United States v. Jose Guadalupe Lara

Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15806
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00331-TCB-LTW-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE GUADALUPE LARA,
a.k.a. Pillo,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 20, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 2 of 9
Jose Guadalupe Lara appeals his convictions for conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846; and conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h). He is currently serving a sentence of 81 months’ imprisonment. 1
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
The facts are not in dispute. During a DEA investigation into a large-scale
drug conspiracy, local law enforcement officers assigned to a DEA task force
obtained a wiretap authorization from a DeKalb County, Georgia, Superior Court
judge. The calls were intercepted and monitored from a DEA listening post in
Fulton County, Georgia. Both counties are within the Northern District of
Georgia.
About nine months after the wiretaps ended, the Georgia Supreme Court
issued an opinion holding that superior court judges lacked jurisdiction to issue
warrants and authorization outside their judicial circuit. See Luangkhot v. State,
736 S.E.2d 397, 401 (Ga. 2013). Lara moved to suppress the evidence obtained
and derived from the wiretaps, arguing that Luangkhot rendered the wiretap
warrants invalid and the evidence inadmissible.
1
Lara pleaded guilty to two conspiracy offenses, retaining the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress.
2
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 3 of 9
The district court denied Lara’s motion to suppress, concluding that the
wiretap evidence remained admissible under federal law despite the territorial-
jurisdiction violation, because the jurisdictional violation did not implicate one of
Congress’s core concerns in passing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III). In the alternative, the district court concluded
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to the wiretap
evidence and that the officers acted in good faith in light of state law that was
unsettled. This is Lara’s appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed
question of law and fact, reviewing the facts for clear error and the application of
the law to the facts de novo. United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1, 7 (11th Cir.
2012). We review de novo whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies to a search, but “the underlying facts upon which that determination is
based are binding on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Martin,
297 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). We may
affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record.
United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010).
III.
3
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 4 of 9
Under the provisions of Title III, evidence obtained from a wiretap is
generally admissible as long as the interception of the information conforms to the
requirements of Title III. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2517(3). In addition to
dictating the requirements for interception by federal authorities, Title III provides
for interceptions by state authorities investigating certain crimes, including drug
trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). Under § 2516(2),
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such
attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to
a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing
or approving the interception . . . , may apply to such judge for, and
such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter
and with the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or
approving the interception . . . by investigative or law enforcement
officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to
which the application is made . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). A state court of competent jurisdiction is defined as “a judge
of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State who is authorized by a
statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or
electronic communications.” Id. § 2510(9)(b). Thus, Title III delegates to the
states the determination of which of its courts are empowered to issue wiretap
warrants. Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1986).
In 1984, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a superior court judge had
authority to authorize wiretaps only “within his territorial jurisdiction.” Evans v.
4
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 5 of 9
State, 314 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 1984). Following the ruling in Evans, however,
Georgia’s wiretap statute was amended to read as follows:
Upon written application, under oath, of the prosecuting attorney
having jurisdiction over prosecution of the crime under investigation,
or the Attorney General, made before a judge of superior court, said
court may issue an investigation warrant permitting the use of such
[interception] device . . . .
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(c) (2002); see also Luangkhot v. State, 722 S.E.2d 193, 196
(Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
Interpreting the amended statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in 2012
that the “plain language of the wiretap statute places a territorial limitation only
upon the prosecuting attorney who applies for the warrant, and requires only that
the warrant be issued by a superior court judge.” Luangkhot, 722 S.E.2d at 196-97.
Accordingly, wiretap warrants authorized by Gwinnett County superior court
judges were valid for interceptions occurring outside of Gwinnett County. Id. at
197. This was the interpretation of the law at the time the DEA task force in
Lara’s case obtained the warrants at issue here.
