Wydell Evans v. Secretary, DOC

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-14920 MAY 23, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
D.C. Docket No. 6:07-cv-00897-JA-KRS
WYDELL EVANS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 23, 2012)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Wydell Evans, a Florida death row inmate, appeals the District
Court’s denial of his first federal habeas corpus petition. This appeal presents a
single claim for relief—whether Evans was denied the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital trial. Because
Evans filed his federal petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 663 F.3d 1336,
1345 (11th Cir. 2011). Where, as here, a state court has denied an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on the merits, the standard a petitioner must meet to
warrant federal habeas relief “was intended to be, and is, a difficult one.” Johnson
v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Harrington v. Richter,
___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)). After carefully reviewing the
record in this case and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that
Evans has satisfied AEDPA’s demanding standard and, therefore, that habeas
relief is warranted.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS1
A. Trial
The Florida Supreme Court summarized the facts presented at Evans’s 1999
trial as follows:
1
Except as otherwise cited, the facts are taken from the opinions of the Florida Supreme
Court: Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2002) (Evans I); Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
2006) (Evans II).
2
On October 21, 1998, two days after being released from prison,
Wydell Evans shot and killed his brother’s seventeen-year-old girlfriend,
Angel Johnson, during an argument over her alleged unfaithfulness to
Evans’[s] brother. At the time of the shooting, Evans was in an
automobile with Johnson, Erica Foster, Sammy Hogan, and Lino
Odenat. At some point during the argument, Johnson laughed, to which
Evans responded, “You think it’s funny? You think it’s funny?” Evans
then pulled out a gun and shot Johnson in the chest.
Evans I, 838 So. 2d at 1092.
After the shooting, Evans instructed Hogan to drive him to a friend’s house.
Along the way, Evans instructed Odenat to get rid of the gun. After stopping at
the friend’s house, Evans directed Hogan to take him to a nearby parking lot where
Evans tried to wipe his prints from the car. He also threatened to kill Foster and
Hogan if they told authorities who shot Johnson. Once Evans was out of the car,
Foster and Hogan took Johnson to the hospital where she later died from her
gunshot wound.
At the hospital, Foster and Hogan eventually identified Evans as the
shooter. He was arrested the next day. During his jury trial in October 1999, the
defense theory was that Evans accidentally shot Johnson while handing the gun to
her. Evans testified to this version of events during the guilt phase of his trial. He
was convicted of one count of first-degree premeditated murder, one count of
kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault.
3
B. Penalty Phase
On November 3, 1999, a penalty phase was conducted. The state
established that Evans had two prior convictions for battery upon a law
enforcement officer and a prior conviction for aggravated battery, and that he was
on probation at the time of the offense.
Defense counsel presented no mental health mitigation. But defense
counsel did present the testimony of several character witnesses, including Lilly
Evans (defendant’s mother), Sandra Evans (defendant’s aunt), Minne Jarrett
(defendant’s cousin), Linda Key (defendant’s lifelong friend), and Patty Walker
(defendant’s cousin). These character witnesses gave positive accounts of Evans,
“describing him as a generous man, a good father, a loving and obedient son and
grandson, a good friend, and someone who counseled children to stay out of
trouble by staying in school.” Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 4. Further, Lilly Evans told
the jury that while Evans had been an obedient child and good in school, her
addiction to crack cocaine had affected his behavior. She also testified that Evans
had been her inspiration to stop abusing crack cocaine. Evans testified that his
mother’s crack addiction adversely affected him.
4
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. Then the
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993),
and entered a written order sentencing Evans to death. The trial court found two
aggravating circumstances: (1) Evans had been convicted of prior violent felonies,
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); and (2) the crime was committed while Evans was on
probation, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(a). Although Evans did not request the trial
court to consider any of the statutory mitigators, the court considered each
statutory mitigator in its sentencing order and found that none applied. Based on
the character evidence presented during the penalty phase, the trial court found the
following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: “(1) Evans experienced an
abused or deprived childhood; (2) he contributed to society; (3) he performed
charitable deeds; (4) he counseled youth to avoid crime and stay in school; and (5)
he exhibited good behavior in prison.” Evans II, at 5 n.3. But the trial court only
gave these mitigating circumstances “some” or “little weight.” Ultimately, the
trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances and sentenced Evans to death for the first-degree murder
conviction.2
2
The trial court also sentenced Evans to life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction
and to 108.15 months in prison for the aggravated assault conviction.
5
C. Direct Appeal
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Evans’s convictions and death
sentence on direct appeal. Evans I, 838 So. 2d 1090. Three Florida Supreme
Court justices concurred in affirming Evans’s convictions, but dissented as to the
death penalty, finding that a death sentence was disproportionate because the
homicide “occurred during an argument between Evans and the victim over her
alleged unfaithfulness to his brother.” Id. at 1099 (Shaw, J., dissenting joined by
Anstead, C.J., and Pariente, J.).3 The Supreme Court denied certiorari review.
Evans v. Florida, 540 U.S. 846 (2003).
4. State Postconviction Evidentiary Hearing
Evans filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851 in the state trial court raising ten claims, including the penalty phase
ineffective assistance of counsel claim now before us. The state trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on October 19 and 20 and December 16, 2004. At the
3
As Justice Shaw explained:
The victim made the fatal mistake of laughing which incensed Evans to the point that
he pulled out a gun and shot her in the chest. There is nothing in the record to show
that this was a planned or premeditated killing. In fact, the record reflects that the
shooting was a spontaneous response to what Evans obviously felt was inappropriate
laughter.
Evans I, 838 So. 2d at 1099 (Shaw, J., dissenting joined by Anstead, C.J., and Pariente, J.).
6
evidentiary hearing, Evans presented the testimony of five lay witnesses: Lilly
Evans, Sandra Evans, Oren Evans (defendant’s brother), Margaret O’Shaunessy
(defendant’s special education teacher), and Barbara McFadden (defendant’s
school counselor). He also presented the testimony of three mental health experts,
Dr. Richard Carpenter, Dr. Henry Dee, and Dr. Harry McClaren,4 and the
testimony of his trial counsel. Evans also testified.
The Florida Supreme Court summarized the lay witness evidence presented
at the evidentiary hearing as follows:
Evans presented evidence of a troubled childhood. He presented his
school and medical records, which demonstrated that he was hit by a car
and was diagnosed with a closedhead injury at the age of three. [FN 9]
His mother, Lilly, and his aunt, Sandra, witnessed the accident and
testified that he stopped breathing for at least a minute after it occurred.
They also testified that his speech and language patterns changed, and
he began to stutter. In addition, Evans’[s] life at home was difficult.
His father died when he was young, and he grew up with a mother who
was addicted to crack cocaine and a stepfather who was abusive. As a
result of his stuttering and difficulties at home, Evans was frequently
picked on and beaten up by neighborhood children. He eventually
retaliated and started fighting frequently. Lilly testified that his temper
“became pretty quick.” Evans’[s] brother, Oren, testified that Evans was
very aggressive and recalled instances of Evans throwing rocks at a
police officer.
FN9. Evans’[s] injury is noted in his school records
because Evans’ mother relayed the incident to a school
4
Dr. McClaren had been retained by the state as a rebuttal witness, but was called as a
witness by the defense during its case-in-chief.
7
social worker during one of Evans’[s] evaluations.
Evans’[s] school records showed a history of speech and learning
disabilities, as well as escalating behavioral problems due to anger and
aggression. In elementary school, Evans was placed in a class for
children with learning disabilities and received speech therapy. While
Evans’[s] IQ tested in the normal range, disparities between his verbal
and performance scores on the test indicated severe learning disabilities.
Evans received mostly failing grades. In addition to academic problems,
Evans was regularly disciplined for being disruptive and, as he got
older, was frequently expelled from school for fighting. Evans’[s]
violent behavior escalated from being aggressive with other students to
being aggressive with a teacher. He was eventually classified as
emotionally handicapped and was recommended for the severely
emotionally disturbed program in high school, a program for the most
violent students. School psychology reports described Evans as having
poor impulse control, displaying excessive aggression, and having
difficulty controlling anger. At the evidentiary hearing, Evans’[s] high
school teacher, Barbara McFadden, and counselor, Margaret
O’Shaunessy, also described Evans as angry, violent, impulsive, and
having an explosive temper.
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 6–7. All of the lay witnesses testified that they would have
testified at Evans’s trial if they had been asked. But while both Lilly and Sandra
Evans testified at the penalty phase, only Lilly was asked before trial to do so.
Three mental health experts also testified at the evidentiary hearing: Dr.
Carpenter, Dr. Dee, and Dr. McClaren. All three testified that Evans “had brain
damage attributable to his head injury.” Evans II, 846 So. 2d at 7. The experts
also “agreed that the difference between Evans’[s] verbal and performance scores
8
on his IQ test indicated possible brain damage as further evidenced by his learning
disabilities.” Id. But Dr. Carpenter and Dr. Dee parted ways with Dr. McClaren
“over whether Evans’[s] brain damage led to any particular behavior.” Id. at 7–8.
Dr. Carpenter and Dr. Dee opined that Evans “suffered from an
uncontrollable rage reaction or impulse disorder as a result of the brain damage.”
