Steven Michael Capshaw v. United States

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12873
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 1:12-cv-00541-MEF-WC; 1:09-cr-00188-MEF-WC-1
STEVEN MICHAEL CAPSHAW,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(July 16, 2015)
Before HULL, JORDAN, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Steven Michael Capshaw pro se appeals the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. This appeal involves Capshaw’s claims: (1) that
his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the admission of certain
cellular telephone records; and (2) that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
was violated when members of the public were prevented from attending voir dire
because security officers would not let them enter the courtroom.
After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the
district court’s order denying Capshaw’s § 2255 motion to vacate.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of Capshaw’s arrest, jury trial, conviction, and sentence are largely
covered in this Court’s review of that conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
See United States v. Capshaw, 440 F. App’x 738, 740-42 (11th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished). We review only those facts relevant to this § 2255 appeal.
A. The Underlying Offense
After learning that his wife Sandra Capshaw wanted a divorce, Capshaw
conceived and attempted to execute a murder-for-hire plot targeting his wife. Id. at
740. The plot involved his sister Karen Whitaker, his niece Nathina Whitaker, and
his niece’s boyfriend Tate O’Neal. Id. Unfortunately for Capshaw, but fortunately
for his wife, Capshaw’s niece and her boyfriend were cooperating with police, who
had received a tip about the potential murder plot. Id.
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On October 30, 2009, a magistrate judge issued a warrant for Capshaw’s
arrest based on a criminal complaint alleging Capshaw’s involvement in the
murder-for-hire scheme. On November 2, 2009, Capshaw was arrested. An
assistant federal public defender, Kevin Butler, was appointed to represent
Capshaw. On November 18, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Capshaw in a one-
count indictment charging him with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, the use of a
facility of interstate commerce (“to wit: a telephone”) with the intent that murder
be committed in exchange for a promise of payment.
B. Court Order for Cell Phone Records
Following Capshaw’s arrest but prior to his indictment, the government
applied for a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, directing various phone
companies to disclose the stored telephone communications records for several cell
phone numbers, including Capshaw’s. In support of its application, the
government averred that: (1) Capshaw solicited Nathina Whitaker and Tate O’Neal
to kill his estranged wife; and (2) he used his cell phone to make interstate
communications with O’Neal and Whitaker in furtherance of this plot. A
magistrate judge granted the government’s § 2703 application and required the
phone companies to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw, O’Neal, Karen
Whitaker, and Nathina Whitaker.
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Before trial, Capshaw’s counsel filed a motion to suppress “illegally seized
evidence,” including documents discovered at Capshaw’s residence, but he did not
seek to suppress the cell phone records.
At trial, the government introduced Capshaw’s cell phone records into
evidence. The records were limited to those in September-November 2009, which
was the relevant offense period. The government separately introduced the cell
phone records for Nathina Whitaker, Capshaw’s niece, and Karen Whitaker,
Capshaw’s sister. 1 The government introduced this evidence to show that
Capshaw used his phone, a “facility of interstate commerce,” in furtherance of his
criminal plot.
C. The Voir Dire Proceedings
On April 12, 2010, the district court conducted jury selection. Voir dire
commenced at 10:37 a.m. and concluded at 12:23 p.m. Capshaw’s counsel was
present throughout, and Capshaw was present except for the period from 11:43
a.m. to 12:16 p.m., during which counsel for both sides exercised their peremptory
1
The government did so through the testimony of Jeffrey Strohm, a records custodian for
Sprint Nextel Corporation, who testified about incoming and outgoing calls for phone numbers
covered by the court orders requiring production by Sprint Nextel, covering the months of
September through November 2009. Strohm’s testimony shows that the records reflected basic
subscriber information, including: (1) the name associated with a particular phone number along
with the date range that the phone was active for the subscriber name; (2) the date, time, and
duration of the phone calls; (3) the number with which the call occurred; and (4) any cell phone
tower used to route the call. While these records contained the cell phone tower numbers for the
towers used to route Capshaw’s calls, the government did not introduce evidence locating those
towers as the prosecution was focused on who Capshaw called and when he called them, rather
than on the location of the caller.
