United States v. Reuben Thaddeus Coffie

Case: 12-13693 Date Filed: 06/13/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13693
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:03-cr-00171-EAK-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REUBEN THADDEUS COFFIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 23, 2013)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reuben Thaddeus Coffie appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, Coffie argues
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that the district court erred in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion because, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.
2685 (2011), a career offender who received a departure and was sentenced below
the guideline range for career offenders is eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence
reduction under Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
“[W]e review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the
scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. White,
305 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002). We are bound by the opinion of a prior
panel until the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc overrules that opinion’s
holding. United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 568 (2012).
In United States v. Moore, we faced the question of whether defendants who
were sentenced as career offenders under United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 4B1.1 were eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief in light of Amendment 706, which,
like Amendment 750, lowered the base offense levels for certain quantities of
crack cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). 541 F.3d 1323, 1325–26 (11th Cir.
2008). Each of the Moore defendants’ base offense level was calculated pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, but then each defendant’s offense level was adjusted because
they were classified as career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Id. at 1335.
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We held that the defendants did not qualify for § 3582(c)(2) relief because
Amendment 706 had no effect on their applicable guideline ranges, which were
calculated based on their career offender classification under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Id.
at 1327–30. This determination even applied to defendant Moore who had been
sentenced below the career offender guideline range due to his substantial
assistance. Id. at 1330.
Coffie argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman has
“undermined Moore to the point of abrogation.” However, this argument has been
foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2012). See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 488 F. App’x 354, 354–55 (11th
Cir. 2012) (holding that Lawson foreclosed the defendant’s argument that Freeman
effectively undermined Moore and that Amendment 750, which only altered the
defendant’s base offense level, did not affect the sentence he received pursuant to
the career-offender guidelines).
In Freeman, the Supreme Court explained that, where a Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea was based on the Guidelines, the defendant
was eligible to seek a reduction under § 3582(c)(2). 131 S. Ct. at 2695 (plurality
opinion). In Lawson we specifically addressed Freeman’s impact on Moore and
held that Moore remained binding precedent. 686 F.3d at 1321. We explained that
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Freeman did not “address[] defendants who were assigned a base offense level
under one guideline section, but who were ultimately assigned a total offense level
and guideline range under § 4B1.1.” Id. “Thus, Freeman [was] not ‘clearly on
point’ to the issue that arose in Moore.” Id. We have repeatedly affirmed this
determination. See e.g., United States v. Clayton, 477 F. App’x 644, 646–47
(11th Cir. 2012) (determining that the district court did not err by not applying
Freeman because “there is no binding authority applying the reasoning of Freeman
to the context of a career offender seeking § 3582 (c)(2) relief”).
It is immaterial that, unlike the defendant in Lawson, Coffie was not
sentenced within the career offender guideline range due to a departure for
substantial assistance. Coffie’s guideline range was still based on his career
offender status even though the court later departed from the guideline range based
on Coffie’s substantial assistance. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330; United States v.
Clark, 485 F. App’x 407, 410 (citing United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203 (11th
Cir. 2012) in support of the proposition that neither Amendment 750 nor 759
changed the fact that the defendant’s guideline range was the career offender
guideline range even though he later received a substantial assistance departure).
Therefore, Amendment 750 “did not alter the sentencing range upon which
[Coffie’s] sentence was based.” See Lawson, 686 F.3d at 1321 (internal quotation
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marks and alteration omitted). Further, there is no indication that the crack cocaine
guideline calculation influenced the district court’s departure.
Therefore, based on a prior precedent, the district court did not err in
denying Coffie’s § 3582(c)(2) motion on the ground Amendment 750 did not
lower his applicable guideline range.
AFFIRMED.
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