United States v. Jason Votrobek

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12790
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00022-RLV-WEJ-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JASON VOTROBEK,
ROLAND CASTELLANOS,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 13, 2017)
Before WILSON and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROYAL, * District
Judge.
*
Honorable C. Ashley Royal, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
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ROYAL, District Judge:
A jury convicted Appellants Jason Votrobek and Roland Castellanos of
conspiring to distribute drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; conspiring to
launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and substantive charges of
money laundering and maintaining a place for unlawful drug distribution. The
district court sentenced both to 180 months in confinement, followed by three
years of supervised release. Appellants challenge their convictions. After careful
review, we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Appellants’ convictions center on their involvement in a “pill mill”
business. 1 Appellants learned how to operate a pill mill clinic from Zachary Rose,
who owned and operated three clinics in Jacksonville, Florida. Indeed, Appellants
met each other while working on the staff at one of these clinics, Jacksonville Pain
and Urgent Care (Jacksonville Pain). However, once law enforcement began to
investigate Rose’s Florida clinics in early 2010, Appellants left Jacksonville Pain
and established their own clinic, Atlanta Medical Group (AMG) in Cartersville,
Georgia. AMG soon hired Dr. James Chapman as its prescribing physician.
Appellants operated AMG in the fashion typical of pill mills. Generally,
AMG patients would pay about $300 in cash for a cursory examination by Dr.
1
A “pill mill” is a term used to describe a medical clinic that prescribes narcotics for illegitimate
purposes.
2
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Chapman, whose prescriptions for pain medications were processed by AMG’s in-
house pharmacy. To pass drug tests, patients frequently brought balloons
containing urine and bribed AMG staff. Security guards searched patients for
weapons. Moreover, Appellants charged more for prescriptions than AMG’s books
reflected and purchased luxury vehicles with the undocumented cash.
As is also typical of these operations, nearby tenants soon began to complain
to AMG’s landlord that unkempt patients arrived before business hours in cars
with out-of-state license plates and loitered in the parking lot. Local pharmacies
refused to fill AMG’s prescriptions because the patients did not appear to be in any
pain. In May 2010, after a traffic stop of four AMG patients carrying large
amounts of prescription narcotics, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
began investigating AMG.
Although Appellant Votrobek had left Florida to open AMG in Georgia, his
involvement in Rose’s Florida clinics caught up with him. On April 20, 2012, in
the Middle District of Florida, a Grand Jury indicted Votrobek for conspiracy to
distribute Oxycodone and Alprazolam not for a legitimate medical purpose and
conspiracy to launder money. After a fifteen-day trial, however, a jury found
Votrobek not guilty.
Votrobek’s respite from conviction was fleeting. Less than two months after
his acquittal in Florida, on June 25, 2013, a Grand Jury in the Northern District of
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Georgia returned a thirty-two count indictment against Appellants Votrobek and
Castellanos, as well as Dr. Chapman, regarding their involvement in AMG.
Pertinent to this appeal, the indictment charged Appellants with conspiracy to
distribute Oxycodone, Hydrocodone with Acetominophen (Lorcet), and
Alprazolam (Xanax) for other than a legitimate medical purpose; conspiracy to
launder money; and substantive counts of money laundering and maintaining a
place for unlawful drug distribution.
After almost four weeks of trial, a jury convicted Appellants on all counts.2
The district court sentenced each to a total of 180 months in prison, followed by
three years of supervised release. Additionally, each was required to pay $200,000
in fines and forfeit to the United States a monetary judgment in the amount of
$3,975,308.
On appeal, Votrobek and Castellanos each raise two issues. Votrobek argues
the district court (1) committed plain error by not dismissing the Georgia
conspiracy charges on Double Jeopardy grounds, and (2) assuming the conspiracy
charges were barred by Double Jeopardy, committed plain error by not dismissing
his substantive convictions based on prejudicial spillover. Castellanos argues the
district court (1) erred by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the
affidavits supporting the four wiretaps, and (2) abused its discretion by refusing to
2
The jury also convicted Dr. Chapman.
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instruct the jury on the entrapment-by-estoppel defense. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm both convictions.
DISCUSSION
I. Double Jeopardy
Votrobek first argues his conspiracy charges in the Northern District of
Georgia arose from the same conspiracy for which he was acquitted in the Middle
District of Florida and thus are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We
disagree.
