Ernest Lord v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-14472 MARCH 16, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00781-GGB
ERNEST LORD,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 16, 2012)
Before HULL, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ernest Lord appeals the order that affirmed the denial of his application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income from the Social
Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Lord challenges the
findings of the administrative law judge that two of Lord’s absences during a
period of evaluation at Goodwill of North Georgia, Inc., were compatible with
employment and that Lord had sufficient residual functional capacity to work as a
store attendant. We affirm.
We review the decision of the Commissioner “to determine if it is supported
by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). “‘Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)). That review “precludes deciding
the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.”
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence supports the finding of the administrative law judge
that Lord’s two absences during a period of evaluation at Goodwill were
attributable to the stress of that job, not an inability to attend work. Lord blamed
the absences on an illness and his tremors, but neither condition had affected his
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attendance at other jobs. When evaluated by Goodwill, Lord had been undergoing
training and became frustrated and overwhelmed because a job coach had
criticized his repetitive cleaning habits. Lord testified that stress and anxiety
caused his tremors, and both Dr. Lavanya Subramanian and Dr. Magdy Rezk
reported that anxiety exacerbated Lord’s tremors. Notably, Lord’s physicians
reported that Lord’s tremors were controlled before he began and after he ended
his training at Goodwill.
Substantial evidence also supports the finding of the administrative law
judge that Lord could work as a store attendant. Despite Lord’s lifelong struggle
with obsessive compulsive disorder, between 1994 and 2001, he worked twice at
Ryan’s Steak House, first as a greeter and server and later as a dishwasher and bar
runner, and twice at Walmart, first as a custodian and later as a sales associate,
stocker, and cart pusher. He also worked for another employer as a car wash
detailer and maintenance worker. After Lord was diagnosed in 2002 with tremors
and asthma, he worked as a donation attendant at Goodwill and participated
several times in its training program. Drs. Virginia Wood, a consulting
psychologist, and Jeffrey Vidic, who conducted a psychiatric review of Lord’s
medical records, reported that Lord’s obsessive disorder imposed moderate
limitations in social functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace, and that
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Lord could recall and complete simple tasks. The administrative law judge
included the findings of Wood and Vidic in the hypothetical questions posed to
the vocational expert, who opined that Lord was capable of working as a store
attendant. Lord argues that opinion failed to account for his poor communication
skills, but the hypothetical question provided that Lord required a working
environment involving minimal stress and supervision. Moreover, Lord had
reported that he enjoyed jobs involving customer service and the administrative
law judge observed that Lord’s ability to communicate improved as he became
more comfortable on the witness stand. See Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009,
1011 (11th Cir. 1987). Lord also challenges the decision to discount the
conclusion in the Goodwill evaluation that he is incapable of competitive
employment, but an administrative law judge is not required to credit the opinion
of a Goodwill representative that Lord is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(e)–(f).
We AFFIRM the denial of Lord’s application for benefits.
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