Rafael Enrique Gonzales-Corrales v. I.C.E.

Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16509
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00089-LGW-JEG
RAFAEL ENRIQUE GONZALES-CORRALES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
I.C.E., c/o United States of America,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 21, 2013)
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 2 of 8
Before CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Rafael Enrique Gonzales-Corrales, a federal prisoner proceeding
pro se, appeals the district court’s denial without prejudice of his pleading titled
“Challenge of Present and Future Incarceration,” construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241habeas petition. After review, we affirm. 1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Gonzales-Corrales’s Federal Conviction and Sentence
In January 2009, Gonzales-Corrales, a Cuban national, was convicted of a
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in the Southern
District of Florida. Gonzalez-Corrales currently is serving his federal 121-month
sentence at D. Ray James Correctional Institution (“D. Ray James”) in Folkston,
Georgia, with a projected release date of June 11, 2017. The Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued an immigration detainer for Gonzales-
Corrales, which was filed with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on October 7,
2009. 2
1
We review de novo the dismissal of a § 2241 petition for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Alanis-Bustamante v. Reno, 201 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000).
2
An immigration detainer “serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the
[DHS] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of
arresting and removing the alien” and “is a request that such agency advise the [DHS], prior to
release of the alien, in order for the [DHS] to arrange to assume custody, in situations when
gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a).
2
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 3 of 8
B. District Court Proceedings
Gonzales-Corrales filed a pro se pleading titled “Challenge of Present and
Future Incarceration.” The pro se pleading named the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), a division of DHS, “c/o United States of America” as the
respondent. Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading alleged that because ICE lodged
an immigration detainer, he is ineligible to participate in the BOP’s Residential
Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) or to be released to a halfway house and is
required to serve a sentence “under circumstances more severe than those facing”
inmates who are U.S. citizens. Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading asked the
district court “to move I.C.E.” to lift the detainer so Gonzales-Corrales will be
eligible to participate in RDAP, but did not identify any statutory basis for the
requested relief.
The district court construed Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading as a § 2241
habeas petition and issued a show cause order. The government’s response argued
that Gonzales-Corrales: (1) had sued only ICE and failed to name the appropriate
party for a § 2241 petition (the warden); (2) could not bring his conditions-of-
confinement claims under § 2241; and, in any event, (3) had not exhausted his
administrative remedies with the prison before filing his action. The government
submitted evidence of the grievance procedures at the prison and that Gonzales-
3
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 4 of 8
Corrales had not filed any grievances regarding the allegations in his pro se
pleading.
Gonzales-Corrales replied, stating that he was not seeking relief under
§ 2241, but rather declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
that ICE was properly named as the defendant. Specifically, Gonzales-Corrales
contended that, as a Cuban citizen, he cannot be removed back to Cuba. Because
D. Ray James prison houses inmates who will be deported when they complete
their sentences, however, D. Ray James prison has no programs for inmates who
need to integrate back into U.S. society upon their release from prison. Gonzales-
Corrales maintained that this “I.C.E. rule,” as he referred to it, treats Cuban
prisoners differently than other U.S. inmates in violation of his equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gonzales-Corrales did not address the
government’s argument that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
C. District Court’s Dismissal Without Prejudice
In a report (“R&R”), a magistrate judge recommended that Gonzales-
Corrales’s action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The magistrate judge concluded that Gonzales-Corrales
had filed “a ‘mixed’ petition,” in that it asserted claims under both § 2241 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S
388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). The magistrate judge determined that, regardless of
4
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 5 of 8
how the action was characterized, however, Gonzales-Corrales still was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his claims in federal court, and
Gonzales-Corrales had not done so.
Neither party filed objections to the R&R. The district court adopted the
R&R in its entirety and dismissed Gonzales-Corrales’s action without prejudice.
Gonzales-Corrales filed this pro se appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gonzales-Corrales argues for the first time that he was denied the
forms necessary to exhaust his administrative remedies. Gonzales-Corrales further
contends that case managers at D. Ray James prison denied all Cubans the forms to
file administrative remedies and that the warden threatened to transfer inmates who
ask for the forms.
Gonzales-Corrales never raised the issue of the availability of administrative
remedies in the district court, even though he had opportunities to do so in
response to the government’s exhaustion argument. Generally, we do not consider
for the first time on appeal arguments not presented in the district court. Sterling
Fin. Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004).
Furthermore, regardless of whether Gonzales-Corrales exhausted available
administrative remedies, the district court properly dismissed Gonzales-Corrales’s
pro se claims without prejudice. See United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184,
5
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 6 of 8
1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that we may affirm the district court “for any
reason supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court”).
Assuming arguendo that Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading could be
construed as a § 2241 petition challenging the execution of his sentence, his § 2241
petition did not name the proper respondent. The proper respondent to a § 2241
petition is “the person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2717 (2004). In
Gonzales-Corrales’s case, that person is the warden at D. Ray James, the prison
where he is currently incarcerated. See id.Instead of naming the warden, Gonzales-Corrales named ICE as the § 2241
respondent and asked the district court to order ICE to lift its detainer so he would
be eligible for these prison programs. On appeal, Gonzales-Corrales continues to
insist that he has properly sued ICE and maintains that he is not challenging the
prison’s policies, procedures or practices. The problem for Gonzales-Corrales is
that he is not in ICE custody.
Although “challenges to detainers may . . . be brought under § 2241” in
certain circumstances, “[t]he filing of [a] detainer, standing alone, [does] not cause
[the petitioner] to come within the custody of [immigration officials].” Orozco v.
INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990). “[A]bsent custody by the authority
against whom relief is sought, jurisdiction will not lie to grant the writ.” Id.6
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 7 of 8
Although Gonzales-Corrales alleged that ICE lodged a detainer against him, he did
not allege that removal proceedings had commenced or that he had been taken into
ICE custody. Because Gonzales-Corrales is not in ICE custody, the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the construed § 2241 petition against
ICE. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed without prejudice the
construed § 2241 petition.
To the extent Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading asserted a Bivens claim
against ICE, the district court also properly dismissed it without prejudice.
Although the Supreme Court in Bivens held that federal officials may be sued in
their individual capacities for violations of an individual’s constitutional rights, a
plaintiff may not bring a Bivens action against a federal agency or a federal officer
acting in his official capacity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86, 114 S. Ct.
996, 1005-06 (1994). Gonzales-Corrales did not sue any federal officials in their
individual capacity. Instead, his pro se pleading named only ICE, a federal agency
that cannot be sued under Bivens. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal without prejudice of Gonzales-Corrales’s Bivens claims against ICE. 3
3
Gonzales-Corrales’s pro se pleading arguably could also be construed as a petition for a
writ of mandamus against ICE. A mandamus, however, will lie only when, inter alia, the
defendant owes the plaintiff a clear, non-discretionary duty. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.
602, 616, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1984). Gonzales-Corrales has not alleged that ICE has such a
duty, and, in fact, whether or not to detain an alien after he finishes serving his criminal sentence
pending a decision on whether to remove him is generally a matter within the discretion of the
Attorney General. See INA § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d); INA § 236(a)-(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-
(e); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 287.7.
7
Case: 12-16509 Date Filed: 06/21/2013 Page: 8 of 8
AFFIRMED.
8