United States v. Junior Sylvin

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-14270
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUNIOR SYLVIN,
a.k.a. Rah Rah,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20264-JLK-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Junior Sylvin, a federal prisoner serving a
211-month sentence for firearm and drug offenses, appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate re-
lease under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by § 603(b) of
the First Step Act of 2018. 1 On appeal, Sylvin argues that extraor-
dinary and compelling reasons warrant his release, specifically the
COVID-19 health crisis. He also contends that the district court
failed to consider his mitigating arguments and erred by consider-
ing only the seriousness of his underlying offense and his leader-
ship role enhancement to the exclusion of the remaining 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in denying his motion. After reading the
1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“First Step
Act”).
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20-14270 Opinion of the Court 3
parties’ briefs and reviewing the record, we affirm the district
court’s order denying Sylvin’s motion for compassionate release.
I.
We review a district court’s order denying a prisoner’s 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,
follows improper procedures in making the determination, or
makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). A district court also abuses its discretion when it
fails to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors when Congress
has expressly required it. United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180,
1183-84 (11th Cir. 2021).
II.
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under
§ 3582(c)’s provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Jones,
962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). As amended by § 603(b) of
the First Step Act, that section now provides, in relevant part,
that:
the court, upon motion of the Director of the
[BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the
defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the war-
den of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earli-
er, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons war-
rant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements is-
sued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In other words, the district court
may deny relief due to the fact the defendant is not statutorily eli-
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20-14270 Opinion of the Court 5
gible because no extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, or
because relief would be inappropriate under the Section 3553(a)
factors, or (as the district court did in this case) for both reasons.
The policy statement applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) is found
in § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In addition to determining
that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction,
§ 1B1.13 states that the district court must also determine that the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of others or to the com-
munity, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and that the reduction
is consistent with the policy statement. Id. § 1B1.13(2), (3).
As relevant here, the commentary lists a defendant’s medi-
cal condition as possible “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
warranting a sentence reduction. Id. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1). A
defendant’s medical condition may warrant a sentence reduction
if he (1) has a terminal disease, or (2) is suffering from a physical
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
or mental condition that diminishes his ability to provide self-care
in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. Id.,
comment. (n.1(A)). Deteriorating mental or physical health re-
sulting from the aging process also may constitute an extraordi-
nary or compelling reason for granting a sentence reduction. Id.
A prisoner’s rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and
compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. Id., com-
ment. (n.3). In a recent opinion, we concluded that the policy
statement in § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions filed under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prisoners, and thus, dis-
trict courts cannot reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) unless
it would be consistent with § 1B1.13. United States v. Bryant, 996
F.3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021).
We have also held that, at least in cases where extraordi-
nary or compelling circumstances exist, an order granting or
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20-14270 Opinion of the Court 7
denying compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must indi-
cate that the district court has considered “all applicable § 3553(a)
factors.” Cook, 998 F.3d at 1184. Under § 3553(a), a district
court’s sentence must be sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary, to achieve the goals of sentencing, which are: reflecting the
seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, provid-
ing just punishment, deterring future criminal conduct, protecting
the public, and providing the defendant with any needed training
or treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Section 3553(a) also requires
district courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sen-
tences available, the Sentencing Guidelines, any pertinent policy
statement, the need to avoid disparate sentences, and the need to
provide restitution to any victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
The weight given to any of the § 3553(a) factors is commit-
ted to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v.
Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). Even so, “[a] dis-
trict court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consider-
ation to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
(3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper
factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
In situations where consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is
mandatory, district courts do not need to address “each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evidence.” United States
v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021). Instead, an
acknowledgement by the district court that it considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient. Id. at
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20-14270 Opinion of the Court 9
1354-55. A sentence may be affirmed if the record indicates that
the district court considered some of the factors. See United
States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
appellant’s sentence because, even though the district court did
not explicitly state that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the
record showed that it considered several of them because it con-
sidered several facts and documents that implicated the factors);
see also United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that, in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) mo-
tion, the district court’s “short” order denying resentencing was
sufficient because the court stated that it had reviewed the record
and the parties’ filings, which in turn discussed the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, and because the same judge presided over the defendant’s
original sentencing and resentencing).
III.
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10 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
As an initial matter, Sylvin has abandoned any challenge to
the district court’s order denying his request for reconsideration
of the denial of his compassionate release motion because he has
failed to brief this issue on appeal. Thus, we only address the
court’s order denying him compassionate release. See United
States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing that we consider an argument abandoned when a defendant
offers no argument on the issue on appeal).
Our review of the record convinces us that the district
court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. Although the dis-
trict court did not have to address every § 3553(a) factor, it ex-
pressly acknowledged the factors and the parties’ filings. See Tay-
lor, 997 F.3d at 1354-55. Further, assigning more weight to the
seriousness of Sylvin’s offense more than the other factors was
within the district court’s discretion, and the record reflects that it
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20-14270 Opinion of the Court 11
considered several § 3553(a) factors, given its statements and the
parties’ filings below. Contrary to his contentions, Sylvin’s role
enhancement is relevant to § 3553(a) because it speaks directly to
the nature and circumstances of his offense. Additionally, the dis-
trict court specifically mentioned its dissatisfaction that the safety
of the public would be adequately protected if Sylvin were to be
released. Pursuant to the guidelines, a district court should not
reduce a sentence if a defendant poses a danger to the safety of
any person or the community. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2).
As to his claim that the district court erred in not address-
ing the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), Sylvin cites no
authority requiring the court, in addressing a motion for compas-
sionate release, to discuss the PSI specifically. Moreover, the rec-
ord reflects that the same judge who denied Sylvin’s motion also
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12 Opinion of the Court 20-14270
imposed his sentence, which further indicates that the court con-
sidered the appropriate factors and was familiar with Sylvin’s case.
Based on the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors and in denying Sylvin’s motion. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order denying Sylvin’s motion for com-
passionate release.
AFFIRMED.