Danny Williams v. Billy Brown

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
No. 08-16230 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00045-CV-6
DANNY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BILLY BROWN,
Jointly and Severally; Individual and
Official Capacities,
WAYNE JOHNSON,
Jointly and Severally; Individual and
Official Capacities,
BILLY TOMPKINS,
Jointly and Serverally; Individual and
Official Capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 10, 2009)
Before BIRCH, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Danny Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
with prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 inmate civil rights case. After a magistrate
judge screened the complaint, the district court dismissed all of Williams’s claims
on the merits save his claim for retaliatory transfer. Thereafter, the district court
dismissed the remaining claim as a sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Based upon a review of the record, we conclude that the district court’s
dismissal of Williams’s retaliatory transfer claim with prejudice as “malicious”
pursuant to § 1915(e) was too harsh a sanction. We affirm the dismissal of all
other claims except retaliatory transfer against Appellee Billy Brown only. While
we agree with the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s compensatory and
punitive damages claims because he failed to allege the requisite physical injury
under 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), the district court did not fully consider whether
Williams’s pro se complaint should be liberally construed to request nominal
damages. Accordingly, except as affirmed herein, we vacate the district court’s
judgment and remand solely as to Appellee Brown.
I.
A detailed recitation of the factual and procedural background is necessary
2
here.
On July 17, 2007, Williams, an inmate in a Georgia state prison, filed an
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy Warden Billy Brown, Deputy
Warden Wayne Johnson, and Warden Billy Tompkins, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights as well as various state law claims. In particular, Williams
alleged (1) retaliatory transfer, (2) denial of access to the courts, (3) deliberate
indifference to medical needs, (4) denial of due process, (5) libel under Georgia
state law, and (6) slander under Georgia state law. In support of his retaliatory
transfer claim, Williams alleged that in 1999, Brown opened his legal mail, and,
after Williams filed a grievance against Brown, he was transferred to another
prison. Williams was transferred back to Smith State Prison in 2004. On
September 7, 2005, while an inmate at Smith State Prison, Williams submitted a
grievance against the staff, primarily Brown, who Williams claimed forced him to
“get rid of” his legal materials. On September 15, 2005, Counselor Angie Henry
notified Brown of Williams’s grievance. On September 19, 2005, Brown
completed a witness statement. On September 22, 2005, Williams was transferred
to Ware State Prison. Although Williams had previously requested and received
approval for a positive transfer closer to his home, Williams’s complaint alleged
that “Brown, Johnson, and Tompkins subjected [Williams] to a retaliatory negative
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transfer to a facility twice as far from [Williams’s] family. . . .”
Before service upon the defendants, a magistrate judge screened the
complaint. On October 24, 2007, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommendation, advising that Williams’s claims for denial of access
to the courts, deliberate indifference to medical needs, denial of due process, libel,
and slander should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Williams v. Brown,
No. CV607-045, 2007 WL 3143714, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2007). That left only
Williams’s retaliatory transfer claim.
On December 7, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, in which
they argued, inter alia, that the district court should dismiss Williams’s complaint
as “malicious” because he abused the judicial process by not disclosing all his
previously filed lawsuits.1 Specifically, the defendants maintained that Williams
failed to disclose the following: (1) Williams v. Wetherington, CA 1:02-cv-0126-
WLS (M.D. Ga), a civil lawsuit that the district court dismissed for Williams’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that we dismissed as frivolous on
appeal; (2) Williams v. Upton, CA 1:202-cv-00177 (S.D. Ga.), a habeas petition
1
Upon the filing of a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, a prisoner must complete a form entitled, “Form To Be Used By
Prisoners In Filing A Complaint Under The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.” The question at issue asks the
following: “As to any lawsuit filed in federal court where you were allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis, was any suit dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state
a claim?” Under penalty of perjury, Williams answered no.
