Karen Vanover v. NCO Financial Services, Inc.

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-15294
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-01434-VMC-EAJ
KAREN VANOVER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NCO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 17, 2017)
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Before TJOFLAT and HULL, Circuit Judges, and BYRON, * District Judge.
BYRON, District Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Karen Vanover (“Vanover”) sued Defendant-Appellee
NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (“NCO”), on April 23, 2014, for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, after NCO
attempted to collect medical debts from her. See Vanover v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.,
Case No. 8:14-cv-964-T-35EAJ (M.D. Fla. 2014) (hereinafter “Vanover I”).
Nearly one year after Vanover I was filed, Vanover sued NCO in Florida state
court, alleging violations of the TCPA, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, and the Florida Consumer Collection
Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 595.55–.785. See Vanover v. NCO Fin.
Sys., Inc., Case No. 2015-CA-1525WS (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015) (hereinafter “Vanover
II”). NCO removed the Florida state court action and filed a motion to dismiss for
improper claim-splitting. Vanover thereafter amended her complaint in Vanover II,
NCO renewed its motion to dismiss for claim-splitting, and Vanover sought leave
to join additional parties and to amend her complaint a second time. The district
court denied Vanover’s motion to join additional parties and entered final
judgment dismissing Vanover’s Amended Complaint.
*
The Honorable Paul G. Byron, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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This appeal involves two issues. First, Vanover alleges the district court
erred by denying her motion to join additional parties. Second, Vanover claims the
district court erred in dismissing Vanover II for improper claim-splitting.
After thorough review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Whether a complaint may be dismissed for asserting claims which could and
should have been presented in an earlier-filed complaint is an issue of first
impression in this Circuit. Due to the nature of the claim-splitting doctrine, and
because this appeal involves a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we outline in detail the
allegations in Vanover I and Vanover II. 1
A. Vanover I
In Vanover I, Vanover alleges that during the twelve months prior to filing
the complaint—April 2013 through April 2014—NCO violated the TCPA by
calling her cellular telephone without express permission and in direct violation of
her instructions, all in an attempt to collect medical debts allegedly owed by her to
various hospitals. Vanover further contends that NCO employed an automatic
telephone dialing system to place the debt collection calls. Under the TCPA, an
1
As will be illuminated later in this opinion, the claim-splitting doctrine derives from the
doctrine of res judicata. Since res judicata may be raised by way of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, so may the claim-splitting defense. See Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1075–
76 (11th Cir. 1982) (advising that a district court may resolve the issue of res judicata at the
pleading stage where the defense appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint and the court is
in possession of any judicially noticeable facts it needs to reach a decision).
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automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) “means equipment which has the
capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random
or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. §
227(a)(1). The TCPA prohibits debt collection agencies such as NCO from calling
a consumer using an ATDS except in an emergency or after obtaining the express
consent of the consumer. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). On May 13, 2015, NCO
moved for summary judgment in Vanover I, arguing that Vanover had consented to
being contacted on her cellular telephone and asserting that NCO did not call her
via an ATDS.
B. Vanover II
One week later, on May 20, 2015, Vanover filed a complaint in Florida state
court (Vanover II), alleging violations of the TCPA from April 2010 through
November 2013, as well as violations of the FDCPA and the FCCPA. NCO
removed the state court case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss for
improper claim-splitting. Vanover requested leave to amend her complaint, which
was granted by the district court, and filed her Amended Complaint on July 31,
2015. Thereafter, NCO moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint in Vanover II,
again citing the claim-splitting doctrine.
