Charles B. Sigal v. Nash-Finch Co.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 04-16541 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ February 21, 2006
THOMAS K. KAHN
D. C. Docket Nos. CLERK
02-00142-CV-6
02-00143-CV-6
CHARLES B. SIGAL,
Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant-
Appellant,
versus
NASH-FINCH COMPANY,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant-
Appellee.
---------------------------------------------
CAROL J. TRIPP,
Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant-
Appellant,
versus
NASH-FINCH COMPANY,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant-
Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 21, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
These are age, gender, and disability discrimination cases brought by
plaintiff-appellants Carol J. Tripp (“Tripp”) and Charles B. Sigal (“Sigal”) against
defendant-appellee Nash-Finch Company (“Nash-Finch”) under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. Appellants
claim that the district court erred in concluding that their agreement with Nash-
Finch barred further legal action regarding appellants’ claims. The district court
determined that appellants were not entitled to pursue further legal action for their
claims under their agreement with Nash-Finch because the EEOC issued a finding
equivalent to a “no cause” finding regarding appellants’ claims. Whether or not
the EEOC’s letters of determination regarding Tripp’s and Sigal’s charges
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constituted a finding of “no cause” is the controlling issue in this case. We affirm
the district court’s conclusion that the EEOC issued “no cause” determinations to
each of the appellants, and that they are therefore precluded from taking further
legal action.
I. Procedural History
Appellants Carol Tripp and Charles Sigal each filed separate lawsuits
against Nash-Finch Company on December 26, 2002 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Tripp alleged age and sex
discrimination and Sigal alleged age and disability discrimination. Nash-Finch
asserted a counterclaim for breach of the non-litigation agreements executed by
Tripp and Sigal on August 19, 2002 and August 30, 2002, respectively.
On March 17, 2003, Nash-Finch moved to dismiss and/or compel arbitration
in both cases. On August 1, 2003, the district court granted Nash-Finch’s motions
to dismiss with prejudice, construing the motions in each case as motions for
summary judgment. The court consolidated the two cases for purposes of the
August 1, 2003 order. The court determined that Tripp and Sigal had both signed
agreements with Nash-Finch which now precluded them from filing suit.
Specifically, the court concluded that the EEOC’s finding of “no cause” for
appellants’ respective charges against Nash-Finch triggered non-litigation
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provisions in the agreements.
Tripp and Sigal appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
we reversed. The district court had erred by converting Nash-Finch’s motions to
dismiss into motions for summary judgment without providing the parties with the
required ten days notice in order that they might supplement the record. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.
On remand, Tripp and Sigal received proper notice but failed to supplement
the record. Then the district court, having the same record, considered Nash-
Finch’s motions a second time and granted summary judgment. The court issued
two separate Orders dismissing each complaint with prejudice. Tripp and Sigal
now appeal those Orders. The appeals were consolidated.
II. Factual Background
In February and March of 2002, Tripp and Sigal filed separate charges of
discrimination with the EEOC alleging that Nash-Finch fired them based on their
age. While the EEOC conducted its investigation of the charges, Nash-Finch
requested arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in
accordance with the organization’s Dispute Resolution Plan.
On May 1, 2002, Sigal amended his EEOC charge to include a charge of
discrimination in violation of the ADA. On May 14, 2002 Tripp amended her
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charge to include sex discrimination under Title VII. On July 31, 2002, the parties
were directed to arbitrate, and in response, decided instead to execute a side
agreement. Tripp and Sigal executed identical agreements, each entitled
“Memorandum of Understanding,” which contained a series of litigation
alternatives based on possible EEOC determinations. Specifically, the agreement
provided that in the event the EEOC issued a finding of “no cause,” the matter
would be closed and appellants would sign a release. If, on the other hand, the
EEOC issued a finding that was inconclusive or found that there was sufficient
evidence to support the charges, appellants would have the right to pursue their
claims. The validity and binding effect of these Memoranda is undisputed.
