Timothy Sneed v. Pan American Hospital

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15530 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 22, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-21415-ASG
TIMOTHY SNEED,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL,
Board of Directors/Administrators, In their Individual and Official Capacities,
DR. RAUL HERNANDEZ,
In his Individual and Official Capacity,
DET. ROLANDO GARCIA,
In his Individual and Official Capacity, City of Miami Police Department,
DET. ORLANDO VILLAVERDE,
In his Individual and Official Capacity, City of Miami Police Department,
CITY OF MIAMI MAYOR MANUEL (MANNY) DIAZ,
In his Individual and Official Capacity, et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees,
CITY OF MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 22, 2011)
Before BARKETT, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy Sneed pro se appeals the district court’s order denying as untimely
his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to vacate or set aside the district
court’s order dismissing Sneed’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. After review, we
affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
In 1998, Sneed was treated at a hospital for a gunshot wound. The hospital
notified the police. Sneed declined to answer the responding detectives’
questions. The detectives then questioned hospital staff and obtained Sneed’s
medical records from a doctor without Sneed’s consent and in violation of Florida
law.
1
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion.
Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
2
At Sneed’s September 22, 2000 state murder trial, Sneed testified that he
had shot the victim and received his own gunshot wound while acting in self
defense. The prosecution introduced Sneed’s medical records and statements from
hospital staff to discredit Sneed’s testimony. Sneed was convicted of second
degree murder. On direct appeal, Sneed’s second degree murder conviction was
overturned as a result of the admission of the improperly obtained medical
evidence. See Sneed v. State, 876 So.2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). At a
second trial on October 12, 2005, Sneed again was convicted of second degree
murder.
On May 12, 2008, Sneed pro se filed a § 1983 complaint. Sneed’s claims
were based on the improperly obtained medical records and statements admitted at
his first murder trial. On September 10, 2009, the district court dismissed Sneed’s
§ 1983 complaint because it was not filed within four years of the admission of the
medical evidence at the first trial in September 2000.2 This Court affirmed the
dismissal order. See Sneed v. Pan Am. Hosp., 370 F. App’x 47 (11th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1482 (2011).
2
The district court originally dismissed Sneed’s § 1983 complaint on August 3, 2009, but
issued a corrected order on September 10, 2009 when it discovered duplicate pages in the August
3 order.
3
On October 27, 2010, Sneed filed the instant Rule 60(b) motion to vacate
the dismissal order. Sneed’s Rule 60(b) motion claimed that, after the district
court dismissed his § 1983 complaint as time-barred, Sneed discovered new
evidence indicating his § 1983 claims were timely. Specifically, Sneed claimed
that while pursuing his state post-conviction relief, he received a copy of the
second murder trial transcript and learned that his defense attorney had
unsuccessfully objected to the admission of two photographs of Sneed’s wounds
during a side bar conference. The defense attorney argued that these photographs,
taken by law enforcement while Sneed was at the hospital, should not be admitted
for the same reasons the medical records and statements could not be admitted.
Sneed claimed that this newly discovered evidence established that the four-year
statute of limitations ran from the October 12, 2005 second trial date, making his
§ 1983 complaint filed on May 12, 2008 timely.
The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion as untimely because it was
not filed within one year of the September 10, 2009 dismissal order. Sneed filed
this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) permits a district court to “relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for,” among other
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things, “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(2). A Rule 60(b)(2) motion is an extraordinary motion, and “the
requirements of the rule must be strictly met.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). A Rule 60(b)(2) motion must be filed “no
more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).3
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Sneed’s
Rule 60(b)(2) motion. The district court’s corrected dismissal order was entered
on September 10, 2009. Sneed did not file his Rule 60(b)(2) motion until October
27, 2010, more than one year later.
Sneed contends that he did not receive a copy of the September 10, 2009
dismissal order until October 30, 2009 because he was being transferred to a
3
Sneed designated his Rule 60(b) motion as one filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Rule
60(b)(6) permits the district court to set aside a judgment or order for “any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion may be filed
“within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Sneed does not argue on appeal that his
motion was a timely Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In any event, because Sneed’s motion was based on
newly discovered evidence, it cannot be construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Seven Elves,
Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 n.3 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (explaining that “the fact that
the rule itself imposes different time limits on motions under Rule 60(b)(6) and 60(b)(1)-(3), has
led to the conclusion that the grounds specified under the first five subsections will not justify
relief under subsection (6)”); Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local No. 480, AFL-CIO, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1972) (“Where either Clauses (b) (1), (2),
(3), (4), or (5) provide coverage for the movant’s claim, relief may not be obtained pursuant to
Clause (b)(6).”).
5
different prison facility. However, the one-year time period for filing Rule
60(b)(2) motions runs from the entry of the September 10, 2009 judgment or order
Sneed’s motion seeks to set aside, not from the time the party receives actual
notice of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). And, Sneed admits
he received the order on October 20, 2009, which was well before the one-year
period expired on September 10, 2010. Thus, Sneed’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion was
untimely.
AFFIRMED.
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