The Amended Complaint in Vanover II names the same plaintiff and
defendant named in Vanover I. Also like Vanover I, the Amended Complaint in
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Vanover II alleges that NCO was attempting to collect multiple unsubstantiated
consumer medical debts from Vanover. The allegations in the Amended Complaint
in Vanover II do not indicate, however, that the debts at issue in the subsequent
lawsuit were different from the debts at issue in Vanover I. Vanover asserts that
NCO used predictive dialers (ATDS) to contact her residential landline phone and
her cellular phone hundreds of times beginning on April 11, 2010 and continuing
through and including April 23, 2013. NCO is also alleged to have contacted third
parties via their cellular, residential, and business telephone numbers to discuss
Vanover’s medical debts. Vanover contends that the medical debts were not owed
because she is covered by Medicaid. Count One of the Amended Complaint in
Vanover II asserts violations of the FDCPA arising from NCO contacting Vanover
against her direction to cease and desist. Count Two sets forth the FCCPA state
analogue to Count I, which is also predicated on NCO attempting to collect the
medical debts after being instructed not to do so. Count Three is the previously
described TCPA claim.
C. The District Court’s Orders
After NCO filed its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in Vanover
II, Vanover sought leave to add Expert Global Solutions, Inc., formerly known as
NCO Group, Inc., and Transworld Systems, Inc. as defendants in a proposed
Second Amended Complaint. The district court denied the motion to join
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additional parties. Thereafter, the district court granted NCO’s motion to dismiss
Vanover II, with prejudice, finding that Vanover I and Vanover II involve the same
parties along with a common nucleus of operative fact and that, as a result,
Vanover II violates the prohibition against claim-splitting.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s decision regarding the joinder of indispensable
parties for abuse of discretion.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746
F.3d 1008, 1039 (11th Cir. 2014). While dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
normally subject to de novo review, the district judge’s dismissal for claim-
splitting was premised on the ability of the district court to manage its own docket;
thus, the dismissal is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard as well. See,
e.g., Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that abuse of
discretion standard controls when a district court’s dismissal due to claim-splitting
is based predominantly on case management grounds); Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of
Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (same), overruled on other
grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226
F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221,
223 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). “A district court abuses its discretion when, in reaching
a decision, it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
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Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 1039 (quoting United States v. Rigel Ships Agencies, Inc.,
432 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Vanover’s Motion to Join Additional Parties
In an attempt to defeat NCO’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in
Vanover II for impermissible claim-splitting, Vanover moved to join Expert Global
Solutions, Inc. (“EGS”) and Transworld Systems, Inc. (“TSI”) in a proposed
Second Amended Complaint. Vanover asserts that TSI and NCO acted at the
direction of their parent corporation, EGS, without specifying how EGS directs
either TSI or NCO. Vanover further alleged that EGS, TSI, and NCO violated
federal and state law when they attempted to collect medical debts after Vanover
advised them she did not owe the alleged debts. Vanover contended that EGS,
NCO, and TSI operated out of the same call centers when they called her
residential and cellular telephones between April 8, 2011, and November 26, 2013.
Vanover verified TSI’s involvement in placing debt collection calls to her from
screenshots on her cellular telephone taken on August 21, 24, and 25, 2012.
The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges the same violations of the
FDCPA, the FCCPA, and the TCPA as were asserted in the Amended Complaint
that was the subject of NCO’s motion to dismiss for improper claim-splitting. The
proposed Second Amended Complaint detailed the same attempted collection of
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debts incurred on over twenty-one medical accounts as was alleged in the
Amended Complaint, and these same medical accounts were the subject of the
alleged unlawful collection efforts in Vanover I. Accordingly, in both Vanover I
and Vanover II, Vanover alleged that NCO was attempting to collect debts incurred
on the same medical accounts. Vanover sought to join TSI and EGS on the basis
that the Court could not accord complete relief without them.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 governs the mandatory joinder of
parties. First, the court must determine whether the absent party is a required
party under Rule 19(a). Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d
1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2011). In general, an absent party is not a required party if
that party’s joinder would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 19(a). Second, if the absent party is a required party, but joinder is not
feasible—i.e., joinder would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction—
the court must consider “ a list of factors to ‘determine whether, in equity and
good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should
be dismissed.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)).
In this case, joining EGS and TSI would not have defeated the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the issue is whether Vanover established
that the district court could not accord complete relief without joining them.
