
facility's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals
affirmed. The Second Circuit rejected the four-part
Bonnette test,
finding that it did not involve prison labor and was not
well-suited to determining the status of prison labor under the
FLSA. The court concluded that prison labor for the prison is not
subject to the FLSA. The court stated:
The relationship is not one of employment; prisoners are
taken out of the national economy; ...; prisoners' living
standards are determined by what the prison provides; and
most such labor does not compete with private employers.
....
As a result, no Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power
of a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform
services for the institution without paying the minimum wage.
Prisoners may thus be ordered to cook, staff the library,
perform janitorial services, work in the laundry, or carry
ou[t] numerous other tasks that serve various institutional
missions of the prison, such as recreation, care and
maintenance of the facility, or rehabilitation. Such work
occupies prisoners' time that might otherwise be filled by
mischief; it trains prisoners in the discipline and skills of
work; and it is a method of seeing that prisoners bear a cost
of their incarceration.
Id. at 42-43. The court concluded that as long as the labor
produces goods and services utilized by the prison, prisoners'
labor is not subject to the FLSA. Id. at 43.
As in Danneskjold, Villarreal's translation services were
performed for the benefit of the correctional institution.
Villarreal's job, like Danneskjold's, was cerebral in nature and
posed no risk of harm to him. Moreover, Villarreal's relationship
with the Sheriff and the GCCF was a custodial relationship, not an
employment relationship. Villarreal could not walk off the job
site at the end of the day. Villarreal performed his services for
the benefit of the correctional facility and other pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners. There was no "bargained-for"
exchange of labor which occurs in a true employer—employee
relationship. Gilbreath, 931 F.2d at 1325.
Focusing on the economic reality of the situation in its
entirety, we conclude that Villarreal is not an "employee" under
the FLSA. The purpose of the FLSA is to protect the standard of
living and general well-being of the American worker. Because the
correctional facility meets Villarreal's needs, his "standard of
living" is protected. In sum, "the more indicia of traditional,
free-market employment the relationship between the prisoner and
his putative "employer' bears, the more likely it is that the FLSA
will govern the employment relationship." Henthorn, 29 F.3d at
686. Villarreal's situation does not bear any indicia of
traditional free-market employment contemplated under the FLSA.
Accordingly, we hold that Villarreal and other pretrial detainees
in similar circumstances are not entitled to the protection of the
FLSA minimum wage requirement.
Eighth Amendment violation
Villarreal also claims that his forced performance of
translation services constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. His claim is more properly
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment following the Supreme
Court's pronouncement on the treatment of pretrial detainees in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1871-72
& n. 16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979).
Whether a restriction or condition accompanying pretrial
detention is punishment turns on whether the restriction or
condition is reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective. Id. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74. "[A]s a matter of
due process, pre[ ]trial detainees may suffer no more restrictions
than are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence at trial."
Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir.1976). A necessary
restriction is the confinement of the pretrial detainee. Bell, 441
U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. "Loss of freedom of choice and
privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility."
Id. A court "must decide whether the disability [placed on the
pretrial detainee] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or
whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose." Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. "[I]f a particular
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to "punishment.' " Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at
1874.
To qualify as cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that is
not inherently punitive must involve more than an ordinary lack of
due care for a prisoner's safety or welfare. See Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-22, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084-86, 89 L. Ed. 2d
251 (1986). There is no evidence that Sheriff Woodham's intent in
requesting that Villarreal perform these translation services was
punitive in nature. Also, these services were not restrictions
placed upon Villarreal. We can assume that the performance of
these services actually served to occupy Villarreal's time, keep
him out of trouble, and allow him interaction with other inmates
and various individuals (e.g., doctors, probation officers, and
other court personnel). Most significantly, the cerebral task of
language translation posed no risk to Villarreal's safety or
welfare.3 Accordingly, we see no Eighth Amendment violation in
this case.4
CONCLUSION
We agree with the district court that Villarreal does not
state a claim under either the FLSA or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
3
Villarreal claims that while engaging in translation
services, other inmates could threaten him or impose harm on him;
however, Villarreal fails to support this allegation with any
specific instance of threat.
4
Villarreal also alleges that his forced translation
services constitute involuntary servitude and therefore violate
his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. This issue was not
presented to the district court and is therefore not properly
preserved for our review. FDIC v. Verex Assur., Inc., 3 F.3d
391, 395 (11th Cir.1993).