Id. at 8. They agreed that at the time Johnson was shot, Evans’s “behavior
demonstrated that he was experiencing an uncontrollable rage reaction, which was
further exacerbated by his alcohol use.” Id. In Dr. Carpenter’s opinion, Evans’s
“behavior at the time of the shooting was due to alcohol abuse, impulse disorder,
and rage reaction secondary to Evans’[s] closed-head injury.”5 Id. Dr. Dee
testified that Evans’s “alcohol abuse exacerbated his brain damage, causing Evans
to experience an instantaneous rage known as ‘clicking.’”6 Id. Both testified that
5
The Florida Supreme Court stated: “Dr. Carpenter’s ‘clinical impression’ or diagnosis
of Evans was in accordance with Axis I of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed. 2000) (DSM IV) test: ‘Axis I: Alcohol abuse; Impulse Disorder; Rage
Reaction Secondary to Closedhead Injury.’” Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 8 n.13.
6
Dr. Dee’s report provided the following “summary impression” of Evans:
Looking at the lifelong history that Evans has, with learning disabilities, a lack of
behavioral and impulse control, which included frequent rages, often when they were
frankly inexplicable to others, attentional problems, over activity, etc., would
strongly seem to support the diagnosis of cerebral damage early in childhood,
probably resulting from the accident [at] age 3.
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 8 n.14.
9
Evans did not form the intent to kill Johnson. Id. Instead, because of Evans’s
impulse control disorder, both experts testified that he met the criteria for Florida’s
two statutory mental-state mitigators: (1) “[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance,” Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2), “[t]he capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired,” id. at § 921.141(6)(f).7
See Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 8.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, “[w]hile Dr. McClaren agreed that
Evans suffered from a brain dysfunction and some degree of brain damage, he did
not agree that Evans’[s] brain dysfunction led him to behave in any particular
way.” Id. Dr. McClaren opined that Evans’s brain damage was “probably
overshadowed by personality characteristics and the effect of alcohol.” Id. More
specifically, Dr. McClaren testified as follows:
There certainly is evidence that he sustained a closed-head injury as a
young child and subsequently had difficulties with his behavior and
learning in school which progressed to juvenile delinquency and adult
criminality. While some minor degree of brain dysfunction is certainly
a possibility given his history of head injury and emotional and
7
Florida also recognizes a third mental-state statutory mitigating circumstance, but that
mitigator is not relevant to Evans’s case. See Fla. Stats. § 921.141(6)(3)(“[t]he defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”
10
behavioral problems as a child prior to the onset of criminality[,] his
behavior later in life appears to be more associated with a criminal
lifestyle than with the effects of some disabling cognitive disorder of
such a severity to cause impairments which would be a significant
difficulty for him.
Id. at 8 n.16. While Dr. McClaren agreed with the other experts that alcohol was
a significant factor in Evans’s behavior at the time of the shooting, he was
uncertain about the quantity of alcohol that Evans had consumed before the
shooting. See id. at 8–9. He noted that Evans reported not drinking during the car
ride and had indicated that he was under control and otherwise knew what he was
doing. Id. at 9. As a result, Dr. McClaren concluded that Evans did not meet the
criteria for the two statutory mental health mitigators, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) &
(f).8 Id. at 9.
8
Dr. McClaren offered a diagnosis of Evans under the DSM-IV that differed from that of
Dr. Dee and Dr. Carpenter:
Dr. McClaren reported that Evans “appears to meet . . . AXIS I criteria for Alcohol
Abuse in Remission in a Controlled Environment and AXIS II diagnosis of
Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Dr. McClaren further noted that Evans “probably
meets the AXIS II diagnosis of Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified with
Narcissistic and Paranoid Traits.” Dr. McClaren also reported that he could not rule
out the “possibility” that Evans “suffers from a Cognitive Disorder, Not Otherwise
Specified, associated with the after affects of a childhood concussion and other blows
to the head . . . given his documented history of head injury as a child, as well as
. . . fights, football, and boxing.”
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 8 n.16.
11
Evans’s trial counsel also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He testified
that he met with Evans two times between the time of his initial appointment and
the start of trial for a total of approximately four hours. Trial counsel testified that
he did not investigate Evans’s “mental health because his conversations with
Evans gave him no reason to believe that Evans was insane or incompetent.” Id.
Further, trial counsel affirmed that the presentence investigation report (PSI)
prepared for sentencing “indicated that his mental health was perfect and that he
had only seen a mental heath expert when he was young.” Id.
Trial counsel explained that he presented an accidental shooting defense
during the guilt phase because Evans insisted on it. Id. Although trial counsel
was aware there was evidence that Evans had been drinking leading up to the
shooting, Evans told him he was not drunk and knew what he was doing. Id. In
short, trial counsel testified that he had no reason to question Evans’s veracity and
planned to exploit inconsistencies in the evidence to create reasonable doubt. Id.
Further, trial counsel testified that the accident theory was supported by Evans’s
statements and there was no evidence to support a heat of passion defense. Id.
With respect to the penalty phase, trial counsel testified that he started
preparing more than five months prior to trial. He met with Lilly for
approximately thirty-minutes and asked her to collect good character witnesses
12
because Evans could face the death penalty. According to Lilly’s testimony, trial
counsel told her he only wanted good character information. Trial counsel
testified that Lilly told him that Evans had been an obedient child and had
received good grades in school. Trial counsel asked Lilly to provide him names of
potential character witnesses, whom he later contacted by mail. Lilly testified that
trial counsel did not explain mitigation to her; that trial counsel did not address
other matters during their meeting; that she never met with a defense investigator;
that she only met with trial counsel this one time prior to trial; and that trial
counsel otherwise did not have time to discuss the case with her; but that she did
speak with counsel at trial prior to her testimony. Based on his interview with
Lilly, trial counsel “adopted the strategy of showing Evans’[s] redeeming
qualities, such as how Evans spent time with his children and devoted time to his
grandmother, at the penalty phase.” Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 9. Thus, without the
benefit of Evans’s school or medical records, which trial counsel never obtained,9
or any awareness of Evan’s closedhead injury, counsel chose to present a positive
character “strategy because he was aware that Evans’s criminal record indicated a
propensity for violence, and he did not want to open the door to the State
9
Although trial counsel was aware that Evans had been a life long resident of the
jurisdiction where the trial was to occur, counsel did not obtain Evans’s school or medical
records.
13
introducing evidence of Evans’[s] acts of violence during his teenage years.”
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 9–10. Moreover, trial counsel testified he did not have
any evidence to support statutory mitigation and did not believe that Evans may
have met the two statutory mental health mitigators. Id. at 10. trial counsel was
not aware that Evans had any problems in school. Id.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the state trial court denied relief on
February 15, 2005 in a written order. With respect to Evans’s claim that trial
counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase (also referred to by Evans, the trial
court, and the Florida Supreme Court as trial counsel’s failure to challenge the
state’s case at penalty phase), the trial court found neither that trial counsel was
deficient nor that Evans had demonstrated prejudice.
5. Postconviction Appeal to Florida Supreme Court
On direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of Evans’s Rule. 3.851 motion,
the Florida Supreme Court considered three ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, including the penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim at issue
in this appeal.10 Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 6, 10–15. After correctly citing to
10
The Florida Supreme Court considered the following three ineffective assistance of
counsel claims: (1) “trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to investigate,
prepare, and present the defense of diminished capacity”; (2) “trial counsel was ineffective at the
penalty phase for failing to adequately challenge the State’s case”; and (3) trial “counsel was
14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), as the governing
standard, Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 10, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of Evans’s penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.
at 11–13. In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court stated:11
Evans next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately investigate his background for mental health mitigation to
present at the penalty phase. Evans claims that defense counsel was
deficient for failing to discover a wealth of mitigating information,
including Evans’[s] brain injury and lifelong emotional and behavioral
problems, and for failing to present anything other than positive
character evidence at the penalty phase. Evans alleges that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient investigation because discovery and
ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to request jury instructions on the statutory mental
health mitigators based on evidence that Evans was drinking at the time of the murder.” Evans
II, 946 So. 2d at 6 (footnote omitted). Evans was only granted a certificate of appealability
(COA) as to claim two [Doc. 23 at 83]; thus, we do not consider these other ineffective
assistance of counsel issues. See Walls v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274, 1278 n.3 (11th Cir. 2011)
(stating we will not consider issues not included in the COA).
We note that claim two had two parts: (1) “counsel was ineffective for failing to request
the appointment of co-counsel to assist” with the penalty phase; and (b) “counsel was ineffective
for failing to adequately investigate Evans’[s] background and discover available mental health
mitigation.” Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 6. Because Evans does not argue the co-counsel issue, we
consider it abandoned and will not address it. See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating “issues not raised by a defendant in his initial brief on appeal are
deemed waived”).
11
We quote extensively from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision because its
factfinding, arguments and theories must be the focus of our inquiry under AEDPA. The
Supreme Court has made clear that “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories
supported . . . the state’s court decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision of [the Supreme Court].” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; see also Johnson, 643 F.3d at
910.
15
presentation of his brain injury and impulse disorder would have led to
an instruction on both mental health statutory mitigators.
We decline to address whether counsel’s investigation was
deficient because we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Evans has
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
present the mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.
“[B]ecause the Strickland standard requires establishment of both
[deficient performance and prejudice] prongs, when a defendant fails to
make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into
whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”
Evans has failed to establish prejudice because the mitigation
evidence he presented at the evidentiary hearing would likely have been
more harmful than helpful. “An ineffective assistance claim does not
arise from the failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence
presents a double-edged sword.” Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437
(Fla. 2004). While the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing
established that Evans suffered from mental health problems, it also
displayed a long history of behavioral problems and escalating violence
throughout his school career. Presenting this evidence at the penalty
phase would have resulted in the jury hearing about Evans’[s]
aggression towards students and teachers, his aggression towards police
officers, his pride in being known as a “jack-boy” because he robs drug
dealers, and his habit of carrying a gun. It is just as likely that this
evidence would have been more “aggravating” than mitigating. See
Reed, 875 So. 2d at 436–37 (denying ineffective assistance claim
because “even if [defense] counsel had . . . investigated further, the
testimony that could have been presented was just as likely to have
resulted in aggravation against rather than mitigation for [the
defendant]”).