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The district judge concluded that Vanover failed to carry her burden under
Rule 19(a) because she failed to demonstrate that she could not obtain full relief
from NCO for money damages without joining EGS or TSI. Additionally, the
district court found that Vanover failed to demonstrate how EGS, as the alleged
parent of NCO, is liable for any violations of law allegedly committed by NCO,
aside from the bald assertion that NCO acted at EGS’s direction. See United States
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (reciting the fundamental principle that the
existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not enough on its own to hold a
parent company liable for the torts of its subsidiary). The district court further
determined that Vanover failed to allege a basis for imposing vicarious liability
against EGS based on the alleged acts of NCO; that is, there were no facts (alleged
or proven) showing that EGS exercised actual control or direction over NCO’s
debt collection efforts.
The district court found that Vanover failed to demonstrate that TSI is a
necessary and indispensable party because the motion to join additional parties and
the proposed Second Amended Complaint failed to allege anything about the
relationship between EGS, TSI, and NCO that would prevent Vanover from
obtaining full relief for any allegedly unlawful communications from NCO.
Moreover, as NCO argued below, TSI is alleged to be a California corporation
whereas NCO is a Pennsylvania corporation, and the record is devoid of any
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allegation indicating that TSI acted in concert with or controlled the actions of
NCO. See Barber v. Am.’s Wholesale Lender, 289 F.R.D. 364, 367–68 (M.D. Fla.
2013) (severing the plaintiff’s claims against numerous defendants where there
were no allegations that the defendants engaged in concerted activity).
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in denying the joinder of
EGS and TSI pursuant to Rule 19(a).
Vanover alternatively sought to join EGS and TSI pursuant to Rule 20(a),
which governs permissive joinder of parties. Rule 20(a) requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate two prerequisites in order to permissively join a party: first, the claims
against the party to be joined must “aris[e] out of the same transaction or
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and second, there must be
some question of law or fact common to all parties to be joined. Alexander v.
Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Joinder is “strongly
encouraged” and the rules are construed generously “toward entertaining the
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.” United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). However, district courts
have “broad discretion to join parties or not and that decision will not be
overturned as long as it falls within the district court’s range of choices.” Swan v.
Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
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The district court balanced the policy considerations that weigh against the
desirability of joining EGS and TSI, and denied Vanover’s motion for permissive
joinder. The district court noted that NCO faced duplicative litigation in Vanover I
and Vanover II, specifically finding that both lawsuits arose out of the same
underlying conduct—the collection of medical debts allegedly owed by Vanover.
The district court further observed that NCO moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint in Vanover II for improper claim-splitting. Accordingly, the district
court found that allowing Vanover to join EGS and TSI in an attempt to defeat
NCO’s motion to dismiss would have the undesirable effect of exposing NCO to
potential conflicting liability and inconsistent judgments. Since Vanover could
have added EGS and TSI as parties in Vanover I, the district court determined
that permissive joinder was not in the interest of justice and would not
advance judicial economy.
The district court was also unpersuaded by Vanover’s argument that
she had just become aware that EGS and TSI should be joined. By Vanover’s
own admission, TSI’s alleged involvement in attempting to collect the
medical debts was confirmed from Vanover’s cellular telephone in August
2012, before she filed Vanover I. Similarly, Vanover failed to allege that she
had been unaware that EGS was the parent company of NCO prior to filing
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Vanover I. Vanover’s motion to join additional parties, if granted, would
have had the effect of forcing NCO to incur additional delay and related costs
of litigation, which could have been avoided had Vanover amended her
complaint in Vanover I. 2
This Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the permissive joinder of EGS and TSI. To be sure, Vanover’s
failure to timely amend her Complaint in Vanover I to include EGS and TSI
does not justify subjecting NCO to duplicative litigation. Vanover’s
contention that NCO could have moved to consolidate Vanover II with
Vanover I as opposed to seeking dismissal is similarly unpersuasive in that
NCO had no obligation to seek consolidation of the actions. Further, as the
district court aptly noticed, Vanover had nine months to amend her complaint
in Vanover I, but she failed to do so. See Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v.
Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming district
court’s decision to sever based on case management concerns); United States
v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court’s
denial of joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) and finding that permissive
2
Vanover contends she was prevented by the district court from engaging in any
discovery relevant to the FDCPA and FCCPA claims. We find, however, that Vanover failed to
raise this issue below in the district court, thereby precluding appellate review. See Depree v.
Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991).
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joinder was unwarranted due to “the late stage of the proceedings”).
Accordingly, the district court properly acted within its discretion when it
denied Vanover’s motion to permissively join EGS and TSI as well.
B. NCO’s Motion to Dismiss for Improper Claim-Splitting
Once the district court disposed of Vanover’s Motion to Join Additional
Parties, it proceeded to NCO’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in
Vanover II for improper claim-splitting.3 This is an issue of first impression in this
Circuit, although several federal circuit courts and district courts within Florida
have comprehensively analyzed the claim-splitting doctrine.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Katz v. Gerardi, confronted the issue of
“whether a plaintiff can split potential legal claims against a defendant by bringing
them in two different lawsuits” and held that “related claims must be brought in a
single cause of action.” 655 F.3d 1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff in Katz
was a minority shareholder in a real estate investment trust which entered into a
merger agreement wherein two investors acquired all of the outstanding public
shares. Id. at 1214. The plaintiff sued alleging the offering documents associated
with the merger contained false and misleading statements or omissions. Id.Another shareholder, Infinity Clark Street Operating, filed a class action lawsuit in
3
“The ‘claim splitting doctrine’ applies where a second suit has been filed before the first
suit has reached a final judgment.” Zephyr Aviation III, L.L.C. v. Keytech Ltd., No. 8:07-CV-
227-T-27TGW, 2008 WL 759095, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2008).
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federal court alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims related
to the merger which was stayed pending arbitration. Id. Katz thereafter filed a
separate class action lawsuit in an Illinois state court that was removed to federal
court asserting security law claims related to the merger and subsequently amended
the class action to join Infinity as a plaintiff. Id. The district court dismissed
Infinity from the Katz’s complaint, finding that joinder of Infinity resulted in the
improper splitting of claims which could have been brought in Infinity’s earlier
class action lawsuit. Id. The district court held, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that:
The rule against claim-splitting requires a plaintiff to
assert all of its causes of action arising from a common
set of facts in one lawsuit. By spreading claims around in
multiple lawsuits in other courts or before other judges,
parties waste “scarce judicial resources” and undermine
“the efficient and comprehensive disposition of cases.”
Id. at 1217 (quoting Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296
F.3d 982, 985 (10th Cir. 2002)); see also Curtis v. Citibank N.A., 226 F.3d 133,
139 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[P]laintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same
subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.”).
Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that a plaintiff ‘may not file duplicative
complaints in order to expand their legal rights.’” Greene v. H & R Block E.
Enters., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Curtis, 226
F.3d at 140). The claim-splitting doctrine thereby “ensures that a plaintiff may not
‘split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the
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grounds upon which relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second
suit, if the first fails.’” Id. (quoting Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477, 485 (1876)). The
claim-splitting doctrine thus “ensure[s] fairness to litigants and . . . conserve[s]
judicial resources.” Id.Claim-splitting has been analyzed as an aspect of res judicata or claim
preclusion. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (referring to claim-splitting as “the ‘other action pending’ facet of the res
judicata doctrine”); Shaver v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 840 F.2d 1361, 1365 (7th Cir.
1988) (observing that “the doctrine of res judicata doctrine prevents the splitting of
a single cause of action and the use of several theories of recovery as the basis for
separate suits”); Khan v. H & R Block E. Enters., Inc., No. 11-20335-Civ, 2011
WL 3269440, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2011) (“[F]ederal courts borrow from the
res judicata test for claim preclusion to determine whether [a] plaintiff[’s] claims
were split improperly.”). While claim-splitting and res judicata both promote
judicial economy and shield parties from vexatious and duplicative litigation,
“claim splitting is more concerned with the district court’s comprehensive
management of its docket, whereas res judicata focuses on protecting the finality of
judgments.” Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s test for
claim-splitting “is not whether there is finality of judgment, but whether the first
suit, assuming it were final, would preclude the second suit.” Id. We agree with the
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test announced by the Tenth Circuit and concur that it “makes sense, given that the
claim-splitting rule exists to allow district courts to manage their docket and
dispense with duplicative litigation.” Id. at 1218–19.