But in January 2013, about nine months after these warrants ended, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals, concluding that
the wiretap statute did not give superior court judges the authority to issue wiretap
warrants for interceptions conducted outside the boundaries of their respective
judicial circuits. See Luangkhot, 736 S.E.2d at 398-400, 427. The state supreme
5
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 6 of 9
court explained that a superior court’s authority is generally limited to its territorial
jurisdiction, which is defined as the judicial circuit in which the court sits. Id. at
400-01.2
Here, the district court concluded that the wiretap warrant in this case was
invalid under Georgia law. We note that the government has not challenged the
court’s conclusion that the warrant was invalid under state law. The district court
also concluded that under existing federal law, wiretap evidence obtained in
violation of state law could still be admissible in federal court. Alternatively, the
court found that, despite the state-law violation in obtaining the evidence, the
evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception.
Lara argues that the good-faith exception does not apply to wiretap
evidence, and even if it did, it would not apply here because the warrant at issue
was facially deficient because it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Lara also contends
that, in applying the exception, the district court impermissibly shifted the burden
of proof onto the defense to show the exception did not apply.
We disagree. Assuming, as the district court found, that the warrants fail to
comply with Georgia’s territorial jurisdiction limitation, the evidence remained
admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
2
The Georgia legislature has since amended the statute to permit superior court judges to issue
warrants throughout the state, thereby removing the jurisdictional issue. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-
64(c) (effective Feb. 13, 2013).
6
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 7 of 9
The exclusionary rule is designed to “deter future Fourth Amendment
violations.” United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Davis v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011)), petition for cert.
filed, (June 2, 2014) (No. 13-10424). And courts rely on it as a “remedy of last
resort, justified only where the deterrence benefits of suppression outweigh the
substantial social costs of ignoring reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt
or innocence.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original). Thus, when law enforcement officers exercise good faith, this goal of
suppression is not met, and exclusion is not required. Id.; see also United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (outlining an exception to the exclusionary rule
when officers act in good faith). Contrary to Lara’s argument, the good-faith
exception can apply to wiretap evidence. 3 See United States v. Malakzadeh, 855
F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d
1249, 1252 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991).
The good-faith exception applies in all but four sets of circumstances. Leon,
468 U.S. at 923. Relevant to this appeal, Lara argues that the exception would not
apply because the warrant was facially deficient in that the state court lacked
jurisdiction. Id. But the warrant in this case was not facially defective. Rather,
3
We are bound by prior precedent unless and until it is overruled by our court sitting en banc or
by the Supreme Court. United States v. Vega–Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008).
7
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 8 of 9
the interpretation of Georgia’s wiretap statute was in flux at the time the officers
obtained the warrant, and it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on
the warrant. As discussed above, after the state courts interpreted the statute to
limit the state court’s jurisdiction, the statute was amended. And in 2012, the
Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted these amendments to limit the jurisdiction of
only the prosecutor seeking the warrant and not the state court issuing it. It was
not until almost nine months after the warrants in this case ceased that the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the state court’s jurisdiction was limited. And, the state
legislature quickly amended the statute again to clarify that a state court judge was
authorized to issue a warrant for wiretaps outside the judge’s circuit. Thus, we
cannot conclude that officers should reasonably have known that the warrant was
invalid at the time they intercepted the calls. 4
Moreover, suppressing the evidence in this case would not meet the goal of
deterring future violations. See United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1216
(11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the minimal, if any, benefit of suppressing the
evidence would not justify the substantial societal costs of excluding the evidence
4
Lara contends that the government failed to offer any evidence to show that the officers were
aware of the amendments or that they even looked at the warrant. But the government’s lack of
extrinsic evidence does not preclude a finding of good faith. See United States v. Robinson, 336
F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the court may apply the good-faith exception based
on facts stated in the affidavit). Although the court should look beyond the four corners of the
affidavit when other evidence is presented, the government is not required to present additional
facts. Id. Here, the government submitted lengthy affidavits to support the warrant application,
and this was sufficient.
8
Case: 13-15806 Date Filed: 10/20/2014 Page: 9 of 9
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22)). In other such incidents, the Supreme Court has
relied on the good-faith exception. See e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1987) (applying the good-faith exception where officers were objectively
reasonable in relying on a statute permitting warrantless administrative searches
even though the statute was later found to be unconstitutional).
Finally, Lara’s contention that the court impermissibly shifted the burden is
without merit. The district court merely commented that Lara failed to rebut the
government’s argument that the warrants were valid under existing precedent.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress is
AFFIRMED.
9