Lynwood Williams v. Charlie Crist

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-15482 December 5, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-00965-CV-T-30-MAP
LYNWOOD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
CHARLIE CRIST, Attorney General
of the State of Florida,
JAMES MCDONOUGH, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 5, 2006)
Before BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and RYSKAMP,* District Judge.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Lynwood Williams, a Florida state prisoner, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred. This appeal
addresses what effect Williams’s motion for belated appeal in state court, which
was filed within the AEDPA limitations period and granted by the state court
thereafter, has on his AEDPA clock.1 After review and oral argument, we reverse
the dismissal of Williams’s § 2254 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Proceedings
Williams’s first degree murder conviction was affirmed on October 24,
1997. See Williams v. State, 701 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). His
conviction became final ninety days later, which was January 22, 1998.
On May 13, 1998, Williams filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the
state trial court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state trial
court denied the 3.850 motion on February 17, 1999. Williams then had until
*
Honorable Kenneth L. Ryskamp, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Florida, sitting by designation.
1
Williams filed his § 2254 petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996),
and the provisions of that act govern this appeal.
2
March 19, 1999, to file a notice of appeal. It is undisputed that Williams asked his
counsel to file a notice of appeal should his 3.850 motion be denied by the state
trial court.
On March 22, 1999, Williams’s counsel inadvertently filed the notice of
appeal three days after the March 19 deadline. On April 6, 1999, the Florida
District Court of Appeal (“Florida DCA”) acknowledged receipt of this notice of
appeal and assigned Williams’s case “Appeal No. 99-01282.” On April 7, 1999,
the Florida DCA issued an order to Williams to show cause as to why his Appeal
No. 99-01282 should not be dismissed as untimely filed.
On April 10, 1999, Williams filed a joint response to the show cause order
and a motion for belated appeal. Williams’s motion for belated appeal was filed
and docketed in Appeal No. 99-01282 and was treated as a motion in that pending
appeal. In his motion for belated appeal, Williams’s counsel admitted that he
“mistakenly calculated the time for filing Mr. Williams’s notice of appeal from the
February 22, 1999, date on the court’s cover sheet instead of from the February 17,
1999, Order” denying the 3.850 motion. Williams’s counsel claimed that this
“neglect, inadvertence or error, and confusion” amounted to ineffective assistance
of counsel under Florida law.
On May 17, 1999, the Florida DCA entered an order in Appeal No. 99-
3
01282, denying Williams’s motion for a belated appeal based on Diaz v. State, 724
So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Diaz relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996), and held that a
belated appeal was not appropriate relief in a post-conviction setting, even where
the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the belated appeal. See Diaz, 724 So. 2d at
596.
In the same Appeal No. 99-01282, Williams then filed a motion for
rehearing and a motion for rehearing en banc, which he later amended. In the
amended motion for rehearing in Appeal No. 99-01282, Williams argued that the
Florida Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931(Fla. 1999), undermined Lambrix and Diaz and required the Florida DCA to grant
Williams a belated appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion.
In an August 20, 1999 order entered in Appeal No. 99-01282, the Florida
DCA expressed doubt about the continued viability of Diaz but was “nevertheless
constrained to dismiss” Appeal No. 99-01282 as untimely filed. Williams v. State,
763 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). However, in that same order in
Appeal No. 99-01282, the Florida DCA granted Williams’s motion for rehearing to
the extent that it certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 1070.
The certified question asked whether, under Florida case law in light of Steele v.
4
Kehoe, a belated appeal from the denial of a post-conviction 3.850 motion could be
allowed by the Florida DCA when the notice of appeal was untimely filed due to
the ineffectiveness of counsel in the collateral proceeding. See id.On November 22, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court held that Williams could
pursue his belated appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion if the failure to timely
file the notice of appeal in Appeal No. 99-01282 was due to counsel’s neglect.
