Dwayne Simpson v. Robert Fender

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-12731 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 27, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:10-cv-00003-LGW-JEG
DWAYNE SIMPSON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROBERT FENDER,
CAROL FENDER,
LINDSEY FENDER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 27, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dwayne Simpson appeals the district court’s judgment granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He contends
that the district court erred when it concluded that there was not complete diversity
of citizenship. He argues that at the time he filed his complaint he was a citizen of
Florida and the defendants were citizens of Georgia.
I.
Simpson filed a lawsuit against the defendants in federal district court,
claiming negligence in an automobile accident and asserting that the court had
subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship under 42 U.S.C. §
1332. In his complaint, Simpson alleged that he was “a resident of Clay County,
Florida” and that the defendants were “citizens and residents of Coffee County,
Georgia.” After discovery, the defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). They contended that Simpson was a citizen of Georgia
and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no
diversity of citizenship.
The district court found that the evidence did not demonstrate that Simpson
was domiciled in Florida. He had offered no evidence other than his own
deposition testimony that his domicile was in Florida, but the defendants had
offered an array of evidence showing that Simpson’s domicile was in Georgia.
2
Specifically, the court noted that the defendants had presented evidence: that
Simpson either owned or rented a home in Douglas, Georgia; that he applied for
utility services there; that he reported his Georgia address to a child support office;
that he applied for a business license in Coffee County, Georgia and listed his
Georgia address on the license; and that his state-issued identification bore a
Douglas, Georgia address. The court found that Simpson had failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that his domicile was in Florida. It concluded there
was no diversity and that it, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Simpson contends that the district court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous.
He argues that the district court considered irrelevant evidence that concerned his
presence in Georgia both before and after his filing of this action. He argues that
the district court relied on that evidence to conclude that Simpson had not changed
his citizenship from Georgia to Florida. Although he concedes that his
maintenance of a Georgia address, receipt of mail at that address, and his Georgia
employment are all evidence that he remained a Georgia citizen, he maintains that
evidence is unpersuasive. He argues that the court should have concluded based
on his deposition testimony that he had been living in Florida continuously for 2–3
3
months1 and intended to remain there indefinitely at the time he filed his
complaint.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v.
Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2010). We review only for clear
error, however, the court’s jurisdictional factfindings. Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London v. Osting Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010). That review is
“highly deferential and requires we uphold the district court’s factual
determinations so long as they are plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus a district court’s finding of domicile
will not be disturbed unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. See Scoggins v. Pollock, 727 F.2d 1025, 1027 (11th
Cir. 1984).
Diversity jurisdiction exists where there is “complete diversity of the
parties’ citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.” Davis v.
Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 794 (11th Cir. 1999); see also 28
1
At his September 14, 2010 deposition, Simpson testified that he had been living in
Florida continuously for 10–11 months. This deposition took place roughly 8 months after he
filed his complaint on January 8, 2010.
4
U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete diversity requires that no defendant in a diversity
action be a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff.” MacGinnitie v. Hobbs
Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). “Citizenship for diversity
purposes is determined at the time the suit is filed.” Id.“Citizenship is equivalent to domicile for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.” McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quotation marks omitted). “A person’s domicile is the place of his true fixed, and
permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of
returning whenever he is absent therefrom.” Id. at 1257–58 (quotation marks
omitted). “Furthermore, a change of domicile requires . . . (1) physical presence at
the new location with (2) an intention to remain there indefinitely.” Id. at 1258(quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal
jurisdiction.” Aderholt, 293 F.3d at 1257. In the present case, Simpson bore the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time he filed his
lawsuit he was not domiciled in Georgia.
III.
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Simpson concedes there was evidence that he was domiciled in Georgia
when he filed his complaint. Although he argues that his deposition testimony
established that he was in Florida and intended to remain there indefinitely when
he filed his complaint, the district court found that testimony was entitled to little
weight when compared with the evidence offered by the defendants. See Hendry
v. Masonite Corp., 455 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1972)2 (“In determining one’s
‘citizenship’ or ‘domicile’ statements of intent are entitled to little weight when in
conflict with facts.”). Because Simpson produced no other evidence that he had
changed his domicile, the district court’s decision that he had not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was domiciled in Florida was not clear
error.
In light of that factfinding, the district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction was not erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
6