Charles McDonell v. Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 21, 2005
No. 04-15781 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-20438-CV-JLK
CHARLES MCDONELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Alberto Gonzales,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 21, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant is a Caucasian male. He has been employed by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons for approximately fifteen years; since November 1996, he has
been employed as a GS-12 Facilities Manager at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Miami-Dade County, Florida (“FCI-Miami”). He brought this action
against appellee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 § U.S.C.
2000e, et seq., alleging that he suffered employment discrimination due to the
treatment he received at FCI-Miami from Michelle Elzie, who, as Associate
Warden, served as his supervisor. The district court granted appellee’s motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that appellant failed to establish that he had
“suffered an adverse job action,” and that “similarly situated employees have been
treated more favorable than him.” Order dated September 29, 2004 at 4-5.
Assuming that he established these elements, the court concluded that appellee
“put forth legitimate non-discriminatory reasons to explain its actions” and that
appellant failed to “provide sufficient evidence that Ms. Elzie’s actions toward him
were discriminatory in any way.” Id. Appellant appeals the court’s judgment,
contending that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
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employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. See Bass v. Board of County Com'rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095,
1103 (11th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Appellant’s Title VII case
rests on circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence. We therefore evaluate his
case under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Under this framework, we first determine whether the employee has made
out a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. To make out a prima face
case, he must show that (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he was qualified to
do his job; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) his
employer treated similarly-situated employees outside his classification more
favorably. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). Once he
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifted to his employer who must
“proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. The employer’s burden is exceedingly light.” Meeks v. Computer Assoc.
Int’l., 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994). Once the employer proffers a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the employee—to survive summary
judgment—“has to come forward with evidence, including the previously
produced evidence establishing a prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable
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fact finder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real
reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106
F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).
The parties’ briefs focus on the third and fourth prongs of the prima facie
case and on whether appellee’s reasons for the challenged action are a pretext for
discrimination. We need not address the third prong because, as the following
discussion indicates, appellant failed to establish the fourth prong and pretext.
Appellant failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case, namely,
that similarly situated non-white employees were treated more favorably under
nearly identical circumstances. He admitted that no other person at FCI-Miami
performed duties that were the same or similar to his duties. In his brief, he
contends that Elzie treated black females, who were department heads, more
favorably. The record reveals that there were only two black females, Evelina
Bradley and Charlotte McCann, who were managers of the departments and were
immediately subordinate to Elzie. However, while appellant’s duties as Facilities
Manager involved the overall physical maintenance of FCI-Miami and supervision
of construction projects, the head of Food Services (McCann, during the events in
question), primarily oversaw the daily feeding of inmates, and the head of
Financial Management (Bradley, during the events in question) oversaw the
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accounting, budgeting, and similar financial functions of the prison. Furthermore,
appellant’s department had an overwhelming responsibility at FCI-Miami since it
could “open or shut” any operation if work was not done timely and accurately.
Accordingly, appellant’s duties were not the same or similar to McCann’s and
Bradley’s.
Furthermore, unlike appellant, who was the permanent head of the Facilities
Department, McCann and Bradley headed their departments only briefly, in a
temporary acting capacity. Moreover, when Bradley was in charge of the Financial
Management Department, she shared her duties when required with two other
members of the department. Thus, appellant has not shown that he was similarly
situated to Bradley and McCann in terms of employment duties and positions.
Moreover, he failed to demonstrate that McCann or Bradley, or any other black
female employee, had job performance problems similar to his, namely, failure to
follow the leave policy established by Elzie, constant difficulty meeting deadlines,
and completing and prioritizing assigned tasks.
Even if we were to assume that appellant made out a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, his claim nonetheless fails. Appellee articulated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for Elzie’s actions towards him, namely, his constant
inability to meet deadlines, his failure to comply with leave request procedures, his
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problems with task prioritization, and inmate and staff accountability, and failure
to comply with work orders and assignments. Appellant failed to establish that
Elzie’s articulated reasons were pretextual. Even though he disagrees with Elzie’s
assertions that he failed to carry out certain work orders or assignments, he did not
present sufficient evidence indicating that Elzie’s actions towards him were
pretextual.
In sum, the record fully supports the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment. The judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.
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