Joel Perez v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc.

Case: 14-11724 Date Filed: 09/30/2014 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11724
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cv-62577-WPD
JOEL PEREZ,
JP GLOBAL EXPRESS, INC.,
other, JMP Global, Inc.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 30, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Joel Perez and JP Global Express, Inc., (collectively “the plaintiffs”) appeal
the district court’s dismissal of their breach-of-contract suit against FedEx Ground
Package Systems, Inc. (FedEx). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Perez contracted with FedEx to provide package pick-up and delivery
services. Specifically, in 1998, Perez entered into a Standard Contractor Operating
Agreement (OA) with FedEx, which gave him a proprietary interest in designated
routes. The OA stated, in pertinent part, that “[t]his Agreement shall be governed
and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.” In 2004, Perez incorporated JP Global Express, Inc. and added his
new company as a contracting party to the OA. The plaintiffs eventually acquired
a total of four routes for FedEx. Perez worked one route and hired drivers to
handle the other three routes. All four routes operated out of the Miami terminal
and made deliveries within Dade County.
In 2008, FedEx unilaterally reassigned three of the plaintiffs’ routes to
operate out of the Pompano Beach terminal. The plaintiffs were unable to comply
with the change because their drivers did not want to work out of the new location.
As a result, they ceased to operate two of their routes and Perez elected to drive the
remaining Pompano Beach route. On October 5, 2009, FedEx terminated the OA
and reassigned the plaintiffs’ routes to other drivers. FedEx accused Perez of
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“padding stops,” by counting each package delivered to the same address as a
separate stop on his route.
Approximately three years later, on August 16, 2012, the plaintiffs moved to
join an existing state court action captioned Encarnacion, et al. v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., Case No.: 09-018531-CI-015 (Encarnacion), by filing a motion
for leave to amend, which included a copy of the amended complaint sought to be
filed in that action. 1 Following a hearing in October 2013, the state court denied
the motion. On November 4, 2013, the plaintiffs filed the instant suit in state court,
alleging breach of contract and the breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. FedEx removed the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. (Rule)
12(b)(6). The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs’
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v.
AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(6)
1
The Encarnacion matter, filed in Pinellas County state court, involved a multi-plaintiff action
brought on behalf of a number of former FedEx pick-up and delivery contractors alleging
wrongful termination of their operating agreements.
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dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate “if it is apparent from the
face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in
dismissing their claims as time-barred on grounds that: (1) the court should have
applied Florida’s five-year statute of limitations, as opposed to Pennsylvania’s
four-year limitations period; (2) the complaint was timely because it “relates back”
to a preexisting state court action; and (3) even if Pennsylvania’s four-year
limitations period applies, their suit should be considered timely based on the
discovery rule or equitable tolling. We consider each issue in turn.
III.
A. Statute of Limitations
The parties dispute the governing law for the statute of limitations analysis.
The plaintiffs maintain that Florida law applies because that state has the most
“significant relationship” to the dispute. FedEx counters that Pennsylvania law
controls because the OA included a choice-of-law provision.
“When it exercises jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §
1332, a federal court must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to
determine which substantive law governs the action.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 550 F.3d 1031, 1033 (11th Cir. 2008). Contrary to the
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plaintiffs’ suggestion, Florida courts consider the statute of limitations to be
substantive rather than procedural. See e.g., Fulton Cnty. Adm’r v. Sullivan, 753
So. 2d 549, 553 (Fla. 1999) (holding that “statutes of limitations are to be treated as
substantive law”); Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So. 2d 540, 542-43 (Fla. 1999) (noting
that Florida “treat[s] statute of limitation choice of law questions the same as
‘substantive’ choice of law questions”).
Here, the OA between the plaintiffs and FedEx contained a choice-of-law
provision designating that the OA would be governed by Pennsylvania law. It is
well settled that absent a public policy prohibition, Florida courts will enforce a
choice-of-law provision in a contract “unless the law of the chosen forum
contravenes strong public policy.” Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d
1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000)). The plaintiffs do not allege, and
there is no indication in the record, that the choice-of-law provision in the OA
conflicted with public policy in Florida. Therefore, the statute of limitations of the
parties’ chosen forum, Pennsylvania, applies in the instant case.2
Under Pennsylvania law, parties have four years to commence “[a]n action
upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon a writing.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
2
By contrast, where the parties have not contractually agreed to the applicable law, Florida
courts apply “the statute of limitations of the state having the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and parties.” Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 709 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.3 (11th
Cir. 2013) (citing Merkle, 737 So. 3d at 542).