See Williams v. State, 777 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla. 2000). The Florida Supreme
Court explained “that the appropriate procedure in these cases is for the defendant
to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” citing the failure of counsel to timely
file the necessary appeal after being asked to do so, and thereafter, receive a
hearing. Id. The Florida Supreme Court further noted that Rule 3.850(g) needed
amending to provide a belated appeal in this circumstance. Id. at 950-51.2 More
importantly for this case, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Florida DCA’s
decision in Williams v. State, 763 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999),
which had earlier dismissed Williams’s Appeal No. 99-01282. Id. at 951.
2
As a result of Williams v. State, 777 So.2d 947 (Fla. 2000), Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850(g) was amended on the same day (November 22, 2000) to provide, in part, that
“[a] petitioner may seek a belated appeal upon the allegation that the petitioner timely requested
counsel to appeal the order denying petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief and counsel,
through neglect, failed to do so.” See Amendment to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(g), 789 So. 2d 262(Fla. 2000). However, it appears that even prior to Williams’s case, motions for belated appeals
were common collateral proceedings in Florida courts. See State v. Porter, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla.
2001); McLeod v. State, 586 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Jones v. State, 642
So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
5
On remand and in a February 15, 2001 order, the Florida DCA adopted the
Florida Supreme Court’s judgment, set aside its August 20, 1999 dismissal of
Williams’s Appeal No. 99-01282, and reinstated Williams’s Appeal No. 99-01282
before the Florida DCA. In that same order, the Florida DCA then expressly
relinquished its jurisdiction to allow Williams to pursue a belated appeal from the
trial court order denying his 3.850 motion by petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the state trial court. Williams v. State, No. 2D99-1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 15,
2001). Williams promptly filed his state petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
February 19, 2001. On April 9, 2001, the state trial court granted the habeas
petition, allowing Williams to pursue his belated 3.850 appeal, which in fact was
already pending in Appeal No. 99-01282 before the Florida DCA.
On June 20, 2001, Williams filed a merits brief in Appeal No. 99-01282.
The State filed its merits brief on September 25, 2001. On February 22, 2002, the
Florida DCA, in a per curiam order also bearing Appeal No. 99-01282, affirmed
the state trial court’s denial of Williams’s 3.850 motion. See Williams v. State,
812 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
In sum, although Williams’s appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion took a
tortuous route, the Florida courts ultimately allowed his appeal of the denial of his
3.850 motion to proceed as a properly filed appeal, ruled on the merits of his 3.850
6
appeal, and affirmed the denial of Williams’s 3.850 motion. Williams’s 3.850
appeal was thus not concluded until February 22, 2002.
B. Federal Court Proceedings
On June 3, 2002, Williams filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court. See Williams v. Crist, No. 8:02-CV-
965-T-30MAP, 2005 WL 2129286 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2005). The district court
dismissed his § 2254 petition as time-barred. Id. at *4. The district court found
that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations to file a § 2254
petition had expired on November 28, 1999. Id. at *3. Under the district court’s
calculations, the limitations period began to run on January 22, 1998, when
Williams’s conviction became final. Id. at *2. The limitations period then ran for
111 days from January 22, 1998 to May 13, 1998, the date Williams filed his 3.850
motion for post-conviction relief. Id. The district court concluded that Williams’s
3.850 motion tolled the limitations period through the denial of Williams’s 3.850
motion and until March 19, 1999 (the date that Williams’s time to file a 3.850
appeal expired). Id. at *3.
However, the district court declined to toll the limitations period beyond
March 19, 1999. Id. The district court concluded that the untimely March 22,
1999 notice of appeal was not a “properly filed” application for post-conviction
7
relief and had no tolling effect. Id. The district court found that the one-year
limitation began to run again on March 19, 1999, and ended on November 28,
1999. Id. The district court also concluded that the Florida DCA’s April 9, 2001
decision allowing Williams to file a belated appeal had no effect on the expiration
of the limitations period. Id.