The district court in this case properly applied a two-factor test whereby the
court “analyzes (1) whether the case involves the same parties and their privies,
and (2) whether separate cases arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions.” Khan, 2011 WL 3269440, at *6. Successive causes of action arise
from the same transaction or series of transactions when the two actions are based
on the same nucleus of operative facts. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365
F.3d 385, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations
omitted). The Fifth Circuit has adopted the transactional test of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, § 24, which instructs the district court to consider the
following factors:
What factual grouping constitutes a “transaction,” and
what groupings constitute a “series,” are to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit,
and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.
[Hence,] “[t]he critical issue is whether the two actions
under consideration are based on the same nucleus of
operative facts.”
Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 396 (footnotes omitted); see also Hatch v. Boulder Town
Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Under the transactional test, a
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new action will be permitted only where it raises new and independent claims, not
part of the previous transaction, based on the new facts.”).
Vanover argues that the operative or transactional nucleus of facts related to
her TCPA claims in Vanover I are limited to whether NCO placed calls to her
cellular telephone using an ATDS without her express consent. Vanover asserts
that the claims asserted in Vanover II are distinct and relate to abusive and
harassing communications in the collection of consumer debts prohibited by the
FDCPA and FCCPA. However, the distinction Vanover draws between Vanover I
and Vanover II is artificially narrow and runs contrary to the prohibition against
bringing a successive cause of action arising from the same nucleus of operative
facts. See Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 395–96.
The district court correctly found that the first prong of the claim-splitting
analysis is satisfied, as the parties are identical in Vanover I and Vanover II.
Turning to the second prong, the district court found the claims asserted in
Vanover I and Vanover II are based on the same nucleus of operative facts,
notwithstanding Vanover’s attempt to distinguish between the two actions.
Vanover takes the position that Vanover II involves calls that began in April
2010—earlier than the date alleged in Vanover I—and that Vanover II involves
calls NCO made to her residential telephone and to third parties—unlike the
allegations made in Vanover I where NCO is alleged to have called only Vanover’s
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cellular telephone. The district court concluded that the claims in Vanover II are
still based upon the same collection efforts set forth in Vanover I, regardless of
whether the calls were placed to cellular telephone calls, residential telephones, or
to third parties. The trial judge also determined that merely extending the time
frame in Vanover II to cover an earlier period than was alleged in Vanover I does
not impact the claim-splitting analysis, since splitting the time frame into two
different periods does not create a separate transaction. The district court correctly
concluded that all of the alleged wrongs by NCO occurred consecutively in time
and prior to filing the compliant in Vanover I; hence, the collection efforts which
form the basis of Vanover I and Vanover II arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions. Stated differently, the factual bases for both lawsuits are
related in time, origin, and motivation, and they form a convenient trial unit,
thereby precluding Vanover from splitting her claims among the lawsuits.
Finally, the district court found that claim-splitting is not defeated by
Vanover’s addition of causes of action in Vanover II. See Trustmark Ins. v. ESLU,
Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that res judicata prevented a
plaintiff from bringing successive lawsuits for separate breaches of the same
contract, committed by the same party, and involving the same general type of
conduct even where different causes of action are alleged); Myers v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1224 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that rule
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against claim-splitting barred ERISA lawsuit where the first lawsuit was filed
under Title VII and ADEA because both cases arose out of “the same transactional
nucleus of facts, and would involve substantially the same evidence”). Vanover
includes two new causes of action in Vanover II alleging violations of the FDCPA
and FCCPA. These claims arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts as
the TCPA claim asserted in Vanover I. Accordingly, the addition of separate
causes of action in Vanover II does not prevent application of the claim-splitting
doctrine. To rule otherwise would defeat the objective of the claim-splitting
doctrine to promote judicial economy and shield parties from vexatious and
duplicative litigation while empowering the district court to manage its docket.
Wherefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Vanover II for improper
claim-splitting.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Vanover’s
amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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