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§ 5525(a)(8) (2002). “The statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right
to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or
misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations.” Montanya
v. McGonegal, 757 A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. 2000) (quotation omitted). As such, the
plaintiffs were required to file their breach-of-contract suit within the requisite
four-year limitations period under Pennsylvania law. 3
The plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that FedEx committed a breach by
terminating the OA on October 5, 2009. As such, they became aware of their right
to file suit as of that date, and the four-year limitations period expired on October
5, 2013. Because the plaintiffs did not initiate this action until November 4,
2013—almost a month after the expiration of the limitations period—the lawsuit
was untimely, and the district court correctly dismissed the suit with prejudice.
B. Encarnacion Proceeding
In an attempt to persuade this court to the contrary, the plaintiffs argue that
their instant suit should be considered timely because they moved for leave to join
the Encarnacion action on August 16, 2012, within the four-year limitations
period. In the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to acknowledge that they were
unsuccessful in their bid to join the Encarnacion suit because the state court denied
3
To the extent that the plaintiffs intended to plead an independent claim for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, the same four-year statute of limitations applies because that claim is
predicated upon “[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon a writing.” 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525(a)(8) (2002).
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their motion to amend and the state appellate court dismissed their appeal.
Moreover, although the plaintiffs rely on Florida law to argue that the filing of a
motion to amend satisfies the applicable statute of limitations, as discussed above,
the parties contracted to have Pennsylvania law govern their instant dispute.
Under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a prior complaint or a motion to
amend does not toll the statute of limitations for a subsequently filed complaint
involving the same allegations. See Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595,
598 (Pa. 1992) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the
amended complaint was filed after the running of the statute of limitations, even
though the motion to amend had been filed prior to the expiration of the limitations
period). Thus, the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their
instant complaint “relates back” to their attempt to join the Encarnacion action.
C. Discovery Rule/Equitable Tolling
We are also unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ assertion that the four-year statute
of limitations should be tolled under Pennsylvania law by either the discovery rule
or equitable tolling. The discovery rule—which applies “to toll the statute of
limitations in any case where a party neither knows nor reasonably should have
known of his injury and its cause at the time his right to institute suit arises”—is
inapplicable here, as the plaintiffs do not dispute that they were aware of their
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alleged injury on the date that the OA was terminated. Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d
850, 859 (Pa. 2005).
The plaintiffs counter that the limitations period only began to run when
they learned that FedEx had waived the terms of the arbitration provision in the
OA and that they had a litigable claim. 4 But the relevant inquiry is when the
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the existence and cause of their injury; it
is irrelevant when the plaintiffs identified their exact claims or the appropriate
forum for advancing their arguments. See Romah v. Hygienic Sanitation Co., 705
A.2d 841, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d 737 A.2d 249 (Pa. 1999) (“[W]ith
respect to knowledge of a claim, plaintiffs need not know that they have a cause of
action, or that the injury was caused by another party’s wrongful conduct, for once
a plaintiff possesses the salient facts concerning the occurrence of his injury and
who or what caused it, he has the ability to investigate and pursue his claim.”)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
Likewise, equitable tolling is not warranted because the plaintiffs cannot
show that FedEx in any way acted fraudulently or concealed facts in an attempt to
prevent them from filing their claim. See Molineux v. Reed, 532 A.2d 792, 794
(Pa. 1987) (Pennsylvania law recognizes that fraudulent concealment by a potential
defendant can result in the tolling of the statute of limitations). The plaintiffs
4
The plaintiffs never specify when they learned that FedEx had waived the arbitration provision
in the OA.
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maintain that they were unaware that FedEx would agree to waive the OA’s
arbitration provision. But they offer no explanation to account for their failure to
pursue relief through arbitration or the court system after they learned that FedEx
had terminated the OA on October 5, 2009. Instead, the plaintiffs waited almost
three years before filing an unsuccessful motion to join the Encarnacion
proceeding in state court. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that
equitable tolling was not warranted under these circumstances.
AFFIRMED.
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