We granted a Certificate of Appealability on the following issue: Whether
the district court erred in dismissing appellant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-
barred, in light of Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2004), and Moore v.
Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir. 2003).3
II. DISCUSSION
The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2254
petition, which begins to run following one of four triggering events. Chavers v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., __ F.3d __, No. 05-15163, 2006 WL 3068840, at *1 (11th Cir.
Oct. 31, 2006). The relevant triggering event here is the date on which Williams’s
conviction became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
It is undisputed that Williams’s conviction became final on January 22, 1998
3
We review de novo a district court’s determination that a habeas petition is time-barred.
Cramer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 461 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir. 2006).
8
(which is ninety days after Williams’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal).
See Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 2002) (indicating that AEDPA
limitations period did not begin to run until the ninety-day window during which
habeas petitioner could have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari expired). Thus, absent any tolling, Williams had until January 25, 1999
to file a federal habeas petition.4 See Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299,
1301 (11th Cir. 2001).
The pivotal AEDPA provision in this case is the tolling subsection in
§ 2244(d)(2), which provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The parties agree that Williams’s 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief,
filed on May 13, 1998, was a “properly filed” application for post-conviction relief
and tolled his AEDPA clock. Williams’s AEDPA clock initially ran for 111 days
from January 22, 1998 (his final conviction) to May 13, 1998 (3.850 motion filed).
At the time Williams filed his 3.850 motion, he had 254 days left on his clock.
4
One year from Williams’s conviction becoming final would have placed Williams’s
non-tolled deadline on January 23, 1999, but that was a Saturday. Accordingly, absent tolling,
Williams’s deadline would have been January 25, 1999 (Monday). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
9
On February 17, 1999, the state court denied Williams’s 3.850 motion. The
State concedes that Williams’s AEDPA clock was tolled from May 13, 1998
(3.850 motion filed) through February 17, 1999 (denial of 3.850 motion) and
through March 19, 1999 (30 days for appeal). However, the State contends that
Williams’s AEDPA clock (which had 254 days left) began to run again on March
19, 1999, and that Williams’s one-year limitations period expired on November 28,
1999. Therefore, the State asserts that Williams’s § 2254 petition, filed on June 3,
2002, was properly dismissed as time-barred.
In response, Williams asserts that his April 10, 1999 motion for belated
appeal was accepted as properly filed and granted by the Florida courts; that his
April 10, 1999 belated appeal motion was filed well within his unexpired AEDPA
period; and that therefore his AEDPA clock was tolled from April 10, 1999, to
February 22, 2002, when the Florida DCA affirmed the denial of Williams’s 3.850
motion. Even adding the 22 days from March 19, 1999 to April 10, 1999 to the
111 days from January 22, 1998 to May 13, 1998, Williams contends that, as of
February 22, 2002, his AEDPA clock had run only 133 days and he still had 232
days left. Given that his § 2254 petition was filed on June 3, 2002 (or 101 days
later), Williams asserts that his § 2254 petition was timely filed.
The tolling issue in Williams’s case depends on how his April 10, 1999
10
motion for belated appeal, filed in his 3.850 proceeding, should be treated. To
answer that question, we first review Supreme Court and our precedent regarding
the terms “properly filed” and “pending” in § 2244(d)(2) and then apply it to
Williams’s case.
A. “Properly Filed” under § 2244(d)(2)
Although the federal statute does not define “properly filed,” the Supreme
Court has construed those words. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S. Ct. 361(2000); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005).
