William Adams v. Gregory Stokes

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-13196
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cv-01104-ACC-KRS
WILLIAM ADAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF ORMOND BEACH,
a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants,
GREGORY STOKES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 1, 2013)
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Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Stokes, an officer of the Ormond Beach Police Department
(“OBPD”) in Volusia County, Florida, appeals the district court’s ruling denying
him summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds in William Adams’s pro se
civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stokes’s motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
I.
In Adams’s verified complaint, he stated that he agreed to remodel the home
of Kenneth King, and Adams completed a substantial amount of work on the
home. However, Adams stopped working on the home when King refused to pay
him for agreed-upon work. Adams stated that, with Stokes’s assistance, King filed
a complaint against Adams at the OBPD, and King claimed in the complaint that
Adams never performed any work on the home, despite King paying Adams
$2,500. As a result of King’s false complaint, Stokes submitted an affidavit in
May 2008 that requested Adams’s arrest for grand theft and exploitation of an
elderly person, and Adams was arrested. The Florida State Attorney’s Office
charged Adams with grand theft, but later dismissed the charges. Adams claimed
that his constitutional rights were violated by King and Stokes fabricating
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evidence, and Adams raised a § 1983 conspiracy claim and a
malicious-prosecution claim against King and Stokes.
Stokes filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking qualified immunity as
to Adams’s federal claims, and Stokes argued that he had arguable probable cause
to arrest Adams. According to Stokes, he called Adams on the telephone in April
2008 to investigate King’s complaint with the OBPD, and Adams stated that he
would repay King the money owed in two weeks. In May 2008, King returned to
the OBPD and indicated that Adams had not repaid King the money owed. Thus,
Stokes completed an affidavit summarizing the contents of his earlier telephone
conversation with Adams and recommending that Adams be charged with grand
theft and exploitation of the elderly, and Stokes forwarded the affidavit to the State
Attorney.
Adams opposed Stokes’s summary judgment motion and disputed the
contents of the telephone conversation. According to Adams, he had informed
Stokes that “work was stopped because King refused to compensate [Adams] for
extra completed work.” Adams then indicated that he would have to call Stokes
back after obtaining Adams’s paperwork concerning the matter. Thus, based on
the April 2008 telephone conversation, Adams argued that Stokes could not have
had arguable probable cause to believe that Adams had committed grand theft or
exploitation of the elderly.
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The district court granted Stokes’s motion for summary judgment as to
Adams’s claims against Stokes in his official capacity, but denied Stokes’s motion
as to the claims against him in his individual capacity because Adams had
demonstrated that his clearly-established constitutional rights were violated. The
court found that, based on Adams’s version of events, Stokes could not have
reasonably believed that Adams committed the relevant offenses because Adams
“told Officer Stokes that he performed work at King’s property in exchange for the
$2,500.” Thus, neither actual nor arguable probable cause existed for Adams’s
arrest, and Stokes was not entitled to qualified immunity.
II.
On appeal, Stokes argues that the district court’s conclusion—that arguable
probable cause did not exist for the arrest of Adams—was based on an erroneous
factual premise. Specifically, the court found that Adams had informed Stokes that
Adams had performed work in exchange for $2,500, but Adams admitted in his
deposition that he did not actually perform the contracted-for work. Rather,
Adams stated that he simply told Stokes that King owed him money and that
Adams would obtain his paperwork before discussing the matter further with
Stokes. Next, Stokes argues that, even based on Adams’s version of the facts,
there was at least arguable probable cause for Stokes to complete the May 2008
affidavit that indicated that Adams should be charged with grand theft and
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exploitation of the elderly based on the facts that Stokes knew in 2008. Stokes
further argues that Adams’s version of events was not corroborated by any other
evidence, and thus, Adams’s testimony alone should not be the basis for defeating
Stokes’s qualified-immunity defense.1
We review de novo the district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion based on qualified immunity, resolving all issues of material fact in favor
of the plaintiff and then addressing the legal question of whether the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity under the plaintiff’s version of the facts. Case v.
Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2009). With the facts so construed,
we have the plaintiff’s best case before us, and thus, genuine disputes as to
material fact are not a factor in our analysis of qualified immunity. Id. at 1325; see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Generally, a plaintiff’s testimony cannot be discounted on
summary judgment unless it is “blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly
inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that
could not have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of
nature.” Feliciano, No. 12-11397, manuscript op. at 3-4, 18-19.
1
Contrary to Adams’s argument, we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal
because this appeal is based, in part, on a question of law, that is, whether the district court erred
in determining that Stokes was not entitled to qualified immunity under a given set of facts. See
Feliciano v. Acosta, No. 12-11397, manuscript op. at 12 n.3 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2013) (providing
that we have jurisdiction where the district court’s denial of qualified immunity is based, even in
part, on a question of law). Moreover, in the course of deciding an interlocutory appeal, we may
resolve any factual issues that are part of the core legal issues, including whether the district
court properly viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
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When asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, an official
must first establish that he was engaged in a discretionary function when he
performed the acts at issue in the plaintiff’s complaint. Holloman ex rel. Holloman
v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2004). If the official satisfies his
burden of proof to show that he was engaged in a discretionary function, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 1264. To do so, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant
violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation. Id. If the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant may not obtain
summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. Id.