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strikes. There is no evidence at all in the trial record of the courtroom being closed
or of any individual being denied entry to the courtroom during voir dire. There is
not even any mention of this by the district court, the parties, or counsel for the
parties.
D. Capshaw’s Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Capshaw of the charged § 1958 offense. The district
court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).
Capshaw appealed. On direct appeal, Capshaw did not raise any issue about the
alleged denial of access to the courtroom during voir dire. On September 7, 2011,
this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Capshaw, 440 F. App’x at 745.
E. Capshaw’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate
On June 19, 2012, Capshaw pro se filed this motion to vacate, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Capshaw’s motion raised 24 separate claims for relief. Of
relevance to this appeal, he argued that his conviction was obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment because the government acquired his and other individuals’
cell phone records from the service provider without securing a warrant. Capshaw
further asserted that his counsel’s failure to challenge the admission of these cell
phone records deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
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On November 26, 2012, Capshaw filed a motion to expand his § 2255
motion, asserting that members of the public were excluded from attending the voir
dire phase of his trial. He argued that this closure of proceedings violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial. A magistrate judge granted Capshaw leave to
amend his § 2255 motion to add this new claim. Accompanying his reply to the
government’s response brief, Capshaw attached affidavits from these five family
members: (1) Patricia Pitts, Capshaw’s sister; (2) Norman Capshaw, Capshaw’s
brother; (3) William Capshaw, also Capshaw’s brother; (4) William J. Capshaw,
Capshaw’s nephew; and (5) Paula Perry, another of Capshaw’s sisters.
In substance, the five affidavits are nearly identical. Pitts and Perry aver
that, after clearing security in the Dothan, Alabama courthouse, court security
personnel required them to wait downstairs in the hallway while jury selection was
being conducted in the upstairs courtroom. They aver that they were told that no
one was allowed to enter the courtroom until jury selection was completed. They
also aver that federal marshals were present at the top of the stairs, allowing only
potential jurors into the courtroom. Norman Capshaw, William Capshaw, and
William J. Capshaw aver that they attempted to enter the courtroom and were “told
by federal marshalls [sic] at the doors that jury selection was closed to the public”
and that they would have to wait outside in the hallway until jury selection was
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over. All of these affidavits are dated between the 14th and 24th of December,
2012, more than two-and-a-half years following the trial.
On June 19, 2014, the district court denied Capshaw’s § 2255 motion. On
January 6, 2015, this Court granted a certificate of appealability as to the two
issues listed above.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to vacate under § 2255, this Court reviews a district court’s
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Devine v. United
States, 520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Id. We
liberally construe pro se filings, including pro se applications for relief pursuant to
§ 2255. Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014).
But our review is limited to those issues specified in the COA. McKay v. United
States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
We review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in a § 2255
proceeding for abuse of discretion. Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1215.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Ineffective-Counsel Claim
On appeal, Capshaw argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to object to the admission of cell phone records at trial. To prevail on an
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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Capshaw must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
(1984). Capshaw bears the burden of proof on both prongs of an ineffective-
counsel claim. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001). To
prove deficient performance, Capshaw must show that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, as measured by prevailing
professional norms. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.
2000) (en banc). We need not “address both components of the inquiry if
[Capshaw] makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697,
104 S. Ct. at 2069.
Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for
failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not
have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s
performance was not deficient for failing to object.
It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and
three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-
hire plot. Obtaining those telephone records through a § 2703 court order did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99
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S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979) (holding that telephone company records of calls made
from a defendant’s home did not require the government to seek a search warrant).
Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these Sprint Nextel
records. Regardless of any subjective expectation (about which we have no
evidence), it was unreasonable for Capshaw to assume that information about his
cell phone calls could not be made available to the government by the third-party
telephone company. See id. at 744, 99 S. Ct. at 2582. (“When he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company
and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers
dialed).