Moreover, this mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing is inconsistent with Evans’[s] own testimony at the guilt phase.
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding Evans’[s]
uncontrollable rage disorder is inconsistent with his testimony that he
16
had a “clear recollection” of the shooting because he was focused and
in control.
Based on the foregoing, Evans has not established that there is a
reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different had
counsel discovered and presented the mitigation evidence Evans
presented at the evidentiary hearing. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,
104 S. Ct. [at 2068] (establishing that appropriate test for prejudice is
whether defendant has demonstrated reasonable probability that
outcome would have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors and defining reasonable probability as “probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome”). Therefore, we are confident in
the outcome and affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 12–13 (some citations omitted).
6. Federal Habeas Proceedings
Evans timely filed a § 2254 petition in the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on May 29, 2007, raising fifteen claims. After briefing by the
parties, but without an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the petition
on September 29, 2010. The District Court granted Evans a COA as to his claim
that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A district court’s grant or denial of a habeas corpus petition is reviewed de
novo. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010). AEDPA “imposes a
highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, ___ U.S.
17
___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). Because Evans
seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 based upon a claim that was
adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, we are restricted in our ability to
grant relief by § 2254(d). See Cave v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 638 F.3d 739,
742–43 (11th Cir. 2011). To grant Evans’s habeas petition, we must find not only
that Evans’s constitutional claims are meritorious, but also that the state court’s
resolution of those claims:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cave, 638 F.3d at 742–43. The Supreme Court has
recognized that § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”
clauses each have independent meaning. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.
Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court
precedent in either of two respects: (1) “if the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the
state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
18
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from
[the Supreme Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 120
S. Ct. 1495, 1519–20 (2000).
To determine whether a state court decision is an “unreasonable
application” of clearly established federal law, the Supreme Court recently stated:
The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the
[relevant constitutional] standard was unreasonable. . . . For purposes
of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different
from an incorrect application of federal law. A state court must be
granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case
involves review under the [relevant constitutional] standard itself.
A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court’s decision. And as the [Supreme Court]
has explained, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable
requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule,
the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785–86 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis
omitted).
In addition, a state court’s factual determination is entitled to a presumption
of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But AEDPA’s “statutory presumption of
correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed
determinations of law and fact.” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.
19
2001); see also Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 2006). “An
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact . . . .”
Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 2008).
Moreover, because “the standards created by Strickland [for evaluating the
merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim] and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly
deferential,’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S. Ct. at 2065), “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Id.
(quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420
(2009)); see also, Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403
(2011) (stating double deference standard and reversing grant of habeas relief for
failure to pay adequate deference to state court adjudication of ineffective
assistance of counsel claim); Premo v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 733,
740 (2011) (same); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003)
(same). When § 2254(d) applies to a Strickland claim, “the question is not
whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.
Notwithstanding double deference under AEDPA and Strickland, “[t]he writ
of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in
20
violation of the law.” Id. at 780. Even under AEDPA, we “must be vigilant and
independent in reviewing petitions for the writ.” Id. Indeed, post-AEDPA, the
Supreme Court and this Court have each granted habeas relief based upon penalty
phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, ___
U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455–56 (2009) (granting habeas relief under
AEDPA based on Strickland); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81, 393, 125
S. Ct. 2456, 2462, 2469 (2005) (same); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520,
534–38, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534, 2542–44 (2003) (same); Williams, 529 U.S. at
367, 120 S. Ct. at 1499 (same); Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328,
1356 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Johnson, 643 F.3d at 910–11 (same); Ferrell v. Hall,
640 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2011); Williams, 542 F.3d at 1345 (same).
III. DISCUSSION
Evans contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to investigate and to
present substantial mitigating evidence. Thus, the merits of Evans’s claim are
squarely governed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 390–91, 120 S. Ct. at 1511–12 (holding that Strickland “clearly
established” Supreme Court precedent for evaluating ineffective assistance of
21
counsel claims under AEDPA). We have summarized the Strickland standard as
follows:
Under Strickland [a petitioner] must make two showings. First,
he must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, which
means that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and
was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” In
deciding whether there was deficient performance, courts must review
counsel’s actions in a “highly deferential” manner and “must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.” To overcome Strickland’s
presumption of reasonableness, [a petitioner] must show that “no
competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did
take.”
The second showing required under Strickland is prejudice: the
petitioner must also show that, but for his counsel’s deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different—that is, our confidence in the
outcome must be undermined by counsel’s deficient performance. . . .
Johnson, 643 F.3d at 928–29 (citations omitted). The question of prejudice differs
somewhat between the guilt and penalty phases, as the Supreme Court explained
in Strickland:
When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. When a defendant
challenges a death sentence . . . the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including
an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the
evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.
22
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068–69.
To show prejudice at either phase of a capital trial, “a defendant need not
show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in
the case.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. This is so because an ineffective
assistance of counsel “claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances
that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat
weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.” Id.
at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. “The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable,
and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id.
In making the prejudice determination, a reviewing court “must consider the
totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the
evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence
in aggravation.” Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 453–54 (quotation marks
omitted). In Sears v. Upton, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010), the Supreme
Court recognized that, even where some mitigation evidence was presented by
counsel, it has:
never held that counsel’s effort to present some mitigation evidence
should foreclose an inquiry into whether a facially deficient mitigation
investigation might have prejudiced the defendant. To the contrary, we
23
have consistently explained that the Strickland inquiry requires precisely
the type of probing and fact-specific analysis that the state trial court
failed to undertake below.
Id. at 3266. Taken together, Porter and Sears make clear that Strickland requires a
“probing and fact-specific analysis” in evaluating the totality of the available
evidence. Id. The Supreme Court noted that such a prejudice inquiry “will
necessarily require a court to ‘speculate’ as to the effect of the new evidence . . . .”
Id. With these general principles in mind, we turn to Evans’s claim of penalty
phase ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. Deficient Performance
As a threshold matter, we reject Evans’s argument that we should review
Strickland’s deficiency prong de novo because the Florida Supreme Court based
its decision only on Strickland’s prejudice prong. The state trial court rejected
Evans’s penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim after it determined
that he had not shown deficient performance or prejudice. While it is true that the
Florida Supreme Court, having determined that Evans was not prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence, declined to address whether
counsel’s penalty phase investigation was deficient, it did not disapprove of the
trial court’s conclusion regarding deficiency. See Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 12.
Thus, both Strickland prongs are due AEDPA deference. See Hammond v. Hall,
24
586 F.3d 1289, 1332 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that, when “a state trial court
rejects a claim on one prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test and the
state supreme court, without disapproving that holding, affirms on the other prong,
both of those state court decisions are due AEDPA deference”). Nevertheless, we
do not view this case as presenting a close question about whether the trial court’s
decision on deficiency was objectively reasonable. In light of trial counsel’s
failure to discharge his constitutional duty to conduct a thorough background
investigation—which was well- and long-established at the time of Evans’s 1999
trial—no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s conclusion that
Evans’s counsel was not deficient.
We begin our AEDPA analysis of Strickland’s deficiency prong with the
state trial court because the Florida Supreme Court declined to address
Strickland’s performance prong. See Hammond, 586 F.3d at 1332. The trial court
correctly identified Strickland as the governing standard and concluded that trial
counsel’s actions in investigating mental health mitigation were not deficient. In
doing so, the trial court determined that counsel “conducted a reasonable
investigation, under the circumstances.” Specifically, the trial court relied upon
the following: (1) that trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did
not think Evans was “crazy”; (2) that Evans had told trial counsel the shooting was
25
an accident and that he was a good student; (3) that trial counsel was aware of
Evans’s violent background; and (4) that trial counsel had “sent letters [to] various
people, asking them if they would be character witnesses for the defense.” In
addition, as part of his penalty phase investigation, counsel had spoken with
Evans, his mother, and an aunt. Counsel was also aware of a presentence
investigation in which Evans stated his mental health was perfect. It fairly appears
from the trial court’s order, as well as our review of all the evidentiary hearing
testimony, that trial counsel focused his investigation on developing evidence of
Evans’s “redeeming qualities.” Moreover, the trial court found that counsel
“conducted a reasonable investigation into [Evans’s] background and made a
strategic decision to focus on the positive aspects of [Evans’s] character—not
open the door to all the prior acts of violence perpetrated by [Evans] since his
teenage years.”
Even under the double deference accorded to trial counsel’s performance
under AEDPA and Strickland, we hold that the state trial court’s determination
that counsel was not deficient is either contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law. In this case, trial counsel’s failure
to conduct a constitutionally adequate background investigation meant that he
never knew about significant mitigating evidence, including Evans’s closedhead
26
injury at age three, resulting brain damage, speech and language difficulties,
learning disabilities, and impulse control problems, all of which were documented
by school records and school psychologists when he was seven years old. The
state trial court’s contrary conclusion unreasonably discounts counsel’s duty to
conduct a thorough background investigation as recognized by the Supreme Court
and then-prevailing professional norms.