4
dismissed as untimely; (3) Williams v. Battle, CA 5:04-cv-00194 (M.D. Ga.), a
habeas petition voluntarily dismissed by Williams; (4) Williams v. Donald
(originally filed as Williams v. Chatman), CA 5:01-cv-00292-HL (M.D. Ga), a
civil lawsuit dismissed, in part, by the district court as frivolous on March 7, 2002.2
The defendants conceded, however, that neither Battle, Upton, nor Donald
constitute a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).3 On February 1, 2008, the
magistrate judge ordered Williams to show cause why his complaint should not be
dismissed as a sanction for failure to disclose all prior cases and frivolity
dismissals on the prisoner civil complaint form. Specifically, the magistrate judge
referenced only two cases, Donald (originally Chatman) and Wetherington.4 In
response, Williams asserted that he truthfully responded to the questions on the
civil complaint form to the best of his ability. He argued that, at the time he filed
2
Williams alleged 8 claims against 15 named defendants. On appeal, we affirmed the
district court’s ruling as to six of the eight claims, but reversed and remanded the case as to parts
of two claims. See Williams v. Chatman, No. 02-11850, 104 F. App’x 150 (11th Cir. Apr. 30,
2004) (per curiam). One claim, that plaintiff had been transferred in retaliation for filing
grievances and federal complaints, was subsequently dismissed with prejudice by Williams. On
remand, the district court granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
3
Section 1915(g) provides that no incarcerated prisoner shall bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions . . . brought
an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
4
While the magistrate judge referenced literally Chatman and Donald in the order, which
appear to be the same case, the appellate number listed by the magistrate judge (No. 05-15803)
refers actually to Wetherington.
5
his complaint, Donald was still pending and, although Wetherington was dismissed
as frivolous on appeal, Williams stated that the complaint asked only about any
“lawsuits” dismissed as frivolous, not appeals. Likewise, with respect to Upton
and Battle, Williams again explained that he did not believe the habeas petitions
constituted “lawsuits” for the purposes of the civil complaint form. On September
12, 2008, the magistrate judge issued a second Report & Recommendation. First,
the magistrate judge advised that Williams’s complaint should not be dismissed as
a sanction pursuant to § 1915(e): “[b]ecause the Court believes that Williams did
not intend to mislead the Court in his responses on the civil complaint form, the
Court is of the opinion that dismissing the case based on his omissions would be
too harsh a sanction.” Williams v. Brown, No. CV607-045, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Ga.
Sept, 12, 2008). Next, the magistrate judge determined that the defendants’ motion
to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. As to retaliatory transfer,
the magistrate judge concluded that Williams stated a claim for retaliatory transfer
against all defendants and that any qualified immunity defense was meritless
because “transferring an inmate in retaliation for filing grievances violates his
clearly established First Amendment rights.” Id. at 10 (citations omitted). As to
damages, the magistrate judge concluded that Eleventh Amendment immunized the
defendants from damages in their official capacities and that “Williams is not
6
entitled to compensatory or punitive damages against them in their individual
capacities since he has not shown an actual physical injury caused by the transfer.”
Id. at 11. In a footnote, the magistrate judge noted the possibility of nominal
damages, even in the absence of a physical injury. See id. at 13 n.5. Lastly, the
magistrate judge determined that injunctive relief remained a viable form of relief
for Williams. Both parties filed objections to the second Report &
Recommendation.
On October 1, 2008, the district court rejected the magistrate judge’s second
Report & Recommendation, sustained the defendants’ objections, and granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. In an one-page “Order,” the district court explained
its reasoning:
Danny Williams has engaged in a clear and persistent
pattern of deceit in his court filings. The Court also
agrees that plaintiff’s failure to allege any physical injury
bars relief. Finally, Williams alleges insufficient facts
(but instead only vague, conclusory assertions which
otherwise lack a causation component) to support his
retaliatory transfer claim.
Williams v. Brown, 607CV045, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2008) (footnote
omitted). In a footnote, the district court stated that Williams’s failure to request
nominal damages waived the recovery of nominal damages. Id. at n.1. The district
court dismissed Williams’s complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
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II.
As a threshold matter, before turning to the substance of Williams’s claims
and the accompanying arguments on appeal, we must first address the district
court’s dismissal of Williams’s complaint as a sanction. In particular, contrary to
the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court concluded that
Williams “engaged in a clear and persistent pattern of deceit in his court filings.”
