Rafael Alberto Llovera Linares v. Department of Homeland Security

Case: 13-11214 Date Filed: 09/06/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11214
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00032-RH-CAS
RAFAEL ALBERTO LLOVERA LINARES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(September 6, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Rafael Linares, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction. He argues that: (1) he was entitled
to withholding of removal and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”) based on his well-founded fear of persecution; and (2) he was
entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
because it was unlikely that the government would be able to effect his deportation
in the near future. After thorough review, we vacate and remand. 1
We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d
1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
When an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General is required to
remove the alien from the United States within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
The removal period begins on the latest of either: (1) the date the order of removal
becomes administratively final; (2) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and
a court orders a stay of removal, the date of the court’s final order; or (3) if the
alien is detained or confined, the date the alien is released from detention or
confinement. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that
six months was a presumptively reasonable period of time to allow the government
to remove an alien after the removal period commences. 533 U.S. at 701. After
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Nevertheless, because Rafael Linares did not file his motion for a preliminary injunction
first in the district court, the motion for a preliminary injunction he filed in this Court is DENIED
without prejudice.
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this time, once an alien shows that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future,” the government must rebut that showing. Id. If
removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the continued detention is unreasonable. Id.
at 699. The Supreme Court further held “that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings
remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-
removal-period detention.” Id. at 688.
However, after Zadvydas, Congress passed the Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, which limits aliens’ ability to seek relief
through § 2241. In particular, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) now
provides that the filing of a petition for review in the court of appeals, is “the sole
and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal” and “for judicial
review of any cause or claim” under CAT. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(4). Furthermore, the INA provides that no court shall have jurisdiction
under § 2241 to review questions of law or fact “arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(9). In Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., we held that an assertion by a petitioner
that he was not subject to a removal order was distinct from a challenge to an order
of removal, and therefore, the Real ID Act did not apply, and the district court was
not divested of jurisdiction. 470 F.3d 1362, 1363, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006).
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As for Linares’s claim challenging his order of removal, a petition for
review is the sole means for judicial review, and it was proper for the district court
to dismiss this claim for lack of jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). However, Linares brought a second, distinct
claim, in which he argued that he was entitled to release based on violation of his
due process rights by continued detention. Linares’s claim regarding continued
detention appears to be independent from his challenge to his removal. Prior to the
REAL ID Act, this kind of claim could be brought under § 2241. Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 688. Like the petitioner in Madu, whose challenge regarding whether he
was subject to an order of removal was deemed distinct from a challenge to his
order of removal, Linares’s challenge to his continued detention is similarly
distinct from a challenge to his removal order. See 470 F.3d at 1363, 1368.
Because Linares is not challenging his removal order, the Real ID Act would not
apply, and his claim can still be brought under § 2241. See id. Therefore, the
district court would have jurisdiction over the claim.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the district court to determine
whether Linares is entitled to relief under § 2241 based on his continued detention.
The district court should consider in the first instance when Linares’s removal
order became administratively final, how long Linares has been detained, and
whether his continued detention is unreasonable under Zadvydas.
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VACATED AND REMANDED.
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