As early as 1986, and long before Evans’s 1999 trial, the Supreme Court
clearly established that counsel in capital cases have an “obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Williams, 529 U.S. at
368–70, 120 S. Ct. at 1500–01 (finding counsel performed deficiently by failing to
conduct constitutionally adequate penalty phase investigation in 1986 trial); see
also Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 448–49, 452–53 (same except 1988 trial);
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378, 387–89 (same); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515–16, 524–29,
123 S. Ct. at 2532, 2536–39 (same except 1989 trial); see also Ferrell, 640 F.3d at
1234 (holding that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it did not
find ineffective assistance in connection with a 1988 trial where counsel, among
other things, “failed to investigate [the defendant’s] upbringing . . . which would
have uncovered evidence [of his] impoverished and abused childhood”). The
Court has further instructed that under Strickland, “our principal concern . . . is not
27
whether counsel should have presented” mitigating evidence, but rather “whether
the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating
evidence of [the defendant’s] background was itself reasonable.” Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 522–23, 123 S. Ct. at 2536 (emphasis omitted). Of course, we
acknowledge that “the Strickland test of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence,” Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1407 n.17 (quotation marks
omitted), and that “Strickland itself rejected the notion that the same investigation
will be required in every case.” Id. at 1406–07. Thus, “in each case we must
determine whether counsel conducted a reasonable background investigation” or
“made a reasonable decision that made conducting a background investigation
unnecessary.” Johnson, 643 F.3d at 931 (quotation marks omitted). As we have
explained:
The question under Strickland is not whether . . . trial counsel’s overall
performance at the sentence stage was exemplary or even average, but
whether he conducted an adequate background investigation or
reasonably decided to end the background investigation when he did.
See Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1226 (“‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable,’ but those made after ‘less than complete investigation’
are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgment
supports the limitations on investigation.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690–691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).
Id. at 931–32.
28
 Further, although a specific mitigation “theory might be reasonable, in the
abstract, [that fact] does not obviate the need to analyze whether counsel’s failure
to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation before arriving at this particular
theory prejudiced” the defendant. Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3265. “The
‘reasonableness’ of counsel’s theory [is] beside the point [because a defendant]
might be prejudiced by his counsel’s failures, whether his haphazard choice was
reasonable or not.” Id. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Sears:
This point is plain in Williams: We rejected any suggestion that a
decision to focus on one potentially reasonable trial strategy—in that
case, petitioner’s voluntary confession—was “justified by a tactical
decision” when “counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” 529 U.S. at
396[, 1205 S. Ct. at 1515]. A “tactical decision” is a precursor to
concluding that counsel has developed a “reasonable” mitigation theory
in a particular case.
Id.; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522, 123 S. Ct. at 2535 (explaining that
“counsel’s failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at
sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision . . . because counsel had not
‘fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background’” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S. Ct. at 1515)).
Here, trial counsel conducted limited family interviews, relying principally
upon a short thirty-minute interview of Evans’s mother together with form letters
29
sent to possible character witnesses. Counsel did not collect readily available
basic background materials, such as Evans’s school and medical records. No
competent counsel in 1999 would have failed to collect and review such
information especially where, as here, the defendant was a lifelong resident of the
county in which the trial occurred. Similarly, no competent counsel in 1999 would
have conducted only a circumscribed interview of the defendant’s mother and
solicited witnesses with form letters. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989),12 cited in Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 524, 123 S. Ct. at 2536–37. For example, ABA Guideline § 11.4.1
from 1989—reflecting prevailing professional norms ten years prior to Evans’s
trial—provides that counsel’s “investigation should comprise efforts to discover
12
We recognize that the standard for effective assistance of counsel is necessarily a
general one: “representation that does not fall ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness’ in
light of ‘prevailing professional norms.’” Bobby v. Van Hook, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 13,
16 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65). “Restatements of
professional standards . . . can be useful as ‘guides’ to what reasonableness entails . . . to the
extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place.” Id.
Thus, we look to the 1989 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases as a guide to what reasonably diligent counsel would do, not a set of
inexorable commands of what every capital attorney must do. See id. In doing so, we recognize
that the Supreme Court has relied upon ABA guidelines to support its conclusion, post-AEDPA,
that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. See, e.g.,
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387–89, 125 S. Ct. at 2465–67 (referencing 1982 ABA guidelines in
context of 1988 trial); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522–25, 123 S. Ct. at 2535–37 (referencing 1980,
1982, and 1989 ABA guidelines in context of 1989 trial); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S. Ct.
at 1514–15 (referencing 1980 ABA guidelines in context of 1980 trial).
30
all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating
evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” ABA Guideline § 11.4.1(C).
Nor would competent counsel in 1999 fail to explore, at least preliminarily,
all pertinent avenues of mitigation going beyond only good character evidence.
The ABA guideline advised counsel to “explore the existence of other potential
sources of information relating to the offense, the client’s mental state, and the
presence or absence of any aggravating factors under the applicable death penalty
statute and any mitigating factors.” Id. § 11.4.1(D)(2)(B).
In addition, the ABA guidelines recognize the critical importance of
investigating the defendant’s background by collecting the defendant’s medical
and school records. Id. § 11.4.1(D)(2)(C). Specifically, the ABA guidelines
advise counsel to “[c]ollect information relevant to the sentencing phase of trial
including, but not limited to: medical history, (mental and physical illness or
injury, alcohol and drug use, birth trauma and developmental delays); educational
history (achievement, performance and behavior) special educational needs
including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities) . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). Because Evans’s trial counsel did not obtain any of his school or medical
records, trial counsel clearly did not discharge this duty.
31
Neither did Evans’s counsel identify and adequately interview collateral
witnesses. See id. § 11.4.1(D)(3)(B) (recommending that counsel should
interview “witnesses familiar with aspects of the client’s life history that might
affect the . . . possible mitigating reasons for the offense(s), and/or other
mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be sentenced to death”). It
is plain from the state evidentiary hearing that trial counsel only sought to
investigate positive character evidence. While it is true that counsel met with
Evans’s mother Lilly prior to trial and asked her to supply the names of character
witnesses to testify at the penalty phase, it is abundantly clear from the evidentiary
hearing that counsel limited his investigation to, and was only interested in,
positive character evidence.
Trial counsel’s interaction with Lilly Evans exemplifies the limited nature
of his investigation and underscores the corresponding unreasonableness of his so-
called strategic decision to curtail his mitigation investigation. Lilly testified that
she met with trial counsel only once prior to trial, and then only for thirty minutes.
During this brief meeting, counsel advised Lilly that he wanted her to collect as
many character witnesses as possible because Evans could get the death penalty.
By character witnesses, Lilly testified that she understood counsel wanted only
“people that could say some good things about” Evans. She further testified that
32
she related good character evidence to Evans’s counsel. According to Lilly, she
never met with a defense investigator and never met again with Evans’s counsel
until the day of trial. Lilly further testified that counsel never explored other
issues about Evans’s background with her.
That counsel’s background investigation was limited to good character
evidence is further demonstrated by the form letters he sent to penalty phase
character witnesses identified by Lilly.13 During the evidentiary hearing, trial
counsel affirmed that he used these letters to prepare for the penalty phase.
Further, counsel testified that the questions in the letter were intended to establish
13
Those form letters stated:
Dear [X]:
Your name and address was provided to me by Lilly Evans, as a possible
character witness for her son, Wydell Jody Evans, with regard to charges of First
Degree Murder.
Would you please indicate, in your own words, the following:
1. How long you have known Wydell Jody Evans;
2. How to [sic] you know Wydell Jody Evans – as a
a. friend;
b. family member;
c. co-worker;
d. employee;
f. employer.
3. In one or two sentences please indicate what you think of Wydell Jody Evans
as a person and whether or not you feel he committed the crime for which he
has been charged.
33
that Evans was a good person. Indeed, trial counsel confirmed that was his
understanding of what “non-statutory mitigation was.”
Of course, the range of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence is far
wider than just good character evidence, which is what trial counsel understood it
be limited to.14 In light of this misunderstanding of mitigation, it is not surprising
that the form letters he sent to investigate mitigation did not explore the full range
of constitutionally relevant background information.
Because counsel conducted no mitigation investigation beyond Evans’s
good character, he failed to uncover Evans’s closedhead injury at age three,
resulting brain damage, learning disabilities, emotional handicaps, and impulse
control problems, all of which were significant enough at age seven to warrant
psychological assessment by public school authorities. This further supports our
14
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978) (recognizing
that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that capital sentencer not be precluded from
considering, “as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death” (emphasis in original)); see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285–87, 124 S. Ct.
2562, 2570–72 (2004) (stating that “impaired intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating”
and that defendant need not establish nexus between mental capacity and crime for evidence to
be relevant to mitigation); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991)
(“We have held that a State cannot preclude the sentencer from considering ‘any relevant
mitigating evidence’ that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence less than death . . . .
[V]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may
introduce concerning his own circumstances” (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114,
102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982)).
34
conclusion that the state trial court’s failure to find counsel’s performance
deficient was unreasonable under AEDPA. See Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1229–30
(“Because Ferrell’s counsel failed to conduct a mitigation investigation beyond
Ferrell’s character, they failed to uncover additional, obvious evidence of serious
mental illness, further compounding our conclusion that the [state court’s] failure
to find their mitigation investigation deficient was unreasonable.”).