On appeal, Williams argues that there was no evidence of a clear and persistent
pattern of deceit in his court filings to justify a dismissal with prejudice. Williams
stated that he had not intended to deceive the court and had honestly responded that
he did not believe that his two habeas corpus petitions and one appeal dismissed as
frivolous constituted a “lawsuit” for purposes of the civil complaint form.
We review sanctions imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “for an abuse of
discretion.” Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted). Section 1915(e) of the PLRA provides that any in forma pauperis action
or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, “[d]ismissal with prejudice in the context of
section 1915 [is] an extreme sanction to be exercised only in appropriate cases.”
Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 1986). “In the absence of a finding
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of bad faith misstatement of assets, litigiousness or manipulative tactics, however,
dismissal with prejudice is not warranted.” Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877,
881 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic
sanction, it should “be applied only after lesser sanctions are considered and found
inadequate.” Camp, 798 F.2d at 438-39 (noting that many “petitions for in forma
pauperis . . . are brought by pro se persons with little legal acumen”) (citation
omitted).
Here, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Williams’s
complaint with prejudice as a sanction pursuant to § 1915(e). In contravention to
the magistrate judge’s second Report and Recommendation, the district court
simply concluded that Williams had “engaged in a clear and persistent pattern of
deceit in his court filings.” However, a review of the record reveals that at the time
when he filed his complaint only one of Williams’s matters had been dismissed as
frivolous – the Wetherington appeal. His failure to disclose one appeal does not
qualify as “malicious” or evidence bad faith by Williams, much less “a clear and
persistent pattern of deceit in his court filings.” Moreover, Williams explained that
he did not include the Wetherington appeal as being dismissed as frivolous because
he did not believe an appeal constituted a “lawsuit.” Considering his pro se status
and taking the language of the form into account, which only requests “lawsuits”
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and does not define that term, Williams’s explanation was plausible on its face.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing Williams’s § 1983
complaint as a sanction for abuse of process and remand for proceedings consistent
with the remainder of this Opinion. We now turn to the substance of Williams’s
other arguments raised on appeal specific to retaliatory transfer, damages, and his
remaining claims.
III.
Williams raised three additional arguments on appeal, asserting that the
district court erred by: (1) concluding that he failed to plead sufficient facts to state
a claim for retaliatory discharge; (2) finding that his failure to allege physical
injury barred compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) dismissing his
remaining claims, i.e., denial of access to courts, deliberate indifference to medical
needs, denial of due process, and state law libel and slander. We shall consider
each in turn.
A. Retaliatory transfer
“We review a dismissal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act [(“PLRA”)]
for failure to state a claim de novo and view the allegations in the complaint as
true.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citation
omitted). “The standards that govern a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
10
Procedure 12(b)(6) apply. . . .” Id. Further, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the
court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted); see Douglas, 535 F.3d at 1321 (construing liberally a prisoner’s
pro se complaint).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (citation omitted). At
the pleading stage, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that “the plain
statement possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at
557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (internal quotations omitted).
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing lawsuits or
administrative grievances. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam). While an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest against being transferred to a less agreeable prison, Moody v. Daggett, 429
11
U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 274, 279 n.9 (1976), prison officials may not transfer an
inmate in retaliation for exercising his right to file grievances against prison
officials. See Bridges v. Russell, 757 F.2d 1155, 1157 (11th Cir. 1985). Such
retaliatory transfers violate an inmate’s First Amendment rights. Wildberger v.
Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
Although Williams’s complaint alleges that a constitutional violation
occurred, the complaint fails to allege facts that associate Johnson or Tompkins
with that violation. Williams simply asserts that “Brown, Johnson, and Tompkins
subjected [him] to a retaliatory negative transfer twice as far from [his] family . . .
.” This assertion does not raise his right to relief against Johnson and Tompkins
above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Williams’s complaint against
Johnson and Tompkins.
As to Appellee Brown, however, taking the well-pleaded allegations in his
complaint as true, Williams stated a chronology of events and alleged sufficient
facts to state a retaliatory transfer claim against Brown in his individual capacity.
