Joel v. HSBC Bank USA etc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 31, 2011
No. 10-13029 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00732-TWT
TIFFANY JOEL,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HSBC BANK USA, National Association,
IRA NEWBLE, II,
in his individual capacity,
HWV PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
in their corporate capacity jointly and severally,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 31, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tiffany Joel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing
her complaint, which sought relief under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act
of 2009 (“PTFA”), Pub. L. No. 111-22, Div. A, Title VII, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-62
(2009). On appeal, Joel argues that the district court erred in dismissing her
complaint because she stated a plausible claim for relief under the PTFA. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
I.
Joel filed a pro se complaint against HSBC Bank USA, Ira Newble, II, and
HWV Property Management, seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled
to remain in a rental property located at 1911 Saxon Valley Circle, NE, in Atlanta,
Georgia. Joel explained that she leased that property from Newble and HWV
Property Management. In December 2009, Joel received a notice stating that
HSBC had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale. The notice informed Joel
that she would have to relinquish possession within 90 days. Joel’s complaint
asserted that, under the PTFA, she was entitled to remain in the property until her
leasing contract expired in February 2014.
Joel attached a copy of the notice as an exhibit to her complaint. She also
submitted a copy of the lease agreement. The terms of the lease provided: “This
agreement shall commence on February 1, 2009 and continue; until February 1,
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2014, on a month-to-month tenancy until either party shall terminate this
agreement by giving a written notice of intention to terminate at least 30 days prior
to the date of termination.”
HSBC moved to dismiss Joel’s complaint, arguing that it had complied with
its obligations under the PTFA. The district court granted HSBC’s motion and
dismissed Joel’s complaint with prejudice. The district court noted that Joel was
not entitled to remain in her property because the lease was terminable at will, and
HSBC had given her the notice required by law to vacate the premises.
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) de novo, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623
F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, but it must set forth “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-1965. In ruling on a motion to
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dismiss, this Court may consider documents attached to the complaint. See
Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (“When
considering a motion to dismiss . . . the court limits its consideration to the
pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.”) (quotation omitted).
In relevant part, the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act provides:
(a) In the case of any foreclosure on a federally-related mortgage loan or
on any dwelling or residential real property after the date of
enactment of this title, any immediate successor in interest in such
property pursuant to the foreclosure shall assume such interest subject
to--
(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate
to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date
of such notice; and
(2) the rights of any bona fide tenant, as of the date of such notice
of foreclosure--
(A) under any bona fide lease entered into before the notice
of foreclosure to occupy the premises until the end of the
remaining term of the lease, except that a successor in
interest may terminate a lease effective on the date of
sale of the unit to a purchaser who will occupy the unit
as a primary residence, subject to the receipt by the
tenant of the 90 day notice under paragraph (1); or
(B) without a lease or with a lease terminable at will under
state law, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90
day notice under subsection (1).
Pub. L. No. 111-22, Div. A, Title VII, § 702, 123 Stat. at 1660-61 (2009).
In this case, Joel maintains that HSBC cannot interpret or enforce the lease
because it was not a party to the original contract. The issue, however, is not
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whether HSBC can enforce the lease. In fact, HSBC is attempting to end the lease,
not enforce it. The issue is whether the lease is terminable at will, in which case
HSBC can end the lease by providing 90 days’ notice to Joel, or whether it is a
lease for a fixed term, in which case HSBC will have to let Joel remain in the
property until it sells the property to a purchaser who will use it as a primary
residence. The fact that HSBC was not a party to the original lease does not mean
that it cannot interpret the express language of the contract to derive the parties’
intent.
Joel’s argument that the leasing agreement established a lease for a fixed
term, rather than a tenancy at will, also fails. By its terms, the lease created a
“month-to-month tenancy” that could be terminated by either party with 30 days’
notice. Because Georgia law requires at least 30 days’ notice before terminating a
tenancy at will, the lease effectively created a tenancy at will. See O.C.G.A.
§ 44-7-7. Therefore, under the PTFA, HSBC could terminate the lease after
providing 90 days’ notice to Joel. See Pub. L. No. 111-22, Div. A, Title VII,
§ 702(a)(2)(B), 123 Stat. at 1661 (2009). The letter attached to Joel’s complaint
demonstrates that she did, in fact, receive such notice. See Grossman, 225 F.3d at
1231 (noting that a reviewing court may consider documents attached to the
plaintiff’s complaint). Because HSBC fully complied with the PTFA, the district
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court properly concluded that Joel’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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