Furthermore, counsel unreasonably failed to follow up on the limited
background information he did have. For example, the Florida Supreme Court
noted that attorney “[Counsel] testified that the presentence investigation reports
(PSI) from Evans’[s] prior convictions indicated that his mental health was perfect
and that he had only seen a mental heath expert when he was young.” Evans II,
946 So. 2d at 9 (emphasis added). Thus, while the state courts emphasized that
Evans had reported “perfect” mental health in his PSI reports, the PSIs also
reported that he had “seen a mental health expert when he was young.” Id. This
information should have been a “red flag” to trial counsel, alerting him to the need
to conduct a follow-up investigation. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392, 125 S. Ct. at
2468–69. No competent counsel in 1999 would have failed to follow-up on such
information. Prompted by this red flag, competent counsel would have then
obtained and reviewed school and medical records, for example. And armed with
35
these records, competent counsel would have investigated Evans’s mental health
and consequently discovered his history of brain damage.
Moreover, the state trial court all but ignored counsel’s obligation to
undertake a thorough and adequate investigation. The trial court side-stepped, and
therefore unreasonably applied Wiggins and its progeny, by placing undue
emphasis on trial counsel’s decision to portray Evans as a “good guy,” despite the
undisputed evidence that trial counsel reached that decision without first
collecting readily available school and medical records or adequately interviewing
family members. Indeed, prior to trial, the only mitigation investigation counsel
conducted was meeting twice with Evans for at total of approximately four
hours,15 meeting once with Lilly Evans for about thirty minutes, and mailing form
letters to potential character witnesses.
While the state trial court indicated that trial counsel’s penalty phase
investigation also included speaking with Evans’s aunt, the record clearly
15
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he only met with Evans for a total
of four hours between the time of his appointment and the first day of trial. He met with Evans
once on December 23, 1998 for two hours and again just before trial on October 23, 1999 for
another two hours. Although we do not categorically find that four hours is an insufficient
amount of time to meet with a capital defendant for the purpose of preparing both phases of a
capital trial, such limited contact between an attorney and an incarcerated capital defendant prior
to trial supports our conclusion that counsel’s penalty phase investigation was unreasonable.
This is especially true given trial counsel’s other limited and cursory efforts to investigate and
prepare for the penalty phase.
36
indicates that Aunt Sandra Evans became a penalty phase witness by
happenstance. Sandra testified during the evidentiary hearing that she became a
character witness at the penalty phase only after she fortuitously attended closing
arguments during the guilt phase. Although Sandra testified that she had lived in
the same house as Evans and knew him his entire life, she had never been
contacted by trial counsel about testifying prior to trial. Further, Sandra testified
that counsel spoke with her less than five minutes just prior to her penalty phase
testimony and that they did not discuss mitigation. Instead, Sandra testified that
defense counsel told her to say only good things about Evans at the penalty phase.
Had counsel explored the full range of mitigation with Sandra, instead of limiting
his investigation to good character evidence, he would have discovered substantial
mitigation. Sandra witnessed Evans being struck by a car at the age of three. She
testified that after Evans came home from the hospital he “was just totally
different.” In her words, “[h]e wasn’t like the same kid I used to know.” Sandra
testified that counsel never asked her about these matters but she would have
testified to these facts at the penalty phase had she been asked. Thus, trial counsel
was deficient because he failed to adequately utilize the family members to whom
he had spoken. See Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1230–32 (finding that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient, in part, because he failed to elicit significant and
37
powerful mitigating evidence from witnesses who were willing to testify if
counsel had asked them about the defendant’s background).
The state trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel made a strategic decision
to present only good character evidence, despite counsel’s lack of investigation,
smacks of the kind of “post-hoc rationalization” rejected in Wiggins. Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 526-527, 123 S. Ct. at 2538. Notably, on the deficiency prong,
Evans’s counsel did far less to investigate mitigation than trial counsel in Wiggins.
In Wiggins, trial counsel did not put on any mental health mitigation or life history
evidence, such as evidence of petitioner’s physical and sexual abuse, because
counsel decided before trial to focus their efforts on retrying the factual case and
disputing Wiggins’s direct responsibility for the crime. See id. at 516–17, 123 S.
Ct. at 2533. Although trial counsel in Wiggins retained a mental health expert
who evaluated the defendant, counsel did not compile a life history with the
assistance of a forensic social worker. Acknowledging these facts, the state court
denied relief, stating, “when the decision not to investigate . . . is a matter of trial
tactics, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 517–18, 123 S. Ct. at
2533 (quotation marks omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that trial
counsel had made “a deliberate, tactical decision to concentrate their effort at
38
convincing the jury” that Wiggins was not directly responsible. Id. at 518, 123 S.
Ct. at 2533 (quotation marks omitted). The state court specifically found that trial
counsel “knew of Wiggins’[s] unfortunate childhood” because they had available
to them the PSI, as well as “more detailed social service records that recorded
incidences of physical and sexual abuse, an alcoholic mother, placements in foster
care, and borderline mental retardation.” Id. (quotation marks and citations
omitted). While the state court acknowledged that the information counsel had
was not as graphic or as detailed as the information developed by a forensic social
worker in the postconviction hearing, the state court found “counsel did
investigate and were aware of appellant’s background.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). As a result, the state court concluded that counsel made a reasoned
choice to proceed with what they perceived was their best defense. Id. at 518, 123
S. Ct. at 2533–34.
Notwithstanding the state court’s conclusion about the strategy of Wiggins’s
counsel, the Supreme Court found that the state court unreasonably applied
Strickland and made an unreasonable determination of the facts, within the
meaning of AEDPA. Id. at 527, 123 S. Ct. at 2538. In doing so, the Court
emphasized that: (1) “petitioner’s claim stems from counsel’s decision to limit the
scope of their investigation into potential mitigating evidence;” and (2) that trial
39
counsel attempted to justify their limited investigation as reflecting a tactical
decision. Id. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535. In rejecting the contention that trial
counsel made a reasonable tactical decision, which is substantially the same as the
argument advanced by the state in Evans’s case, the Supreme Court in Wiggins
emphasized an aspect of Strickland that bears repeating:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support
the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness
case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed
for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure
of deference to counsel’s judgments.
Id. at 521–22, 123 S. Ct at 2535 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S.
Ct. at 2066) (emphasis added). The Court in Wiggins ultimately concluded,
“[w]hen viewed in this light, the ‘strategic decision’ the state courts and
respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit of mitigating evidence
resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct than an accurate
description of their deliberations prior to sentencing. Id. at 526–527, 123 S. Ct. at
2538.
40
We believe the Supreme Court’s reasoning and conclusion apply equally to
Evans’s case. Even assuming that defense counsel limited the scope of his
investigation for strategic reasons, Wiggins make clear that “Strickland does not
establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with
respect to sentencing strategy.” Id. at 527, 123 S. Ct. at 2538. In Evans’s case, the
state trial court assumed that, because counsel had obtained some information with
respect to Evans’s background, (i.e., talking to Evans and his mother and sending
out form letters), trial counsel was in a position to make a tactical decision not to
conduct further investigation and instead to present a good character defense.
This was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Further, the state trial court focused on whether trial counsel should “have
presented [mitigation evidence],” instead of considering “whether the
investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of
[the defendant’s] background was itself reasonable.” Id. at 523, 123 S. Ct. at 2536
(emphasis omitted). That the state trial court’s focus was misplaced is reflected
throughout its order. For example, after summarizing the positive character
mitigation that was presented at the penalty phase, the state trial court concluded
that Evans “has not shown that his attorney was ineffective for failing to further
investigate his mental health and to present this information in mitigation.” The
41
trial court then noted trial counsel was “aware of Evans’[s] prior criminal record . .
. . [and] was also aware that [Evans] had stated his mental health was perfect.”
The court went on to find that trial counsel made a “reasonable investigation into
the Defendant’s background and made a strategic decision to focus on the positive
aspects of the Defendant’s character—and not open the door to all the prior acts of
violence perpetrated by the Defendant since his teenage years.” Moreover, the
state trial court’s discussion of deficiency focuses almost entirely on whether trial
counsel should have presented the mitigation he did not know of, instead of on
counsel’s decision not to investigate. This is an unreasonable application of
Strickland’s deficiency prong.
In sum, Evans’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he
terminated his investigation too early, before having completed the kind of
thorough investigation contemplated by Wiggins and then-prevailing professional
norms. See Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3264 (agreeing with state court’s determination
that the “the cursory nature of counsel’s investigation into mitigation
evidence—‘limited to one day or less, talking to witnesses selected by
[defendant’s] mother’—was ‘on its face . . . constitutionally inadequate’” (citation
omitted)). Had trial counsel collected readily available medical records, or
interviewed family members about Evans’s medical or psychological history, he
42
would have learned about the closedhead injury from the car accident. Similarly,
had counsel obtained Evans’s school records or interviewed any of his special
education teachers and counselors who lived in the community, he would have
also learned about the closedhead injury because it was documented in his school
records along with his learning disability, emotional handicap, and impulse control
problems. “Whether or not those omissions were sufficiently prejudicial to have
affected the outcome of sentencing, they clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did
not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S. Ct. at 1514–15.
Here, counsel’s decision to focus his investigation on Evans’s good
character was not an informed decision based upon a constitutionally adequate
investigation. As in Wiggins, and in breach of well-defined norms in existence at
the time of Evans’s 1999 penalty phase, Evans’s trial counsel “abandoned [his]
investigation of [Evans’s] background after having acquired only rudimentary
knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524,
123 S. Ct. 2537; see also Johnson, 643 F.3d at 934–35 (finding, under AEDPA,
that trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate defendant’s background was
deficient performance and that state court’s contrary conclusion was an
unreasonable application of Strickland); Williams, 542 F.3d at 1340–1342
43
(holding, under AEDPA, that trial counsel was deficient when they tried to obtain
firsthand knowledge about the defendant’s background only from the defendant’s
mother and that state court’s contrary conclusion was an unreasonable application
of Strickland).