On September 25, 2002, the EEOC issued a determination for each of the
two cases. The EEOC used a standard form containing ten possible reasons for
dismissal with a vertical row of boxes to the left of each possible reason. The
EEOC entered an “X” inside the box beside the eighth statement which read as
follows:
The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation,
the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes
violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in
compliance with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that
might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
Nash-Finch interpreted these as “no cause” findings and subsequently prepared
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release agreements for Tripp and Sigal in accordance with the Memoranda of
Understanding.
Tripp and Sigal, on the other hand, interpreted the EEOC determinations as
generic right to sue letters, entitling them to pursue arbitration. Thus, they refused
to sign their respective releases and sought to go forward with the AAA
arbitration. Nash-Finch informed the AAA that it would not consent to arbitration.
Nash-Finch explained that Tripp and Sigal had contractually waived their rights to
pursue these claims. Appellants responded by filing these lawsuits in federal court.
III. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Kerr v. McDonald’s
Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2005). The issue before us is whether or not
the EEOC issued a finding of “no cause” regarding appellants’ charges, thus
precluding them from compelling arbitration with appellee. We agree with the
district court, and find that the EEOC’s determination in this case constitutes a “no
cause” finding. The language of the form issued to appellants, the EEOC
regulations and procedures, and a statement by the EEOC Area Director1 all
1
The Area Director for the EEOC office that investigated appellants’ charges verified
that the EEOC determinations were “no cause” findings in a declaration dated April 4, 2003.
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support the conclusion that the EEOC’s determination in this case was the
equivalent of a “no cause” finding.
The form issued to each appellant stated as the reason for dismissal that the
Commission was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes
violations of the statutes.” Appellants argue that the operative language of the
form indicates that the EEOC failed to draw any conclusion from the evidence
presented, and therefore the determination could not be considered a “no cause”
finding. Moreover, appellants submit that the language, quoted above, regarding
non-certification of compliance, and inapplicability to issues outside the present
charge, further support the conclusion that the EEOC was unable to make a
determination.
We disagree. The form clearly indicates that the EEOC investigated
appellants’ charges and found that, based on the evidence submitted, appellants
were unable to establish a violation of the relevant statutes. The fact that the form
does not certify Nash-Finch’s compliance with the statutes does not mean that it
cannot constitute a “no cause” finding. The language is merely consistent with an
ordinary plaintiff’s right to sue after receiving a “no cause” finding from the
EEOC. Appellants, however, have already negotiated a different outcome by
agreeing to refrain from taking further legal action in the event of a “no cause”
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finding. For the same reasons, the fact that the form contains a standard right to
sue notice does not render it a “generic Notice of Right to Sue letter” for purposes
of the Memorandum of Understanding. This alternative in the Memoranda
assumes that the EEOC did not make a determination. We find, however, that the
EEOC made a “no cause” determination.
Furthermore, an EEOC Area Director stated unequivocally that the forms
issued to appellants were “no cause” determinations. She explained that the forms
simply use different language to express what is commonly referred to as a “no
cause” finding. Thus, although the EEOC dismissal forms did not contain the
specific phrase “no cause,” these forms nevertheless constituted “no cause”
findings by the EEOC.
Finally, the EEOC Area Director’s statement is consistent with EEOC
regulations and procedures. EEOC regulations state that, “Where the Commission
completes its investigation of a charge and finds that there is not reasonable cause
to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, the Commission
shall issue a letter of determination to all parties to the charge indicating the
finding.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (2005). Notably, the regulations do not require
the use of any specific language to indicate a “no cause” determination. The EEOC
merely chose to express findings of “no cause” using the language contained in the
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forms issued to appellants, but this does not change the nature of those findings.
IV. Conclusion
The district court properly granted summary judgments to appellee, Nash-
Finch in these cases. Appellants, Tripp and Sigal each negotiated and signed an
agreement with Nash-Finch that barred their ability to take further legal action in
the event that the EEOC issued a determination of “no cause” regarding their
charges. We find that the EEOC did, in fact, issue “no cause” determinations. The
summary judgments are AFFIRMED.
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