United States v. Clint Lavaston Walker

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15624 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 30, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 6:08-cr-00076-SLB-TMP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLINT LAVASTON WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 30, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clint Lavaston Walker appeals his 120-month sentence, the maximum
statutorily available sentence and an upward variance of more than twice the
maximum suggested by the Guidelines, after pleading guilty to one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On
appeal, Walker argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because
the court, in fashioning its sentence, looked solely to his history and characteristics
to the exclusion of the other factors the court is required to consider under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Walker also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court placed too much weight on his criminal
history and merely used the offense of conviction as a pretext to sentence him for
offenses for which he had already been sentenced. Lastly, Walker contends that
the reasons given by the district court in support of its decision to impose a
variance from the guidelines were not sufficiently compelling, especially in light
of the degree of the variance.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011). We will reverse a sentence under
that standard only if the district court has made a clear error of judgment. Id. at
1189. When conducting this review, we must take into account the totality of the
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facts and circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the guideline
range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We will
not reverse merely because we believe that a different sentence might have been
more appropriate. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191. The appellant bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
sentencing is a two-step process that requires the district court first to “consult the
Guidelines and correctly calculate the range provided by the Guidelines,” then to
consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine a reasonable sentence.
Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Those factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need
to protect the public; (5) the kinds of sentences available; (6) the sentencing
guideline range; (7) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(8) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (9) the need to
provide restitution to the victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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The district court commits a clear error of judgment if it weighs the
§ 3553(a) factors unreasonably, thus arriving at a sentence that does not achieve
the statutory purposes of sentencing. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The court may also
abuse its discretion by failing to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight, or by giving significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor. Id.Nonetheless, a district court does not abuse its discretion when it merely attaches
“great weight” to a single, permissible factor or set of factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at56–59, 128 S. Ct. at 600–02.
The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to substantive reasonableness
review “[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. In general, “a major
departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one.” Id. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Still, due deference is owed to “the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance,” and no presumption of unreasonableness attaches merely because a
sentence is outside of the guidelines range. Id. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
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Walker’s 120-month sentence was both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. As to procedural reasonableness, the district court did not focus on
Walker’s criminal history to the exclusion of the other § 3553(a) factors, but
instead used Walker’s criminal history to help inform its decision about how best
to further the § 3553(a) statutory goals in this case. The court may have chosen to
highlight certain § 3553(a) factors as being especially salient to its task in
fashioning a sentence, but the court does not abuse its discretion by placing special
emphasis on a particular factor or set of factors in making its sentencing
determination. Gall, 552 U.S. at 56–59, 128 S. Ct. at 600–02.
As to substantive reasonableness, although the sentence imposed by the
court does represent a “major departure” from the range suggested by the
Guidelines, the decision of the district court finding that a “significant
justification” supported the variance was not unreasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50,
128 S. Ct. at 597. The court made specific findings regarding the applicability of a
number of the § 3553(a) factors to its sentencing decision, giving particular
importance to its conclusion that Walker’s criminal history demonstrated “that
deterrence is the only effective tool to protect the public.” Such a concern with
the deterrent effect of a sentence is clearly a statutorily permissible factor for a
court to consider under § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).
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Lastly, the district court was not unreasonable in its weighing of the
§ 3553(a) factors, as consideration of “the history and characteristics of the
defendant” is also clearly appropriate when fashioning a sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1). The court at no point indicated that the sentences Walker had
received for his prior offenses were inappropriately lenient or that an above
guidelines sentence was warranted here solely because of his history. Walker has
not met his burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied as moot.
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