Because Votrobek failed to raise this argument below, he forfeited his right
to a Double Jeopardy defense, and we review for plain error. United States v.
Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Under this standard, an
appellant must establish “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial
rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002)). If the
appellant meets all three conditions, “an appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides “[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S. Const. amend V. Specifically, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
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against (1) “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal”; (2) “a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction”; and (3) “multiple
punishments for the same offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct.
2221, 2225 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Clause, however, does
not “forbid a second prosecution involving a violation of exactly the same law.”
United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1993). Accordingly,
“[w]hether a defendant has committed the same offense twice is a factual question”
requiring a “determination that the underlying facts that gave rise to the first
prosecution are, or are not the sole basis for the second.” Id.Thus, to determine whether Votrobek’s conviction violated Double
Jeopardy, we must decide whether he committed two separate conspiracies in
Florida and Georgia or only one. To do so, we consider five factors: “(1) time, (2)
persons acting as co-conspirators, (3) the statutory offenses charged in the
indictments, (4) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description
of the offense charged which indicates the nature and scope of the activity which
the government sought to punish in each case, and (5) places where the events
alleged as part of the conspiracy took place.” United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d
151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978).3 Using these factors, the government bears the burden of
proving a separate conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. Maza, 983 F.2d
3In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.
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at 1013. In this analysis, we are free to consider the record in addition to the
indictments. Marable, 578 F.2d at 154; see also United States v. Benefield, 874
F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989).
Applying the Marable factors to this case, we conclude the government has
shown Votrobek committed two separate conspiracies, one in Florida and one in
Georgia. First, the Florida and Georgia conspiracies did not overlap in time. A
temporal gap between the end of one conspiracy and the beginning of another
indicates separate conspiracies. See United States v. Sturman, 679 F.2d 840, 844
(11th Cir. 1982). Here, Votrobek ended his involvement in the Florida conspiracies
in April 2010, one month before the Georgia conspiracies began. 4
Second, Votrobek’s different co-conspirators in Florida and Georgia indicate
separate conspiracies. The only named participant the conspiracies had in common
was Votrobek himself. 5 As we have previously noted, the participation of a single
common actor fails to establish the existence of a single conspiracy. See United
4
Although Votrobek argues the conspiracies briefly overlapped from May through July of 2010
based on the time periods set forth in the indictments, at trial three witnesses testified that
Votrobek left the Florida conspiracy in April 2010. Moreover, in Votrobek’s response to the
government’s 404(b) notice, he asserted that as of April 19, 2010, he had “intentionally severed
ties with” and “had absolutely no involvement with” Rose’s Florida clinics. Doc. 162 at 3.
5
The Florida indictment named twelve co-conspirators in addition to Votrobek: Zachary Rose,
Dr. Hall, Dr. Perla, Dr. Tafflin, Dr. Posca, Dr. Brandt, Krystopher Legg, Ryan Young, Yevgeny
Drubetskoy, Theodore Enquist, Brian Goldberg, and Theresa Faulker. In Georgia, the named
indicted co-conspirators were Votrobek, Castellanos, Jesse Violante, Tara Atkins, and Dr.
Chapman, while the named undicted co-conspirators were Kim Bovino, John Cendor, Jamie
Priest, Cheryl Votrobek, David Votrobek, Dr. Locke, Dr. Efobi, Dr. Daniachew, Dr. Nortick, and
Timothy Spurlock. Although Castellanos worked at the Florida clinic before joining Votrobek in
Georgia, “the identity of unindicted persons is inconsequential for this double jeopardy analysis.”
Sturman, 679 F.2d at 843.
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States v. Nino, 967 F.2d 1508, 1511—12 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 754—55, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1242—43 (1946)). Indeed,
the absence of co-conspirators charged in both indictments indicates “two distinct
conspiracies.” Sturman, 679 F.2d at 843. Moreover, the linchpin of the Georgia
conspiracy was Dr. James Chapman, whose participation allowed AMG to
distribute controlled narcotics. Yet Dr. Chapman did not participate in the Florida
conspiracy. The fact that certain patients patronized both the Florida and Georgia
clinics is irrelevant because no patients were co-conspirators. We agree with the
government that the evidence indicates Votrobek learned the pill mill business in
Florida, then left to start AMG in Georgia with new co-conspirators.