At Capshaw’s trial, the cell phone records were introduced to show
Capshaw’s use of a “facility of interstate commerce” in the course of his murder-
for-hire plot. The records introduced also contained the assigned numbers of the
cell phone towers used to route Capshaw’s calls. Capshaw, however, makes no
specific argument about historical location information drawn from these tower
numbers. This is not surprising, because the government did not seek to admit
Capshaw’s cell phone records to prove his location, but only to prove he used a
cell phone to arrange the murder-for-hire of his wife.
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At the time of Capshaw’s trial, no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit law
required the government to seek a search warrant for the cell phone records
procured in this case. Rather, the government was required, by statute, to procure
a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703. It did so. Though not available to
Capshaw’s counsel at the time, this Court’s binding precedent confirms that the
claim Capshaw says his counsel should have raised had no merit back in 2011 and
has no merit now. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 (11th Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (“Following controlling Supreme Court precedent[,] . . . we hold that the
government’s obtaining a § 2703(d) court order for production of [a cellular
telephone company’s] business records . . . did not constitute a search and did not
violate the [defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”).
Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue. See
Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001) (counsel is not ineffective
for failing to argue a meritless claim); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974
(11th Cir. 1992) (same).
We recognize that, at trial, the government introduced not only Capshaw’s
cell phone records, but also the cell phone records of the other individuals to whom
Capshaw made calls in furtherance of his murder plot. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that Fourth Amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966-67 (1969).
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Capshaw thus lacked the necessary standing to challenge the introduction of the
cell phone records of the other individuals. Assuming Capshaw successfully
challenged the introduction of his own cell phone records, the same evidence
(demonstrating his use of a telephone in his murder-for-hire plot) was introduced
through other means. Counsel’s performance was not deficient for this reason
also.
B. Public Access to Voir Dire
On appeal, Capshaw also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial was violated because the courtroom was closed to the public during his jury
selection proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The
Supreme Court has held that this public-trial right extends to voir dire. Presley v.
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010). “The denial of a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial requires some affirmative act
by the trial court meant to exclude persons from the courtroom.” United States v.
Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Brazel, 102
F.3d 1120, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (examining a district court’s affirmative
imposition of a requirement that all persons show identification before entering the
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courtroom and affirming the denial of the defendant’s objection to that “partial
closure”).
Where a district court affirmatively decides to close a trial to the public, the
Supreme Court requires the district court to follow procedures to ensure the
balancing of interests. A complete closure of proceedings is only justified where:
(1) the party seeking to close the trial advances an overriding interest that is likely
to be prejudiced; (2) the closure is no broader than necessary to protect that
interest; (3) the trial court has considered reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4)
the court makes findings adequate to support the closure. Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 48, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984). Where proceedings are only partially
closed by the affirmative decision of the district court, the test is less stringent,
requiring the court to find only a “substantial,” rather than a “compelling,” reason
to justify a partial closure. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155.
Here, there is no evidence that the alleged exclusion was ordered, known, or
ratified by the trial judge. Indeed, the trial record shows that no party or attorney,
much less the trial judge, mentioned or knew about any courtroom closure. There
is not even any allegation that the district court judge affirmatively decided to close
voir dire to the public. To the contrary, the affidavits state that court security
personnel refused entry to Capshaw’s relatives. Under the particular factual
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circumstances of this case, the alleged exclusion of the affiants cannot be imputed
to the trial judge. 2
There was thus no constitutional error by the district court and also no abuse
of discretion in the denial of an evidentiary hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying
Capshaw’s motion to vacate under § 2255.
AFFIRMED.
2
Further, Capshaw never raised an objection about the alleged exclusion before adding
this claim in the amendment to his § 2255 motion—after his case had passed through the entire
direct-review process. Indeed, Capshaw’s claim would already be procedurally defaulted had the
government appropriately raised such an argument. The government did not properly raise
procedural default, as it acknowledges, and so we do not consider the late arrival of this claim
except insofar as it bore on the ability of the district court to clarify or cure any alleged harm
created by the exclusion of Capshaw’s family members from the voir dire.
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