Fidensio Flores Franco v. Christopher Caldwell

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-15802 MAY 23, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60944-JIC
FIDENSIO FLORES FRANCO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL,
SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Alfred T. Lamberti, Sheriff,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 23, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON, and HILL, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff, Flores Franco, appeals the denial of his Rule 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law, which he renewed following a jury verdict against
him on his federal constitutional and state law claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution. Flores asserts that the district court erred in its instructions to the
jury and that its verdict form misstated the law and misled the jury. We review
allegations of error in jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Broaddus v.
Florida Power Corp., 145 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation
omitted). We do not find such an abuse unless we are left with a “substantial and
uneradicable doubt” as to whether the jury was properly guided during its
deliberations. Id.
Franco’s main complaint regarding the court’s jury instructions is that they
used the word “intentionally” when no intent must be proved to establish a
violation of a constitutional right. Franco is correct that proof of intent to violate a
constitutional right is not required under Section 1983. The Eleventh Circuit
Pattern Jury Instructions, which the court used to instruct the jury, also correctly
reflect this law. The jury was instructed that as to plaintiff’s claim of
constitutional violation by reason of false arrest and malicious prosecution:
In order to prevail on this claim, the Plaintiff must prove each of the
following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:
2
First: That [the Defendant] intentionally committed acts that violated
Flores Franco’s federal constitutional right not to be arrested
without probable cause;
Second: That in so doing [the Defendant] acted “under color” of the
authority of the State of Florida; and
Third: That the acts of [the Defendant] were the proximate or legal
cause of damages sustained by Flores Franco . . . .
This charge clearly requires only that the defendant intentionally committed
the acts that are now alleged to be a constitutional violation – not that the
defendant must have intentionally violated Franco’s constitutional right. Franco is
correct that only the former is required and the district court correctly instructed
the jury to that effect. Accordingly, we find no error in these instructions.
Furthermore, the jury found that the third element – proximate cause of
plaintiff’s damage – was not met. On the verdict form, the jury answered the
question whether the defendant proximately caused damages sustained by Franco
in the negative. Therefore, even if the jury had been incorrectly instructed
regarding intentionality in this action, they found that the defendant did not
proximately cause damages to Franco, thereby extinguishing his claim.1
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the judgement of the district court is
due to be
AFFIRMED.
1
Franco’s final issue on appeal deals with an alleged error in the verdict form as to
sovereign immunity, which is mooted by our decision finding no error in the instructions, and,
therefore, no taint on the jury’s verdict finding no liability.
3