Although counsel’s decision to focus on good character evidence might be
“reasonable, in the abstract, [it] does not obviate the need to analyze whether
counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation before arriving at
this particular theory prejudiced” the defendant. Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3265. While
we accept that the state trial court made a factual determination that trial counsel
made a strategic decision to limit the scope of his investigation, the reasonableness
of trial counsel’s decision is a question of law. Collier, 177 F.3d at 1199
(quotation marks and citations omitted). For all these reasons, we hold that the
state trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision
to limit his background investigation to good character evidence was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court
precedent. See generally, Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447; Rompilla, 545 U.S.
374, 125 S. Ct. 2456; Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527; Williams, 529 U.S.
362, 120 S. Ct. 1495.
B. Prejudice
44
Because the Florida Supreme Court adjudicated the merits of Evans’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on Strickland’s prejudice prong, its
decision as to prejudice is entitled to deference under AEDPA. See Hammond,
586 F.3d at 1332. Further, since the Florida Supreme Court correctly identified
Strickland as the governing Supreme Court principle, we ask whether the state
court’s adjudication of prejudice “involved an unreasonable application” of
Strickland when it concluded that Evans was not prejudiced. See Williams, 529
U.S. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case”). After carefully reviewing the
Florida Supreme Court’s written opinion, we hold that it unreasonably applied
Strickland. Specifically, Porter v. McCollum makes plain that a state court
unreasonably applies Strickland’s prejudice prong when it does “not consider or
unreasonably discount[s] the mitigation evidence adduced in the [state]
postconviction hearing.” 130 S. Ct. at 454.
An understanding of the facts in Porter v. McCollum, especially the
reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court with respect to its Strickland prejudice
analysis in Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2001), is critical to understanding
45
the Supreme Court’s holding in the case. In Porter v. State, the defendant was
convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on one of
those counts. 788 So. 2d at 919–20. After Porter’s conviction and death sentence
became final on direct review, he filed a motion for postconviction relief in the
state trial court alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland.
Id. at 920. Porter claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed
to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. Id. at
921. The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and was presented
with evidence describing Porter’s abusive childhood, his heroic military service
and the trauma he suffered while serving, and his long-term substance abuse. Id.
at 921–24. The evidence included conflicting testimony from the state’s and
defendant’s mental health experts regarding two statutory mental-state mitigating
circumstances: (1) substantial impairment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b); and (2)
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. at § 921.141(6)(f). Id. at 923. The
state trial court found the defense expert’s testimony that the statutory mental-state
mitigators were present to be speculative and not supported by the evidence, and
credited the state expert’s contrary testimony. Id. The state trial court denied
relief and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to
46
meet the prejudice requirement of Strickland. Id. at 925. In doing so, the Florida
Supreme Court stated:
At the conclusion of the postconviction evidentiary hearing in this case,
the trial court had before it two conflicting expert opinions over the
existence of mitigation. Based upon our case law, it was then for the
trial court to resolve the conflict by the weight the trial court afforded
one expert’s opinion as compared to the other. The trial court did this
and resolved the conflict by determining that the greatest weight was to
be afforded the State’s expert. We accept this finding by the trial court
because it was based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Id. at 923.
After losing in the state courts, Porter then sought and was granted federal
habeas relief in the District Court based upon ineffective assistance of counsel at
the penalty phase. See Porter v. Crosby, No. 6:03-cv-1465-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL
1747316, *23–31 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2007). But this Court reversed because it
did not find anything unreasonable about the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2003). See Porter v. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d
1260, 1272–75 (11th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s
judgment in part and held that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied
Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 454–455.
The Supreme Court stated its reasoning as follows:
47
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Porter was not prejudiced by
his counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough—or even
cursory—investigation is unreasonable. The Florida Supreme Court
either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the mitigation
evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing. Under Florida law,
mental health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a
statutory mitigating circumstance may nonetheless be considered by the
sentencing judge and jury as mitigating. Indeed, the Constitution
requires that “the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to
consider any relevant mitigating factor.” Yet neither the postconviction
trial court nor the Florida Supreme Court gave any consideration for the
purpose of nonstatutory mitigation to [the defense expert’s] testimony
regarding the existence of a brain abnormality and cognitive defects.
While the State’s experts identified perceived problems with the tests
that [the defense expert] used and the conclusions that he drew from
them, it was not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that his
testimony might have had on the jury or the sentencing judge.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
We believe that Porter v. McCollum compels the conclusion that the Florida
Supreme Court, in Evans’s case, “did not consider or unreasonably discounted the
non-statutory mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing.” Id. at
454. While we acknowledge that Dr. McClaren may have disagreed with the
defense expert’s conclusions regarding the extent of Evans’s brain damage and the
conclusions that were drawn from his medical and school records (i.e., the
defense’s contention that it supported the existence of statutory mental-state
48
mitigators), “it was not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that his testimony
might have had on the jury or the sentencing judge.” Id. at 455.
Much of Evans’s mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
was not rebutted. All three experts agreed that Evans had been hit by a car,
suffered brain damage, and that the evidence from his school records and teachers
showed that he was emotionally handicapped, severely learning disabled, and had
difficulty controlling his impulses long before the onset of his criminality and
alcohol abuse at age twelve. Indeed, it is not disputed that Evans was hit by a car
when he was three years old, stopped breathing, was rushed to the hospital, and
was later diagnosed with a closedhead injury and probable concussion. It is not
disputed that following the accident, Evans had problems with his speech and
behavior. Nor is it disputed that, by age seven at the latest, Evans’s cognitive
deficits and impulse control problems manifested themselves to such a degree as
to warrant psychological testing by school authorities. As a result, Evans was
thereafter classified as severely learning disabled, emotionally handicapped, and
unable to adequately control his impulsive behavior.
Nevertheless, Dr. McClaren disagreed with the opinions of Evans’s experts
that this evidence rose to the level of statutory mental-state mitigation.
Specifically, Dr. McClaren questioned whether Evans’s adult conduct and
49
criminality, particularly at the time of the offense, were caused by these factors.
Dr. McClaren testified on this point at the evidentiary hearing as follows:
There certainly is evidence that [Evans] sustained a closed head injury
as a young child and subsequently had difficulties with his behavior and
learning in school which progressed to juvenile delinquency and adult
criminality. While some minor degree of brain dysfunction is certainly
a possibility given his history of head injury and emotional and
behavioral problems as a child prior to the onset of criminality[,] his
behavior later in life appears to be more associated with a criminal
lifestyle than with the effects of some disabling cognitive disorder of
such a severity to cause impairments which would be a significant
difficulty for him.
Evans II, 946 So. 2d at 9 n.16.
We are not persuaded by the District Court’s attempt to distinguish Porter v.
McCollum from Evans’s case. The District Court reasoned that, unlike Porter v.
McCollum, the Florida Supreme Court “did address the new mitigating evidence
in its opinion, and found that although the evidence established [Evans] suffered
from mental health problems, the evidence also showed a history of escalating
violence.” But in our view, this analysis misapprehends the Supreme Court’s
holding in Porter v. McCollum.
In Porter v. McCollum, the Supreme Court explained that the state court’s
prejudice analysis was unreasonable because it “either did not consider or
unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction
50
hearing.” 130 S. Ct. at 454. Given the context of this statement, we interpret this
language to mean that a state court unreasonably applies Strickland’s prejudice
prong when it fails to consider, or unreasonably discounts to irrelevance,
significant mitigation that does not rise to the level of statutory mitigation and its
probable effect on the sentencer.
In other words, the error recognized in Porter v. McCollum cannot be
merely that the Florida Supreme Court literally failed to address or discuss the new
mitigating evidence in its opinion. Even a cursory examination of the Florida
Supreme Court’s written opinion in Porter v. State reveals that that court explicitly
addressed Porter’s new mitigating evidence by reviewing the evidence adduced at
the state court evidentiary hearing at length. See 788 So. 2d at 921–25. Indeed,
the Florida Supreme Court gave a detailed description of the mitigation presented
by Porter at his state court evidentiary hearing. See id. at 922–25. Despite this
lengthy exposition of the mitigation, however, the Supreme Court clearly held that
the Florida Supreme Court’s application of Strickland’s prejudice analysis was
unreasonable. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 454–55. This is because
Porter v. McCollum stands for something different than the notion that a state
court must mention all of the mitigation presented by a defendant in state
postconviction proceedings in order to properly conduct Strickland’s prejudice
51
analysis. Rather, Porter v. McCollum confirms that Strickland’s prejudice analysis
must focus on the obligation of the judge and jury to consider mitigation, as well
as the important role of the jury in the determination of life and death. This
principle is reflected in three aspects of the Court’s analysis in Porter v.
McCollum.
First, the Supreme Court in Porter v. McCollum emphasized the important
role of the jury in Florida’s capital punishment statute in relation to Strickland’s
prejudice standard:
Under Strickland, a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient
performance if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” In Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as
to the existence and weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the punishment, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3), but he must give the jury
verdict of life or death “great weight.” Porter must show that but for his
counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have
received a different sentence. To assess that probability, we consider
“the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at
trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding”—and
“reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.”