Third, although the offenses charged in both indictments were almost
identical, this factor is not controlling. We have previously explained “it is possible
to have two different conspiracies to commit exactly the same kind of crime.”
Nino, 967 F.2d at 1512. Accordingly, we have described this factor as “clearly” the
least important to the Marable analysis. See Sturman, 679 F.2d at 843. Moreover,
although both indictments alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. §
1956(h), the controlled substances alleged in each drug conspiracy differed
somewhat. Whereas the Florida indictment alleged only Oxycodone and
Alprazolam (Xanax), the Georgia indictment also alleged Hydrocodone with
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Acetaminophen (Lorcet), indicating Votrobek distributed an additional drug in
Georgia.
Fourth, the Florida and Georgia conspiracies involved similar but different
overt acts. Different overt acts indicate separate conspiracies. See United States v.
Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 737—38 (11th Cir. 1993). Even if the overt acts charged are
superfluous, they “serve to describe the offense charged,” and thus, “we may
examine them for the additional insight they provide into the nature and scope” of
the conspiracies. Marable, 578 F.2d at 155.6 According to the Florida indictment,
the conspirators distributed controlled substances without adequate examinations
or treatment plans, solicited out-of-state patients, required $250 or $300 cash
payments, referred patients to a certain individual who provided magnetic
resonance images, allowed patients to evade drug tests, and made daily cash
deposits in various Jacksonville banks. These overt acts were conceptually similar
to but objectively different from those in Georgia, which included purchasing and
selling excessive quantities of controlled substances, monitoring law enforcement
actions against similar clinics, allowing AMG employees to accept bribes from
drug addicts, and using proceeds to purchase additional controlled substances. That
AMG utilized the same startup plan, hiring process, and policies and procedures as
6
We note that the government is not required to prove an overt act under 21 U.S.C. § 846.
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11, 115 S. Ct. 382, 383 (1994). Because the indictment in
this case included numerous overt acts, we consider them in our Marable analysis.
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the Florida clinics is unsurprising, as Votrobek and Castellanos carried their
knowledge of the pill mill business with them from Florida to Georgia. Thus,
although similar, the overt acts in Florida and Georgia were different.
Finally, the fifth Marable factor strongly suggests the existence of two
separate conspiracies because the conspiracies took place in two different states.
Indictments alleging “the conspiratorial events occurred in separate places,”
indicate separate conspiracies. Sturman, 679 F.2d at 843. Here, the Florida
conspiracy revolved around three clinics in Jacksonville, Florida. In contrast, the
Georgia conspiracy focused on AMG in Cartersville, Georgia. Indeed, the Georgia
indictment is silent as to any of Votrobek’s activities in Florida, while the Florida
indictment only briefly notes Votrobek left Florida “to open his own pain
management clinic” in Georgia. Doc. 340 at 6. Although Votrobek argues both the
Florida and Georgia clinics catered to patients from Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Ohio, none of the events alleged as part of either conspiracy took place in these
states. The origin of the clinics’ clientele does not establish the conspiracies
occurred in the same place.
Based on (1) the absence of temporal overlap, (2) the lack of any common
co-conspirators, (3) the additional substances distributed in Georgia, (4) the
different overt acts, and (5) the entirely separate locations of the clinics, we
conclude the government has established the existence of two separate
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conspiracies. Hence, Votrobek’s conviction is not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. At the very least, we cannot say the district court committed plain error by
failing to dismiss the Georgia conspiracy charges on Double Jeopardy grounds.
Finally, as to Votrobek’s second enumeration of error, because his
conspiracy charges did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, there was no
prejudicial spillover as to his substantive charges. Thus, we need not address his
argument on this issue.
II. District Court’s Refusal to Hold a Franks v. Delaware Hearing
We now turn to Appellant Castellanos’ two enumerations of error.
Castellanos first argues the district court erred in denying his request for a Franks
hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978),
based on certain alleged false statements in the affidavits used to obtain court
authorization for telephone wiretaps. We disagree.
To challenge the veracity of an affidavit in support of a wiretap order under
Franks, a defendant must make “a substantial preliminary showing” that (1) “a
false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,” and (2) “the allegedly
false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at155–56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are
insufficient,” and the defendant’s “attack must be more than conclusory and must
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be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” Id. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at
2684. Upon such a showing, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the issue. Id. at 155, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. Although we have not articulated the precise
standard to review a district court's denial of a Franks hearing, normally a district
court's decision regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). We will apply that standard here.