In Artuz, the Supreme Court stated that “an application is ‘properly filed’
when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and
rules governing filings.” 531 U.S. at 8, 121 S. Ct. at 364. The Artuz Court
explained that the laws and rules about filings “usually prescribe, for example, the
form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery [and] the court and office in
which it must be lodged . . . .” Id. at 8, 121 S. Ct. at 364.5 “[U]nder Artuz, we look
to the state procedural rules governing filings to determine whether an application
for state post-conviction relief is ‘properly filed.’” Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254,
5
As we have recently explained, the Artuz Court ultimately did not decide a timeliness
question; rather, “its holding was limited to whether a claim filed in a state petition that was
subject to a procedural bar made the filing of the entire application improper.” Sweet v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). The Sweet Court pointed out that Artuz
concluded that the procedural bars at issue in Artuz were “‘condition[s] to obtaining relief,’” as
opposed to “‘condition[s] to filing’” and that thus Artuz “concluded that the state petition had
been properly filed.” Id. (citation omitted).
11
1260 (11th Cir. 2004).6
After Artuz, the Supreme Court in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, “held that a state
post-conviction petition rejected by the state court as being untimely under state
law is not ‘properly filed’ within the meaning of AEDPA’s § 2244(d)(2).” Sweet
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing Pace,
544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, at length). The Supreme Court in Pace concluded
that “[b]ecause the state court rejected petitioner’s [post-conviction] petition as
untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under
§ 2244(d)(2).” 544 U.S. at 417, 125 S. Ct. at 1814.
Both before and after Pace, this Court repeatedly has held that a petitioner’s
state court post-conviction filing is not “properly filed” within the meaning of
§ 2244(d)(2) if the state court has already determined that the petitioner’s state
court filing did not conform with the state’s filing deadlines. Sweet, 467 F.3d at
1318 (stressing that state courts had “unambiguously” dismissed Sweet’s second
motion for post-conviction relief as untimely filed, and concluding that a state
post-conviction motion rejected by the state court as being untimely under state
6
“Even prior to Artuz, this Court held that a petitioner’s state post-conviction application
must meet state filing deadlines in order to toll AEDPA’s one year-limitation period.” Wade,
379 F.3d at 1260 (citing Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)).
12
law is not “properly filed” with the meaning of § 2244(d)(2));7 Wade, 379 F.3d at
1260-61 (giving “‘due deference’” to the Georgia Supreme Court’s determination
that Wade’s Certificate of Probable Cause application failed to comply with
statutory thirty-day time requirements and concluding that Wade’s application was
not properly filed); Stafford v. Thompson, 328 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003)
(same); Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (affording “due
deference” to Florida court’s holding that Webster’s third 3.850 petition was not
timely filed under Florida law and concluding that Webster’s 3.850 petition was
not properly filed).
B. “Pending” Under § 2244(d)(2)
“[E]ven ‘properly filed’ state-court petitions must be ‘pending’ in order to
toll the limitations period.” Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259. In Carey v. Saffold, 536
U.S. 214, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002), the Supreme Court defined the meaning of
“pending” in § 2244(d)(2):
[A]n application is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral
review process is “in continuance” – i.e., “until the completion of”
that process. In other words, until the application has achieved final
7
In Sweet, this Court emphasized that “when a state court unambiguously rules that a
post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, we must respect that ruling and conclude
that the petition was not ‘properly filed’ for the purposes of § 2244(d)(2), regardless of whether
the state court also reached the merits of one of the claims.” 467 F.3d at 1318. The Sweet Court
also stated that “when a state court determines that a petition is untimely, and also rejects the
substantive claim on the merits, the timeliness decision standing alone compels a federal court to
conclude that the state motion was not ‘properly filed.’” Id.
13
resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, by
definition it remains “pending.”
536 U.S. at 219-20, 122 S. Ct. at 2138; see Wade, 379 F.3d at 1261 (quoting same
passage from Saffold).