Id. at 453–54 (some citations omitted). Applying this standard, the Supreme
Court’s analysis emphasized the effect of trial counsel’s errors on the sentencing
jury. See id. at 454 (“The judge and jury at Porter’s original sentencing heard
almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow them to accurately gauge his
52
moral culpability.”); id. (“Had Porter’s counsel been effective, the judge and jury
would have learned of the ‘kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to
assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.’” (quoting Wiggins, at 535, 123 S. Ct. at
2542)); id. (stating, the judge and jury did not hear evidence which “might well
have influenced the jury’s appraisal of [Porter’s] moral culpability” (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S. Ct. at 1515)); id. at 455 (“[T]he relevance of
Porter’s extensive combat experience is not only that he served honorably . . . but
also that the jury might find mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional
toll that combat took on Porter.”)
Second, what is important under Strickland’s prejudice analysis is the jury’s
appraisal of the evidence, including credibility.16 “Under Florida law, mental
16
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S. Ct. 1555
(1995), confirms the idea that the jury’s appraisal of credibility must be considered in the
prejudice analysis. Kyles involved a prosecutor’s duty to turn over favorable evidence to the
accused under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). In this context, Kyles
rejected the notion that a habeas court should evaluate the “materiality” of withheld evidence
exclusively through the eyes of the postconviction judge, by stating:
Justice Scalia [dissenting] suggests that we should ‘gauge’ Burns’s credibility by
observing that the state judge presiding over Kyles’s postconviction proceeding did
not find Burns’s testimony in that proceeding to be convincing, and by noting that
Burns has since been convicted for killing Beanie. Of course, neither observation
could possibly have affected the jury’s appraisal of Burns’s credibility at the time of
Kyles’s trials.
Kyles, 514 U.S. 419, 449 n.19, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1573 n.19 (emphasis added). While Brady’s
standard is formulated somewhat differently than Strickland’s standard, as the Supreme Court
53
health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a statutory mitigating
circumstance may nontheless be considered by the sentencing judge and jury as
mitigating.” Id. at 454 (citing Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 17–18 (Fla. 2007)).
Also, “the Constitution requires that ‘the sentencer in capital cases must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor,’” id at 454–55 (quoting
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S. Ct. 869, 875 (1982)), and give
that mitigating evidence effect.17 As a consequence, although a reviewing court
may resolve a conflict in expert testimony regarding the existence of statutory
mitigating evidence against a defendant, it may not fail to give, for example, “any
has recognized, Brady’s materiality test was adopted from Strickland’s prejudice standard. See
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985) (adopting Strickland’s
“reasonable probability test” for prejudice as Brady’s materiality standard).
17
It is black letter law that sentencing judges and juries in capital cases must give
independent weight to evidence of the defendant’s character, record, and background, as well as
any circumstances of the offense that might justify a penalty less severe than death. See, e.g.,
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S. Ct. at 2965 (plurality opinion) (holding it unconstitutional to
exclude evidence of defendant’s age, minor role in offense, and absence of intent to cause death);
see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–99, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824 (1987) (reversing the
Eleventh Circuit and holding Florida’s death penalty scheme was unconstitutional to the extent it
excluded evidence of defendant’s family background and capacity for rehabilitation); Abdul-
Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007) (holding it
unconstitutional to preclude jury from giving meaningful effect to all mitigating evidence that
could provide basis for refusing to impose death penalty); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286,
294–296, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1713–14 (2007) (holding it unconstitutional to preclude jury from
giving meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence of defendant’s mental illness, substance
abuse, and troubled childhood); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8–9, 106 S. Ct. 1669,
1673 (1986) (holding it unconstitutional to exclude evidence of defendant’s good behavior
during post-arrest incarceration).
54
consideration for the purpose of nonstatutory mitigation to [expert] testimony
regarding the existence of a brain abnormality or cognitive deficit.” Id. at 455.
Said another way, where there is a conflict in the evidence about the import of
mitigating evidence that may require credibility determinations, it is “not
reasonable to discount entirely the effect that [expert] testimony might have had
on the jury.” Id.
Thus, a reviewing court applying Strickland’s prejudice standard must
consider the jury’s perspective. The question is whether there is a reasonable
probability of a different outcome from the sentencer. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (“[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”).
This necessarily includes considering the probability that a reasonable jury, after
hearing conflicting expert testimony, “would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstanced did not warrant death.” Id. at 695, 104
S. Ct. at 2069.
Third, and finally, while Porter v. McCollum clearly stands for the
proposition that a defendant’s heroic or distinguished military service for this
country is inherently a significant type of mitigating evidence, and therefore
55
cannot be ignored in Strickland’s prejudice analysis, the reasoning of Porter v.
McCollum is not limited to war heroes for several reasons. To begin, nothing in
Porter v. McCollum itself indicates the Supreme Court meant for its holding to be
so limited. Indeed, Porter v. McCollum illustrates how courts must apply
Strickland’s prejudice standard. It did not break any new legal ground. Rather, it
is an example of an unreasonable application of an old rule established by
Strickland.
It is also true that the Court in Porter v. McCollum not only concerned itself
with the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to consider and give effect to Porter’s
military service, but was equally concerned with the fact that Porter’s jury never
heard about other constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, such as Porter’s
“childhood history of physical abuse, and . . . his brain abnormality, difficulty
reading and writing, and limited schooling.” 130 S. Ct. at 454. The Court
emphasized that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is
relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may
be less culpable.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 319, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)); id. at 448 (noting that Porter’s
56
“commanding officer’s moving description of [Porter’s combat service] was only a
fraction of the mitigating evidence that his counsel failed to discover or present
during the penalty phase of his trial” (emphasis added)).
Also, independent of Porter’s heroic military service, the Court found “it
was not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that [the defense expert’s]
testimony might have had on the jury or the sentencing judge,” notwithstanding
the state court’s conclusion that the expert evidence did not rise to the level of
statutory mitigation. Id. at 454.
And finally in this regard, after Porter v. McCollum was decided, the
Supreme Court relied on it to support its reversal in Sears v. Upton. Sears is the
most recent example of the Supreme Court’s finding “deficiency and prejudice in
other cases in which counsel presented what could be described as a superficially
reasonable mitigation theory.” 130 S. Ct. at 3266 (citing Porter v. McCollum). In
Sears, the Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court for misapplying
Strickland’s prejudice inquiry and determining that the defendant was not
prejudiced by trial counsel’s facially inadequate mitigation investigation. See id.
at 3264–65. The mitigation that was developed during Sears’s state
postconviction hearing did not include heroic military service. Rather, Sears’s
unpresented mitigation evidence showed he was the victim of childhood abuse
57
and, like Evans, struggled in school from a young age with substantial behavioral
problems. See id. at 3262. Also just like Evans, by the time Sears reached high
school he was “described as severely learning disabled and as severely
behaviorally handicapped.” Id. at 3262.
Unlike the Florida courts in Evans’s case, this Court has the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. McCollum to guide our analysis and
understanding of Strickland’s prejudice inquiry. Again, we do not interpret Porter
v. McCollum as creating new law but rather as illustrating how Strickland’s
prejudice test must be properly applied. Porter v. McCollum compels the
conclusion that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice prong
in Evans’s case.
Like Porter, the state courts in Evans’s case failed to give any meaningful
consideration to the unrebutted testimony of brain damage, learning disability, and
emotional handicap by the experts and lay witnesses for “the purpose of
nonstatutory” mitigation. Even assuming the jury would have completely agreed
with Dr. McClaren’s opinion that these conditions did not directly contribute to
Evans’s inability to control his impulses at the time of the offense, and therefore
establish statutory mental health mitigation, this evidence is relevant mitigation
that could have been considered by the sentencing judge and jury. As a result, it
58
should have been weighed by the Florida Supreme Court in its prejudice analysis.
Yet, that court failed to do so because, as in Porter v. McCollum, it unreasonably
discounted this evidence to “irrelevance” insofar as it assumed the evidence was
more harmful than helpful. In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the
possibility that competent counsel could have turned the negative evidence into
support for his mitigation theory. That Evans was disruptive and otherwise a
difficult student with escalating patterns of violence is consistent with evidence of
brain damage and an impulse control disorder. Indeed, that was the testimony of
Evans’s post-conviction mental health experts. Just as evidence that Porter went
AWOL following combat was consistent with his theory of mitigation, so too was
evidence of Evans’ disruptive behavior in school. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S.
Ct. at 455; cf. Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3263 (“[T]he fact that Sears’ brother is a
convicted drug dealer and user, and introduced Sears to a life of crime, actually
would have been consistent with a mitigation theory portraying Sears as an
individual with diminished judgment and reasoning skills, who may have desired
to follow in the footsteps of an older brother who had shut him out of his life.”
(citation omitted)). To conclude otherwise represents, like Porter, a “failure to
engage” with what Evans went through as a result of his closedhead injury,
59
resulting brain damage, learning disabilities, and impulse control problems. Porter
v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 455.
We recognize that evidence of Evans’s teenage alcohol abuse and violence
may have been a double edged sword, though only at a certain chronological
point. But we cannot agree that Evans’s closedhead injury at the age of three,
resulting brain damage, and academic and behavioral difficulties in school are
more harmful than helpful, as the state courts concluded. Just the opposite is true.
We emphasize that undisputed brain damage resulting from a traumatic brain
injury is inherently mitigating. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hall, 570 F.3d 1283,
1311–15 (11th Cir. 2009) (Carnes, J., dissenting) (discussing the significance of a
capital defendant’s head injury and brain damage in the context of a penalty phase
ineffective assistance of counsel claim), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub. nom.
by Jefferson v. Upton, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010).