Here, the United States submitted wiretap applications on February 16,
March 18, April 19, and June 6, 2011. In the supporting affidavits, DEA Special
Agent Lourdes M. Bowen averred that in May of 2010, the DEA identified AMG
as a pill mill after receiving complaints from the public concerning AMG’s high
volume of patients. During a traffic stop of four patients, agents discovered large
amounts of controlled narcotics. Over the course of the investigation, agents
interviewed three AMG patients, who all described receiving Oxycodone
prescriptions after perfunctory exams performed by Dr. Chapman. For example,
one patient met with Dr. Chapman for no more than twenty-five minutes, during
which time he merely asked her to bend over, touch her toes, and move her legs
against resistance, before prescribing pills. Based on this information, agents
interviewed Dr. Steven Lobel, a medical doctor, who stated new patient
examinations should include assessments of cranial nerves, concentration, speech,
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reflex, and sensation. Further, Dr. Lobel opined that the large doses of Oxycodone
reflected “callous disregard for legitimate prescribing.” TT-1 Aff. ¶ 27.
Additionally, agents interviewed three former AMG employees, who all
indicated the clinic initially accepted only cash payments. One former employee
explained patients might pay up to $1,200 per visit, and she once collected
approximately $22,000 in cash in a two-hour period. According to the same
employee, patients arrived in groups of three to five, often in the same vehicle, and
occasionally bribed AMG staff to let them pass drug screens. The employee found
discarded condoms, bottles, and balloons in the restroom, but the office manager
told her it was none of her business. Further, Castellanos instructed AMG nurses to
search patients for weapons.
In a consensually recorded telephone conversation with a confidential
source, Votrobek confided he could not sleep at night because he feared he would
watch his child grow up from behind bars, repeatedly mentioned Zachary Rose’s
Florida clinics, and discussed AMG’s sophisticated security systems. Moreover, he
asserted AMG was not a pill mill because it did not process 120 patients per day or
allow patients to sell pills in the parking lot. Based on Votrobek’s explicit
contradiction of these details typical of pill mills, Agent Bowen concluded
Votrobek was identifying ways to avoid raising suspicion at a pill mill.
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Finally, Agent Bowen explained why the wire intercepts were necessary to
the investigation. Prior to seeking the wiretaps, agents had utilized toll-record
analysis, financial transaction reports, confidential informants and sources,
interviews with AMG patients and former employees, physical surveillance, video
surveillance, GPS trackers, and trash searches; however, these investigative
techniques had failed to reveal the knowledge and intent of the conspirators.
According to Agent Bowen, AMG’s owners had become more guarded as the
investigation progressed and had stopped communicating with two of the
confidential sources. Agent Bowen believed other confidential sources or
undercover agents would be unlikely to interact with those at the upper echelons of
the conspiracy. Similarly, physical surveillance and pole cameras had only allowed
agents to observe Dr. Chapman’s visits to a nearby liquor store and patients
arriving and departing from the clinic. Finally, techniques such as surveillance and
searches of the owners’ residences, interviews, and grand jury subpoenas would
immediately alert the conspirators to the investigation.
Castellanos argues Agent Bowen had no basis to conclude (1) the four
patients in the initial traffic stop possessed large amounts of controlled narcotics,
and (2) AMG wrote prescriptions without sufficient medical reason based on
inadequate examinations performed by AMG physicians. Castellanos contends
both statements constitute unfounded medical opinions because Agent Bowen
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lacked medical training. These arguments are unfounded. Agent Bowen averred
that after interviewing multiple patients, she conferred with Dr. Steven Lobel, who
opined that AMG physicians prescribed narcotics in “relatively large quantities”
and did not perform proper neurological and physical examinations. TT-1 Aff. ¶
27. Hence, we conclude Agent’s Bowen’s statements were “supported by
substantial evidence” and thus were not knowingly and intentionally false or in
reckless disregard of the truth. See O’Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257,
1269—70 (11th Cir. 2001).
