Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condominium Ass'n

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Sept. 22, 2009
No. 09-11797 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00097-CV-3-RV-EMT
DAVIS C. HAWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHORELINE TOWERS PHASE 1 CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
JEFFREY LUTHER,
NORMA FREEMAN,
JAMES L. BRAZEALE,
GREG O'BRIEN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 22, 2009)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case was brought by Davis C. Hawn against Shoreline Phase I
Condominium Association, Inc. and members of its board of directors
(collectively, “Shoreline”) for alleged violations of federal and state housing laws,
as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hawn alleges that by
denying his request to permit his service dog, “Booster,” in his condominium unit,
Shoreline discriminated against Hawn on account of his disability. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Shoreline on all claims. Hawn timely
appealed.
I. Facts
In June 2004, Hawn purchased a condominium unit in Shoreline Towers
Phase III. According to the condominium’s bylaws, owners of units must comply
with regulations promulgated by Shoreline. At the time that Hawn purchased his
unit, there was a sign on the property that read, “No Animals Allowed,” and Hawn
was aware of the existence of this sign and Shoreline’s “no pets policy.”
In a letter to Shoreline dated January 5, 2005, Hawn wrote that he had
recently gone on vacation and acquired a puppy named Booster. Hawn stated that
on his trip Booster “entertained children. . . [and was] more well behaved than I
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ever was as a child! He sleeps at the foot of my bed, and has even jumped into the
shower to be with me.” Hawn repeatedly referred to Booster as a “pet,” “pup,”
and even a “companion,” but never as a service animal. Hawn said that “one
impediment” that kept him from “enjoying [his] home” was Shoreline’s no pets
policy. Hawn recommended a change to Shoreline’s policy so as to permit
homeowners to “own a pet” or for Shoreline to “agree to a 6-month trial period to
give folks a chance to prove that they love their pets as one would love any other
family member.” Shoreline did not respond to Hawn’s letter.
Hawn sent another letter to Shoreline, dated June 25, 2006, in which he
claimed that he suffered from a “physical disability and psychiatric disability.”
Hawn alleged that he had suffered a “debilitating injury to [his] leg,” resulting in
pain and restricted mobility. He also contended that “a long time [ago]” he was
robbed, kidnaped, and assaulted by his friend’s stepson and that, when Hawn was
out of town, this person lived in Hawn’s condominium unit without permission.
Hawn claimed that the individual subsequently was arrested, but as a result of
those experiences he “can never feel safe alone.” Hawn’s letter also discussed
Booster and, for the first time, referred to him as a “service animal . . . dually
trained to help me both physically and psychologically.” Hawn requested that
Booster be exempted from Shoreline’s no pets policy. Exhibits were attached in
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support of this request, including: (a) a document from the Service Animal
Registry of America certifying Booster as a “Registered Service Animal”;
(b) letters from Hawn’s chiropractor, Dr. Hoda, and psychologist, Dr. Evans,
contending that a service animal was medically necessary for Hawn; and (c) a
description of tasks that Booster could accomplish.1
On August 28, 2006, Shoreline’s general manager told Hawn that he needed
additional information in order to consider Hawn’s request, including
documentation supporting his disability allegations and the qualifications of Drs.
Hoda and Evans. Hawn did not respond, and Shoreline sent a letter dated
September 13, 2006, which stated,
additional information is needed for the Board to consider your
request . . . includ[ing]: Additional expert evidence under oath of the
nature of your impairment, the manner in which it substantially limits
one or more of your major life functions or activities, how the requested pet is
necessary to afford you an equal opportunity to use and enjoy your dwelling and if
there are other corrective measures which will permit such use and enjoyment.
The letter concluded,“[w]hile the Association sympathizes with your situation, at
this time we must deny your request to keep a pet in your condominium unit.”
Hawn again failed to respond to Shoreline’s request for further
documentation, but instead he filed a complaint on September 20, 2006 with the
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These included, inter alia, notifying Hawn of intruders, bringing the telephone upon
request, bringing socks and shoes upon request, opening the refrigerator and bringing water, and
giving a “hug” to calm Hawn after a panic attack.
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Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”). After an investigation, the
FCHR found cause to believe that Shoreline had discriminated against Hawn by
refusing to reasonably accommodate his disability.
In March 2007, Hawn filed the instant action against Shoreline, seeking
monetary and injunctive relief for violations of the federal and Florida Fair
Housing Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 3604; Fla. Stat. § 760.23, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, all stemming from Shoreline’s refusal to permit Hawn to have a
service animal in his unit. On Shoreline’s motion, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Shoreline on all of Hawn’s claims. With regard to
the federal and state Fair Housing Act claims, the court assumed that Hawn had
demonstrated that he was disabled but held that he nonetheless had failed to
provide sufficient evidence to establish that (a) Shoreline knew or should have
known of the disability; (b) Hawn’s requested accommodation was necessary to
afford him equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling; or (c) the “No Animals
Allowed” sign evidenced discriminatory intent on the part of Shoreline. Moreover,
the court held that Shoreline’s conduct was not so egregious as to constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Hawn appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to all three
of his claims. In addition to disagreeing with the district court’s interpretation of
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the evidence, Hawn argues that the district court failed to consider documents
presented to Shoreline during the FCHR investigation and that this evidence, when
coupled with the information provided to Shoreline prior to September 13, 2006,
was sufficient to put Shoreline on notice of Hawn’s disability and the necessity of
a service dog.
II. Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standards that bound the district court, and viewing all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citation and quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. Discussion
“The Florida Fair Housing Act contains statutory provisions that are
substantively identical to the federal Fair Housing Act.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1299 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to
Hawn’s claims under these two statutes. See id. at 1302.2
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This opinion will henceforth analyze Hawn’s claims in the context of the federal Fair
Housing Act’s provisions, but the discussion applies equally to Hawn’s claims brought under the
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Hawn alleges that Shoreline violated two different provisions of Section
3604 of the Fair Housing Act: (1) Section 3604(f)(3)(B), which prohibits the denial
of a reasonable accommodation that is necessary to ensure an equal opportunity for
a disabled person to use and enjoy his dwelling; and (2) Section 3604(c), which
prohibits “any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling that indicates any . . . discrimination based on . . . handicap . . . .”3
A. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)
To prevail on a Section 3604(f)(3)(B) claim, a plaintiff must establish that
(1) he is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested
a reasonable accommodation, (3) such accommodation was necessary to afford
him an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to
make the requested accommodation. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544
F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2008).
An individual is handicapped, for the purposes of the Fair Housing Act, if he
has (a) “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person’s major life activities,” (b) “a record of such impairment,” or (c) is
“regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). But, a defendant
Florida analogue.
3
The parallel Florida provisions are found in Fla. Stat. § 760.23(9)(b) and (3),
respectively.
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“cannot be liable for refusing to grant a reasonable and necessary accommodation
if [it] never knew the accommodation was in fact necessary.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at
1219 (quoting Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1275
(10th Cir. 2001)). Other circuits have held that this means that the defendant must
know or reasonably be expected to know of the existence of both the handicap and
the necessity of the accommodation. See, e.g., DuBois v. Ass’n of Apartment
Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).
Hawn argues that his June 25, 2006 letter to Shoreline was sufficient to
create genuine issues of material fact as to whether Shoreline knew of Hawn’s
handicap and the necessity of his requested accommodation. We disagree. “[T]he
duty to make a reasonable accommodation does not simply spring from the fact
that the handicapped person wants such an accommodation made. Defendants
must instead have . . . the ability to conduct a meaningful review of the requested
accommodation . . . .” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Prindable v. Ass’n of
Apartment Owners, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1258 (D. Haw. 2003)). Hawn’s June
2006 letter included unclear explanations as to the nature and extent of his
disability and was wholly inconsistent with the reasons he provided in his January
2005 letter for wanting Booster in his condominium unit. Hawn’s refusal to
comply with subsequent requests for reasonable documentation prevented
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Shoreline from conducting a meaningful review of Hawn’s application and thereby
Shoreline could not have actually known of Hawn’s disability and the necessity of
a service animal.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Hawn’s argument that the district court
erred by failing to consider the documentation made available to Shoreline during
the course of the FCHR investigation. First, the district court did in fact consider
such evidence; it noted in its order that Hawn’s doctors completed “Medical
Certification Forms,” in which they “opined that plaintiff had a disability and that a
service dog was necessary.” Second, a review of the Medical Certification Forms
reveals that they lack much of the information requested by Shoreline. The
Medical Certification Forms appear to be generic forms obtained from the FCHR
that merely required Hawn’s doctors to check “yes” and “no” boxes and, in some
spaces, provided blank lines for brief comments. The forms did not ask for – and
the doctors did not provide – other information requested by Shoreline, such as
Hawn’s doctors’ credentials. Third, aside from the documents addressed by the
district court, it is unclear what other evidence was presented to the FCHR and
made available to Shoreline. The Medical Certification Forms were the only
documents attached to Hawn’s response to Shoreline’s motion for summary
judgment that appear to have been created during the pendency of the FCHR
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investigation. Finally, the FCHR’s opinion, in which it found cause to believe that
Shoreline had discriminated against Hawn, relies predominantly, if not exclusively,
on evidence predating the filing of the FCHR complaint. It is therefore unclear
what additional evidence Hawn believes was presented to Shoreline during the
FCHR investigation that put Shoreline on notice of Hawn’s disability and the
necessity of a service animal.
Because there is insufficient evidence to create any genuine issues of
material fact as to Shoreline’s knowledge of Hawn’s disability and the necessity of
an accommodation, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of Shoreline on Hawn’s 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B) and Fla. Stat.
§ 760.23(9)(b) claims.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)
With respect to the Section 3604(c) claim, Hawn alleges that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the “No Animals Allowed” sign was
discriminatory in nature and was posted in order to “discourage any handicap[ped]
person with a service animal from renting or owning a unit on the property.”
Hawn argues that unlike a sign that reads “No Pets Allowed,” the “No Animals
Allowed” sign evidences the intent to bar all animals from the property, including a
service animal for an individual that is “clearly disabled and in need of a service
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animal.” Such speculation is unsupported by the record. The sign outside of the
condominium complex had been erected approximately ten years before Hawn
bought his unit, and there is no evidence that Shoreline ever discriminated against
any other handicapped individuals or that handicapped individuals were dissuaded
from purchasing units because of the sign. Hawn has not presented any evidence
of discriminatory intent or impact and has thus failed to sustain his burden to
“come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis omitted).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment as to Hawn’s 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) and Fla. Stat. § 760.23(3) claims.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distresss
Having disposed of the Fair Housing Act claims, we need not separately
analyze Hawn’s tort law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because his argument as to this issue is wholly premised on the allegation that
Shoreline “recklessly refused to allow Hawn’s service animal on the premises.”
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278-79 (Fla. 1985)
(holding that in order to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s “conduct has been so
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outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community”). Because we have disposed of Hawn’s Fair Housing Act
claims, and his intentional infliction of emotional distress argument is premised on
the viability of these claims, the district court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of Shoreline on this tort law claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Shoreline on all of Hawn’s claims.
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