The relevant facts are these. In 1999, Brown opened Williams’s mail, Williams
filed a grievance, and he was transferred. After being transferred back in 2004,
Williams filed another grievance against Brown in September 2005; a prison staff
12
member notified Brown of the grievance; and Williams was again transferred to
another prison. The facts provide circumstantial evidence that Brown transferred
Williams in retaliation for his filing a grievance against him.
Furthermore, we agree with the magistrate judge in the second Report &
Recommendation that qualified immunity does not shield Appellee Brown from
liability. “[Q]ualified immunity provides that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Case v.
Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). When assessing qualified immunity cases, we consider whether a
constitutional right has been violated and whether the right was clearly established
by the law at the time of the violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.
Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001). Although Appellee Brown acted within his discretionary
authority in transferring Williams, the law is clearly established that a prison
official may not transfer an inmate in retaliation for exercising his right to file
grievances against prison officials. See Bridges, 757 F.2d at 1157. Thus, Brown
cannot claim qualified immunity as a bar to Williams’s complaint.
B. Damages
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“[C]ompensatory damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on
actual injuries caused by the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the
abstract value of the constitutional rights that the defendant violated.” Slicker v.
Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e),
in order to recover for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody, a
prisoner bringing a § 1983 action must demonstrate more than a de minimus
physical injury. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th Cir.), opinion
reinstated in part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The district court did not err in determining that Williams could not recover
compensatory or punitive damages with respect to his First Amendment retaliation
claim. In his complaint, Williams alleged that in August 2005, before his transfer,
he was approved for surgery to correct a herniated cervical disc. Williams alleged
the Appellees were aware of the approved surgery; however, beyond his
conclusory statement, he fails to allege how they were so aware. Further, Williams
did not substantially allege (1) that the Appellees knew of his condition or (2) that
the delay in surgery exacerbated his condition. Accordingly, because he has not
alleged the requisite physical injury, the district court properly dismissed
Williams’s compensatory and punitive damages claims.
However, “[n]ominal damages are appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a
14
violation of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual
injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages.” Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, a prayer for nominal
damages is not precluded by § 1997e(e). Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271
(11th Cir. 2007). While the district court determined that Williams waived any
entitlement to nominal damages,5 the district court did not consider whether
Williams’s pro se complaint should be liberally construed to request nominal
damages, especially considering that Williams requested both monetary and
injunctive relief and in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. See F ED. R.
C IV. P. 54(c) (“Every other final judgment [besides default judgment] should grant
the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that
relief in its pleadings.”). For this reason, we remand for the district court to
consider, in the first instance, Williams’s potential nominal damages claim against
5
In support of its finding of waiver, the district court cited Oliver v. Falla, in which we
addressed “the propriety of nominal damages in an Eighth Amendment excessive force case
where the plaintiff waived a request for nominal damages.” 258 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir.
2001). There, we concluded that the plaintiff “unequivocally waived his right to nominal
damages” in light of the fact that (1) the plaintiff did not request a nominal damages jury
instruction, (2) defense counsel stated during oral argument that plaintiff’s counsel “vehemently
opposed a nominal damages instruction,” and (3) the plaintiff “did not object when the district
court failed to give a nominal damages instruction to the jury.” Id. at 1282. Oliver is inapposite
to the instant case for at least two reasons. One, the procedural posture of the two cases is quite
different. We found that the plaintiff in Oliver waived his right to nominal damages at trial after
he, among other things, failed to request them and failed to ask for a jury instruction. On the
contrary, the instant case is in its infancy. And two, the plaintiff in Oliver was represented by
counsel whereas Williams is pro se.
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Brown in his individual capacity for the alleged retaliation. See Hughes, 350 F.3d
at 1162-63 (noting that “the district court did not consider whether Hughes’s
complaint could be liberally construed to request nominal damages” and
remanding to allow the district court to consider that claim in the first instance).
C. Remaining claims
As to Williams’s remaining claims, upon review of the record as well as the
parties’ briefs, the district court did not err in dismissing his claims for denial of
access to court, deliberate indifference, denial of due process, and Georgia state
law libel and slander.
IV.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing
Williams’s § 1983 complaint with prejudice based on abuse of process and remand
to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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