United States v. Jonathan Brito

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
No. 08-15972 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 99-00395-CR-T-27EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JONATHAN BRITO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 30, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Brito, a pro se federal prisoner serving a 121-month sentence for
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, appeals the district court’s
denial of his “Motion Requesting From Court to Issue an Order to Government to
Transfer Defendant to Probation Department Under Court’s Supervision to Start
Supervised Release Pursuant to Court’s Judgment/Commitment Order” filed after
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued a detainer against him.
Brito argues that the government violated the district court’s sentencing
order by using immigration laws to alter the second part of his sentence, preventing
him from serving his court-ordered 5 years’ supervised release. Brito requests that
we uphold the district court’s sentence in its entirety, allowing him to serve 121
months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Brito claims that the district
court could have provided that he would be deported as a condition of his
supervised release, but that such a condition should have been put in place at the
time of sentencing, which it was not. Accordingly, Brito also claims that ICE
lacked jurisdiction to violate the district court’s order and that the government’s
denying him supervised release violated 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the statute outlining
supervised release.
The filing of a detainer, standing alone, does not cause an alien to be in the
custody of immigration officials such that he or she would be entitled to pursue
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Orozco v. U.S. I.N.S., 911 F.2d
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539, 541 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the All Writs Act provides that district
courts may “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a). “The [All Writs] Act does not create any substantive federal jurisdiction”
but instead it is only “a codification of the federal courts’ traditional, inherent
power to protect the jurisdiction they already have, derived from some other
source.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2004).
“[T]he All-Writs Act also empowers federal courts to issue injunctions to protect
or effectuate their judgments,” at their discretion. Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470
F.3d 1019, 1026 (11th Cir. 2006). An “All Writs Act injunction . . . must simply
point to some ongoing proceeding, or some past order or judgment, the integrity of
which is being threatened by someone else’s action or behavior.” Klay, 376 F.3d
at 1100.
Under immigration law, the Attorney General shall take aliens who have
committed felonies into custody “when the alien is released, without regard to
whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1). “[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien who is sentenced
to imprisonment until the alien is released from imprisonment.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(4)(A). However, “[p]arole, supervised release, probation, or possibility
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of arrest or further imprisonment is not a reason to defer removal.” Id.The district court did not err in declining to issue an extraordinary writ
because Brito properly was placed under a detainer by ICE pursuant to statute, and
ICE’s action did not keep the district court from effectuating its judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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