We emphasize as well the early onset of Evans’s mental health problems:
Evans’s difficulty in controlling his impulsive behavior, as well as his learning
disabilities, were documented by school records and psychological testing no later
than age seven. Such undisputed mitigation evidence must be given some credit in
the Strickland prejudice analysis, notwithstanding Evans’s later teenage alcohol
abuse and criminality. See, e.g, Cooper, 646 F.3d at 1355 (“We acknowledge that
60
evidence of alcoholism and drug abuse is often a two-edged sword which can
harm a capital defendant as easily as it can help him at sentencing. However, we
credit [defendant’s] evidence of alcohol abuse beginning at age 11 as mitigation,
as it was used as a way to escape his horrible background.” (quotation marks and
citations omitted)); cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70, 125 S. Ct. 1183,
1194–95 (2005) (recognizing, generally, the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders in terms of moral culpability); id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (“The
susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’” (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699 (1988)
(plurality opinion)); id. ([Juveniles’] vulnerability and comparative lack of control
over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults
to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment.”).
In sum, it was unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to discount
Evans’s postconviction evidence of mitigation to irrelevance in its Strickland
analysis. Its decision therefore is not entitled to AEDPA deference because it was
an unreasonable application of Strickland’s prejudice test.
61
We conclude that Evans has satisfied Strickland’s demanding standard of
deficiency and prejudice. His trial counsel presented no mental health mitigating
evidence, statutory or otherwise. Trial counsel failed to investigate or obtain
Evans’s school or medical records, and conducted unreasonably limited family
interviews, despite the fact that Evans had lived in the community his whole life.
Cf. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 384–86, 390–93, 125 S. Ct. at 2464–65, 2467–69
(holding under AEDPA, that trial counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase
where counsel failed to obtain or examine defendant’s prior conviction file, which
was a public document and “readily available” at the courthouse where the
defendant was tried).
As a result of counsel’s deficient performance, trial counsel was unaware of
Evans’s closedhead injury, brain damage, impulse control disorder, and learning
disabilities. There was ample nonstatutory mitigating evidence that counsel could
have presented which would have painted a remarkably different picture of Evans,
but that the jury never heard. Much of this evidence was not disputed by even the
state’s expert. Further, it is not difficult to imagine that competent counsel could
have used this evidence to argue for a life sentence, even if it did not rise to the
level of statutory mitigation. For example, evidence of Evans’s brain damage and
impulse control disorder, either alone or in combination with his alcohol use and
62
abuse, are consistent with a theory of defense that the killing was a spontaneous
act, and therefore not deserving of death. See Evans I, 838 So. 2d at 1099 (Shaw,
J., dissenting joined by Anstead, C.J., and Pariente, J.) (“The victim made the fatal
mistake of laughing which incensed Evans to the point that he pulled out a gun
and shot her in the chest. There is nothing in the record to show that this was a
planned or premeditated killing. In fact, the record reflects that the shooting was a
spontaneous response to what Evans obviously felt was inappropriate laughter.”).
In light of all this, we hold “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104
S. Ct. at 2069. Had Evans’s jury been confronted with the considerable mitigating
evidence that was presented during the postconviction proceedings, “there is a
reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.”
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536, 123 S. Ct. at 2543.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons above, we vacate the order of the District Court with
respect to Evans’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.
Except for this claim, we affirm the remainder of the District Court’s order. This
63
case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas
corpus as to Evans’s penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim
consistent with this opinion.
64
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I dissent in this case largely because I believe that the Florida Supreme
Court decision of no prejudice is a decision that is within the range of reasonable
decisions that could be made in this case, in the light of the holdings of the
Supreme Court of the United States. It is conceivable that the state supreme
court’s decision about no prejudice might, in reality, be mistaken. But even if the
state decision is mistaken, mistaken does not authorize this federal court to
interfere.1
To say that the Florida decision cannot be reasonably squared with the
holding of Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009), seems just wrong to me.2
The facts of the present case are too different from the facts in Porter. The
1
The pivotal question in these kinds of cases is whether the state court’s application of
Supreme Court holdings was unreasonable. This point cannot be stressed too much: “an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Under AEDPA, the state court must be truly
granted deference and latitude.
2
Today’s Court plays up the Supreme Court opinion in Porter. Porter had not been
decided yet by the Supreme Court at the time that the Florida Supreme Court decided Mr.
Evans’s case. Given the timing of the Supreme Court Porter opinion and given the “clearly
established Federal law” AEDPA touchstone, I regard the emphasis on the Porter opinion today
as problematic on the basis of timing, apart from other things. But I pass over this issue.
If the Supreme Court’s Porter decision had been decided years earlier and put squarely
before the Florida Supreme Court when that state court decided Mr. Evans’s case, I believe
objectively reasonable, fair-minded jurists -- for reasons I sketch out in this dissent -- could
conclude that the Porter decision is distinguishable from Mr. Evans’s case and could still
conclude that no prejudice was shown, given the facts of this case.
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holding about prejudice in Porter relied on the omission at trial of evidence
(including testimony from Porter’s commanding officer) concerning Mr. Porter’s
service and suffering in combat on behalf of our country as a member of the
nation’s armed services in wartime. That this service and suffering was treated as
an important fact in Porter and material to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision on prejudice in that case seems plain to me.3 Therefore, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Porter is limited to (and binding on) cases with materially
similar facts: cases involving the historical fact of significant military service.
The present case completely lacks the important material fact of wartime
military service. Mr. Evans has no evidence about military service at all in his
record.
The Porter opinion might give some persuasive guidance in many
circumstances in which Porter is not a direct precedent. But if a state court is
facing facts that are materially different from the facts in Porter (with its stress on
the wartime events), the state court’s decision about prejudice on those different
facts is not bound by Porter’s holding; and the state court’s conclusion of no
prejudice -- whether correct or incorrect in some ultimate sense -- will not be
3
Our Court has recognized the great legal importance of the historical fact of Mr. Porter’s
service. “Porter’s military service was critical to the holding in Porter.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1249 n.21 (11th Cir. 2010).
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contrary to or an unreasonable application of the Porter holding (or that of
Strickland, read in the light of or taking into account Porter). To say that Porter’s
holding somehow controls this case or that this case is like Porter seems to me to
reduce the facts of Mr. Porter’s military service and wartime suffering to matters
of no consequence. As I read Porter, the historical facts of military service and
wartime suffering were highly significant to the Supreme Court’s decision: the
Porter holding is tied to material facts.
By Congress’s direction in AEDPA, we -- as a federal court -- must defer to
state court decisions about state prisoners, except in precise and extremely limited
situations. I believe, in the light of AEDPA, we lack the authority to override a
state supreme court decision that, at worst, fails to extend a Supreme Court
holding to a significantly different state case: for example, a state case which
lacks at least one of the facts that was obviously important to the supposedly
pertinent holding in a case before the Supreme Court.
Some quotations from the Porter opinion are set out in today’s Court
opinion for support. The opinions of the Supreme Court are not the United States
Code. Every sentence written in a Supreme Court opinion is not law. Only the
Court’s holdings of cases are law. And for AEDPA’s “clearly established Federal
law” standard, only the Supreme Court’s holdings count: “the holdings, as
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opposed to the dicta.” See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). The
reasoning in Supreme Court opinions is not the holding of the Supreme Court
decision. “There is, of course, an important difference between the holding in a
case and the reasoning that supports that holding.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S.
Ct. 1584, 1590 (1998). When we consider the limitations placed on the lower
federal courts by AEDPA -- limitations tied precisely to Supreme Court holdings,
it seems worthwhile to bear in mind a jurisprudential fundamental:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used . . . The reason of this maxim is obvious. The
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and
considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to
illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but
their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
investigated.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
Whatever “general expressions” the Supreme Court might have written
about prejudice as borne by Mr. Porter cannot be correctly lifted out of the context
of the specific facts of the Porter case and then declared by us to be broad law that
the Supreme Court has made. For me, Porter’s holding represents no per se rule
about prejudice and mitigation evidence that compels this Court, in the light of
Strickland’s standard, to grant habeas relief in this case.
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In this case, Florida’s Supreme Court noted (and, in my view, gave
meaningful consideration to) the same evidence we face.4 Florida’s Supreme
Court set out the correct legal standard per Strickland. The question of prejudice
at sentencing necessarily calls for judicial speculation. While looking at the
evidence, the Florida Supreme Court did the necessary speculation and reached a
definite conclusion: no prejudice. This Court has speculated and today reached a
different conclusion. I am unconvinced that, in this case, this Court’s speculation
is right and lawful and that the Florida Supreme Court’s speculation is not merely
wrong and unlawful (if it is) but, on top of that, actually unreasonable. On the
total record, I do accept that the Florida Supreme Court decision in this case is not
4
Today’s Court seems to lay great stress on the wording (or lack of wording) of the
Florida Supreme Court opinion. I think that the state opinion as written is all right. But as I
understand the law, if the Florida Supreme Court’s entire opinion read this way: “Evans is due no
relief for he has failed to demonstrate prejudice,” that conclusion of “no prejudice” would still be
due deference by federal judges. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011)
(“Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial.”) (penalty-phase-
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim). And no federal court, given AEDPA, could correctly
grant habeas relief in this case, unless a review of the entire record -- in the light of the holdings
of the United States Supreme Court -- established that the state court conclusion of no prejudice
was beyond the outside border of reasonable. It is the state court decision that is the essential
thing to which we owe deference, I think. “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what
arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and
then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.”
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (emphasis added). For law, I stress what is to me the
important and clear difference between a court’s decision and a court’s opinion by which the
court might make some effort to explain its decision: a crucial difference for both federal and
state courts.
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outside the range of reasonable applications of the law of the United States as
established by the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States.
I would affirm the District Court’s denial of habeas relief.
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