Castellanos’ next argument—that Agent Bowen misrepresented Votrobek’s
statements during the consensually recorded phone call—also fails. Castellanos
argues Agent Bowen had no basis to conclude Votrobek was identifying ways to
avoid raising suspicion at a pill mill because Votrobek explicitly stated AMG did
not see 120 patients per day or allow patients to sell pills in the parking lot. Based
on Agent Bowen’s considerable experience investigating drug trafficking,
however, Votrobek’s explicit contradiction of details typical of pill mill operations
supported her conclusion Votrobek was identifying ways to avoid raising
suspicion, especially considering Votrobek knew the conversation was being
recorded. Thus, we cannot say Agent Bowen’s statement was either knowingly and
intentionally false or in reckless disregard for the truth.
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Finally, Castellanos argues Agent Bowen made only conclusory statements
supporting the wiretap’s necessity. A wiretap order requires a showing that
“normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. §
2518(3)(c). This necessity requirement ensures “wiretapping is not resorted to in
situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the
crime,” but it does not require “a comprehensive exhaustion of all possible
investigative techniques.” United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202,
1214 (11th Cir. 2010). As set forth above, Agent Bowen spends nearly 24 pages
supporting each affidavit detailing the multiple investigatory techniques utilized by
law enforcement and explaining why they were unlikely to reveal the knowledge
and intent of the targets.
Castellanos has failed to make a substantial showing that Agent Bowen’s
statements were knowingly and intentionally false or made in reckless disregard
for the truth. Nor has Castellanos shown the affidavit lacked probable cause absent
the challenged material. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to hold a Franks hearing.
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C. District Court’s Refusal to Give Requested Instruction on Entrapment by
Estoppel
Castellanos next argues the district court erred in denying his request to
instruct the jury on the entrapment-by-estoppel defense.
We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested “theory of defense”
instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1350
(11th Cir. 1999). Such a refusal is reversible error only if the requested instruction
“(1) was a correct statement of the law; (2) was not adequately covered in the
instructions given to the jury; (3) concerned an issue so substantive that its
omission impaired the accused’s ability to present a defense; and (4) dealt with an
issue properly before the jury.” United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1216 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The instruction must
have “legal support” and “some basis in the evidence.” United States v. Morris, 20
F.3d 1111, 1114—15 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a
district court “has authority to refuse to instruct the jury on a defense where the
evidence used to support it, if believed, fails to establish a legally cognizable
defense.” United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1993).
Although ignorance of the law generally is no defense, “[e]ntrapment-by-
estoppel is an affirmative defense that provides a narrow exception” to this rule.
United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998). Entrapment by
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estoppel “applies to a defendant who reasonably relies on the assurance of a
government official that specified conduct will not violate the law.” United States
v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 484—85 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, the defense “requires a
showing that a government official affirmatively communicated to the defendant
the official’s approval of the conduct at issue.” Id. at 485. Reliance on the official’s
statement must be “objectively reasonable” in light of “the identity of the official,
the point of law represented, and the substance of the misrepresentation.”
Funches, 135 F.3d at 1407. Accordingly, when entrapment by estoppel is “asserted
as a defense to a federal crime,” the defendant must show “reliance on a
misstatement by an official or agent of the federal government.” Id.Here, Castellanos requested an entrapment-by-estoppel jury instruction
based on the testimony of Georgia Bureau of Investigation Agent Kenneth
Howard. According to Agent Howard, in July 2010, he received a phone call from
Castellanos, who volunteered that AMG had received complaints from local
pharmacies, acknowledged the clinic’s out-of-state patients raised red flags,
assured Agent Howard that AMG was a legitimate business, and asked whether
AMG was under investigation. When asked whether he told Castellanos that law
enforcement considered out-of-state patients to be red flags, Agent Howard
answered, “No, I didn’t volunteer anything. I was very cautious with that
conversation. He did most of the talking, and he volunteered that.” Doc. 361, at
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146. Agent Howard reiterated that he did not advise AMG they were violating the
law because “that would be contradictory to [the] investigation.” Doc. 362, at 80.
Subsequently, Tara Atkins met with DEA agents on multiple occasions, but no
testimony was given as to what, if anything, the agents told her.
We conclude that the issue of entrapment by estoppel was not properly
before the jury. At no point did any witness testify that Agent Howard or the DEA
agents affirmatively communicated to Castellanos or Atkins that AMG’s conduct
was in compliance with the law. Therefore, the requested instruction had no factual
basis in the evidence. Moreover, as an employee of a state agency, Agent Howard
had no authority to bind the federal government to any erroneous interpretation of
federal law. As a result, the requested instruction lacked legal support.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct
the jury on entrapment by estoppel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Appellants’ convictions.
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