United States v. Lamar Perry

Case: 13-10073 Date Filed: 09/04/2013 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10073
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:97-cr-00016-CDL-MSH-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAMAR PERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(September 4, 2013)
Before DUBINA, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-10073 Date Filed: 09/04/2013 Page: 2 of 3
Lamar Perry appeals his 30-month sentence imposed for violating the
conditions of his supervised release. We affirm. 1
While on probation for various drug offenses, Perry was arrested by Georgia
police for possessing cocaine and marijuana. Perry pleaded guilty in state court
and was sentenced to ten years of probation. Perry’s state-law drug offenses
admittedly violated the conditions of his federal supervised release and called for a
guideline-range sentence of 30 to 37 months. After a hearing, the district court
sentenced Perry to 30 months’ imprisonment.
Perry argues his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Perry’s arguments lack merit. First, Perry’s sentence was not procedurally
unreasonable. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 345, 356, 358 (2007).
Even if brief, the district court’s explanation of Perry’s sentence was nonetheless
sufficient. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). The court properly calculated the guideline range, treated the Guidelines as
advisory, considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C § 3553(a), and did not
rely on clearly erroneous facts. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). On this record, Perry has not carried his burden to show procedural
unreasonableness.
1
A sentence imposed for revocation of supervised release is reviewed for reasonableness.
United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006). Such a sentence is upheld
unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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Second, Perry’s 30-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable. See
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting sentencing
courts must only acknowledge their consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, but are
not required to discuss each of the factors considered). Ordinarily, guideline-range
sentences like Perry’s are reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). Also, the district court did not improperly weigh
§ 3553(a)’s sentencing factors in considering the recidivist nature of Perry’s state-
law drug offenses. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (noting courts should
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as the history and
characteristics of the defendant). Moreover, because the weight given to each
§ 3553(a) factor is “a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district
court,” the court did not err in rejecting Perry’s explanations or excuses for his
state-law offenses. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, Perry has not shown his 30-month
sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Perry’s 30-month sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised
release is AFFIRMED.
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