United States v. David O. Edwards

Case: 12-14141 Date Filed: 11/18/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14141
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:03-cr-00249-SCB-EAJ-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID O. EDWARDS,
a.k.a. Dre,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 18, 2013)
Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David O. Edwards, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for reconsideration of an order granting in part his motion to reduce his
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sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Edwards raises two issues in his appeal.
First, Edwards argues that the district court failed to consider his post-sentencing
rehabilitation at his § 3582(c) proceeding, which could have led to a sentence
below the advisory guideline range. Second, Edwards argues that the district court
should have ordered the Bureau of Prisons to credit him for time served in pretrial
detention. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). Pro
se pleadings are construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Edwards’s first argument is that the district court failed to consider his post-
sentencing rehabilitation during his § 3582(c)(2) proceeding because it was too
focused on selecting a sentence that “mirrored” his original sentence. Edwards
suggests that if the district court had considered his rehabilitation, he would have
received a sentence below the amended guideline range.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that a district court may modify a term
of imprisonment that was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding
does not constitute a de novo resentencing, and “all original sentencing
determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range
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that has been amended since the original sentencing.” United States v. Bravo, 203
F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted); see also United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 1B1.10(b)(1) (providing that all other guidelines
determinations remain unaffected). In reducing a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), “a
district court may lower a defendant’s sentence below the amended guidelines
range only if the original sentence was below the original guidelines range because
the defendant provided substantial assistance to the government.” United States v.
Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012); see also USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’s motion
for reconsideration. First, the district court explicitly considered Edwards’s post-
sentencing rehabilitation in reducing his sentence. Indeed, the district court’s order
stated that the court had “considered public safety as well as post-sentencing
information in imposing this sentence.” Second, the district court was not
authorized to reduce Edwards’s sentence below his minimum amended guidelines
range. Section 1B1.10(b)(2) states that a court shall not reduce a defendant’s
sentence below the amended guideline range in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding unless it
reflects a defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities. See also Glover, 686
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F.3d at 1207. That being the case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Edwards’s motion for reconsideration. 1
Edwards’s second argument is that the district court should have granted his
motion for reconsideration because it failed to order the Bureau of Prisons to credit
him for time served in pretrial detention. This argument fails because a claim for
time-served credit is properly brought under § 2241 after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th
Cir. 2000). Because there is no indication that Edwards has exhausted his
administrative remedies, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to grant a motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d
1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that “the granting of credit for time served
is in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial, function”).
Based on the above, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
1
Edwards argues that the district court could have reduced his sentence under Pepper v. United
States, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). In Pepper, the Supreme Court held that when a
defendant’s sentence has been vacated on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider
and impose a below-guidelines-range sentence based on evidence of the defendant’s post-
sentencing rehabilitation. Id. at 1241. Pepper does not apply here, however, because Edwards’s
sentence was not set aside on direct appeal. Edwards instead sought a reduction in his sentence
in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Therefore, Pepper does not apply to this case.
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