In Saffold, the Supreme Court concluded that a petitioner’s claim is
“pending” for the entire term of state court review, including those intervals
between one state court’s judgment and the filing of an appeal with a higher state
court. 536 U.S. at 219-21, 122 S. Ct. at 2138-39; Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377,
1380 (11th Cir. 2003). “Therefore, a state post-conviction application is ‘pending’
under § 2244(d)(2) both when it actually is being considered by the state habeas
court and during the gap of time between the state habeas court’s initial disposition
and the petitioner’s timely filing of a petition for review at the next level.” Wade,
379 F.3d at 1262. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “[t]he time that an
application for state post[-]conviction review is ‘pending’ includes the period
between (1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a
notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under
state law.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, __, 126 S. Ct 846, 849 (2006).
A complicating factor in this case is that although Williams’s March 22,
1999 notice of appeal was three days too late and not timely filed, Williams also
filed an April 10, 1999 motion for belated appeal, which the Florida courts
14
ultimately granted, allowing his 3.850 appeal to proceed. Thus, the question arises
as to what effect Williams’s motion for belated appeal has on his AEDPA clock.
This Court addressed the statutory tolling effect of a motion for belated
appeal in Moore. Petitioner Moore’s conviction became final on December 12,
1996, and 270 days ran on his AEDPA clock before he filed his 3.850 motion on
September 8, 1997. 321 F.3d at 1379 n.1. Moore had only 95 days left on his
AEDPA clock when he filed his 3.850 motion.
On September 15, 1998, the state court denied Moore’s 3.850 motion, but
Moore did not timely appeal. Moore’s 3.850 motion tolled his AEDPA clock not
only until September 15, 1998 (denial of 3.850 motion), but also until October 15,
1998 (30 days for appeal after denial). Id. On May 11, 1999, Moore filed his first
state petition for belated appeal, which was denied on September 9, 1999. Thus,
another 208 days ran on Moore’s AEDPA clock before he filed even his first
motion for belated appeal. On December 4, 2000, Moore filed a second motion for
belated appeal, which was granted on March 22, 2001. Thus, Moore was already
outside of the one-year limitation period when he filed his first motion for belated
appeal (which was denied) and also his second motion for belated appeal (which
was granted). Id. at 1378.
In Moore, one question before our Court was how long Moore’s 3.850
15
motion was “pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). 321 F.3d at 1379. We
noted that this question implicated the sub-issue of “whether the motion for belated
appeal has any effect on tolling the AEDPA because it was filed beyond the
AEDPA’s limitations period.” Id.The Moore Court concluded that “the petitioner’s belated appeal motion was
not pending during the limitations period” and “[t]he statutory tolling provision
does not encompass a period of time in which a state prisoner does not have a
‘properly filed’ post-conviction application actually pending in state court.” Id. at
1381. Since the one-year limitations period had already elapsed, the Moore Court
concluded that Moore’s motions for belated appeal could not revive or restart his
AEDPA clock. Id. Further, the filing of a belated appeal motion outside the
limitations period, even if granted by the state court, cannot erase the time period
when nothing was pending before the state court. Id. With this precedent, we now
turn to Williams’s case.
C. Williams’s Belated Appeal Motion
We have not addressed whether a motion for a belated appeal tolls an
unexpired AEDPA period. For the following reasons, we conclude that Williams’s
April 10, 1999 belated appeal motion did have a tolling effect under the facts of
this case, resulting in Williams’s § 2254 petition being timely filed.
16
First, in contrast to Moore, Williams filed his April 10, 1999 belated appeal
motion in his 3.850 proceeding well before his AEDPA limitations period expired.
Since there was time left on his AEDPA clock, his belated appeal motion in his
3.850 proceeding had the potential to toll that clock. We say “potential” because
much depends on how the Florida courts treated Williams’s motion for belated
appeal.
Second, the Florida courts recognized and ultimately granted Williams’s
belated appeal motion under Florida law and allowed his 3.850 appeal to proceed.
Because the state courts recognized and granted Williams’s belated appeal motion
as properly filed under Florida law, we must give due deference to that state court
procedural determination. See Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1318; Wade, 379 F.3d at 1260.