A plaintiff can show a violation of the Fourth Amendment, made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, by showing that he was arrested
without probable cause. Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 n.15 (11th
Cir. 2010). Probable cause is defined as facts and circumstances that would lead a
prudent man to believe that the suspect had committed or was committing an
offense. Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). An
officer’s lack of corroboration through independent police work is noteworthy in
the probable cause analysis. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1229
(11th Cir. 2004).
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To receive qualified immunity, an officer need only have arguable probable
cause to arrest, rather than actual probable cause. Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257.
However, where an officer fabricates false statements to establish probable cause
or arguable probable cause, we have held that reasonable officers in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defendant officer cannot
believe that probable cause existed for the arrest. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233.
Similarly, an officer violates the Constitution where he prepares a warrant affidavit
that contains omissions made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the
accuracy of the affidavit, where inclusion of the omitted facts would have
prevented a finding of probable cause. See Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321,
1326-27 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff can raise an inference of recklessness by
pointing to facts omitted from the affidavit that are clearly critical to a finding of
probable cause. Id. at 1327.
Under Florida law, a person commits the felony offense of grand theft, inter
alia, where he knowingly obtains or uses the property of another with the intent to
permanently or temporarily deprive the person of a right to the property and causes
damage to the property in excess of $300. Fla.Stat. § 812.014(1)-(2). “Obtains or
uses” includes obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future
act, or a false promise. Fla.Stat. § 812.012(3)(c). Florida case law provides that,
to prove grand theft, the state must establish that the defendant had the requisite
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criminal intent at the time of the taking. See Stramaglia v. State, 603 So. 2d 536,
537-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). As Florida case law illustrates, a defendant does
not commit grand theft where he intended to perform a contract at the time he
entered into the contract. See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 453 So. 2d 1139, 1140-43
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (providing that the state had not proven intent to commit
grand theft because, although a defendant did not return any of a homeowner’s
down payment on a construction contract, despite not completing any portion of
the contract, the defendant intended to perform the contract when he entered into it,
as he had purchased some materials and ordered others). The Florida courts have
indicated that, actual performance of some portion of the contract, even where
minimal, negates an intent not to perform a contract. Segal v. State, 98 So. 3d 739,
744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Thus, where the evidence essentially shows a
contractual undertaking that the defendant failed to complete, Florida courts treat it
as a civil matter, as contractual cases often do not lend themselves to a conclusion
that felonious intent is present at the inception of the agreement. Id.
The felony offense of exploitation of an elderly person occurs, inter alia,
where a person who has a business relationship with an elderly person, by
deception or intimidation, obtains or uses an elderly person’s funds with the intent
to temporarily or permanently deprive the elderly person of the use, benefit, or
possession of the funds. Fla.Stat. § 825.103(1)-(2). The state must prove that the
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defendant used deception or intimidation to obtain the elderly person’s funds with
the intent to deprive the individual of those funds. See Ellison v. State, 983 So. 2d
1205, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Here, the district court misstated the evidence when it stated that Adams told
Stokes that Adams “performed the work at King’s property in exchange for the
$2,500.” Rather, in Adams’s affidavit that he filed in opposition to Stokes’s
motion for summary judgment, Adams stated that he told Stokes that Adams
stopped working at King’s residence “because King refused to compensate
[Adams] for extra completed work.” However, this statement by Adams did not
provide Stokes with arguable probable cause to believe that Adams had committed
grand theft or exploitation of the elderly, as no reasonable officer, after hearing
Adams’s statement could believe that Adams had committed the relevant offenses
under Florida law. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257. Adams’s statement showed that
he intended to perform the contract at the time he entered into the contract and
showed that he did not deceive King at the time Adams obtained King’s money.
There is no evidence that Stokes asked King about whether King was aware of a
dispute about money for additional work outside the scope of the contract. Further,
there is no evidence showing that Stokes ever attempted to call Adams back in
May 2008 to inquire further into King’s complaint, despite Stokes’s ability to
contact Adams in April 2008. In their answers to Adams’s interrogatories, Stokes
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and King state that Stokes investigated King’s complaint by visiting King’s home.
However, Stokes does not mention this fact in his affidavit filed in support of his
summary judgment motion or in the information that he forwarded to the State
Attorney’s Office. Further, based on the evidence in this case, it is unclear what
Stokes discovered upon visiting King’s home and whether his investigation
supported King’s complaint or Adams’s version of the events.
By sending the May 2008 affidavit—that contained false information and
omitted other information that appears to have been critical to establishing actual
or arguable probable cause and that recommended that Adams be charged with
grand theft and exploitation of the elderly—to the State Attorney’s Office, Stokes
violated Adams’s clearly-established Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures, as Adams was arrested on the basis of the information in the
affidavit. See Brown, 608 F.3d at 734 n.15; see also Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257.
Although Stokes argues that Adams’s testimony alone should not be sufficient to
defeat summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, a case should be put to
the jury where there is any genuine issue of material fact, even where the issue is
created solely by the testimony of the party. See Feliciano, No. 12-11397,
manuscript op. at 3-4 (noting the “modern rule” that a case should be put to the
jury where there is any genuine issue of material fact, including one created solely
by the testimony of a party). Thus, at this stage in the proceedings, where we must
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accept Adams’s version of events as true, Stokes is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stokes’s
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
AFFIRMED.
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