T. Carlton Richardson v. Ron Peterson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11695 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar APRIL 7, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket Nos. 8:07-cv-01492-EAK, 8:94-ap-00554-KRM
T. CARLTON RICHARDSON,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RON PETERSON,
as Trustee of the Jacqueline N.
Overton Trust,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 7, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is the second time that we have reviewed the denial of Theodore
Richardson’s motions to reconsider a ruling of the bankruptcy court. Richardson
moved twice for the bankruptcy court to reconsider its ruling that the debt arising
from a judgment against Richardson and in favor of Ron Peterson was
nondischargeable. The bankruptcy court denied the motions to reconsider in two
separate orders, but the district court failed to review those orders. This Court
reversed and remanded for the district court to “address the orders of the
bankruptcy court . . . that denied Richardson’s motions to reconsider,” Richardson
v. Peterson, No. 08-16074 (11th Cir. July 31, 2009), after which the district court
affirmed those orders. We affirm.
Richardson argues that his right to due process was violated in three ways,
but his arguments fail. First, Richardson argues that he should have received an
evidentiary hearing after his case was remanded to the district court, but the
district court permitted Richardson to file a supplemental brief in which he raised
numerous arguments and to which he attached several exhibits. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349, 96 S. Ct. 893, 909 (1976) (rights of due process are
satisfied when the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to be heard).
Second, Richardson argues that his first motion for reconsideration should not
have been struck summarily, but his motion was untimely and Richardson was not
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entitled to a hearing to examine that determination. See Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d
1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006). Third, Richardson complains about the rules
mandating that his time to appeal ran from the entry of the order denying his first
motion, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a), instead of the service of that order, see id.
9022(a), but Richardson had actual notice of and an opportunity to appeal the
denial of his first motion. Nineteen days after the denial of his first motion,
Richardson filed a second motion in which he timely requested a “20 [day]
extension to file notice of appeal . . . pursuant to [Rule] 8002(c),” but he failed to
provide an excuse for failing to timely appeal, id. 8002(c).
Richardson challenges on two grounds the denial of his motions to
reconsider, but these arguments also fail. First, Richardson argues that he was
entitled to an additional three days within which to appeal the denial of his first
motion because he was served the order by mail, but “[t]he ten day period of Rule
8002(a) begins to run upon the entry of the order, not its service.” In re Williams,
216 F.3d 1295, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Arbuckle, 988 F.2d 29, 31
(5th Cir. 1993)). Second, Richardson argues that the bankruptcy court erred in
finding that he failed to make a showing of excusable neglect in his second
motion, but Richardson did not even mention excusable neglect in his second
motion. See id. 8002(c)(2); Williams, 216 F.3d at 1297.
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We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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