The State argues that even if Williams’s belated appeal motion was
“properly filed” under Florida law, it merely asked for an out-of-time appeal, did
not challenge Williams’s final conviction, and thus was not an application for post-
conviction relief for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). We need not resolve that question
because Williams’s motion was not a new, separate proceeding; rather, the Florida
DCA treated Williams’s belated appeal motion as a motion in his pending 3.850
appeal, which did challenge his conviction. Specifically, Williams’s 3.850 appeal
was Appeal No. 99-01282 before the Florida DCA. His belated appeal motion was
17
filed and docketed in that same Appeal No. 99-01282. Thus, under the facts of this
particular case, Williams’s motion for belated appeal was part of his 3.850 appeal.8
Third, at all times after the April 10, 1999 belated appeal motion was filed,
Williams diligently and continuously sought permission (through properly filed
state motions and petitions) to pursue his belated appeal. The state courts granted
Williams a belated appeal, and his belated appeal was not final until February 22,
2002. No further time thus elapsed on Williams’s AEDPA clock between April
10, 1999, and February 22, 2002 because (1) his motion for belated appeal was
filed within his limitations period and in his 3.850 proceeding, (2) properly filed
state motions were continuously pending during this time period, (3) his belated
appeal motion was ultimately granted by the Florida courts, and (4) his 3.850
8
After Williams’s case, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141, expressly entitled
“Review Proceedings in Collateral of Post-Conviction Criminal Cases,” provides for motions for
belated appeals in 3.850 proceedings. Specifically, appellate Rule 9.141(c), entitled “Petitions
Seeking Belated Appeal or Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel,” provides, in
relevant part, that petitions seeking belated appeal shall be filed in the appellate court to which
the appeal was or should have been taken and that such petitions “shall be treated as original
proceedings under rule 9.100, except as modified by this rule.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(1) and
(2).
Williams’s belated appeal motion, however, took place before this rule was enacted, and
the Florida DCA did not treat Williams’s belated appeal motion as an original proceeding in the
appellate court. Instead, the Florida DCA treated Williams’s belated appeal motion as a motion
in his already pending Appeal No. 99-01282, which challenged his conviction. Thus, our
holding in this case is strictly limited to what happened in Williams’s case. We have no
occasion to address whether statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) may occur when Rule 9.141
motions are filed within an unexpired AEDPA limitations period or whether Rule 9.141 motions
qualify as applications for state post-conviction relief under § 2244(d)(2). Compare Ford v.
Moore, 296 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2002), with Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.
2005), and Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002).
18
appeal was not finally resolved until February 22, 2002.
Fourth, treating Williams’s motion for a belated appeal, which was granted,
as a statutory tolling motion when filed within an unexpired AEDPA period is
consistent with Congress’s intent to encourage the exhaustion of state remedies
without permitting petitioners to indefinitely toll the limitations period. Allowing
Williams to pursue a belated 3.850 appeal within the one-year time period serves
the exhaustion requirement in AEDPA. In contrast, in Moore, allowing a belated
appeal motion filed beyond the one-year period to toll the period would have been
contrary to the purposes of AEDPA, because it would have permitted a state
petitioner to avoid the preclusive effect of the federal one-year time bar. See
Moore, 321 F.3d at 1381.
Fifth, the total elapsed time as of the June 3, 2002 filing of Williams’s
§ 2254 petition was only 234 days, consisting of:
(a) 111 days from January 22, 1998 (final conviction) to May 13,
1998 (3.850 motion filed);
(b) 22 days from March 19, 1999 (30 days after denial of 3.850
motion) to April 10, 1999 (belated appeal motion filed); and
(c) 101 days from February 22, 2002 (affirmance of denial of 3.850
motion) to June 3, 2002 (§ 2254 petition filed).
19
Therefore, when Williams filed his § 2254 motion, 131 days remained on his
AEDPA clock, and his § 2254 petition was timely filed.
Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s dismissal of
Williams’s § 2254 petition and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
REVERSED and VACATED.
20