United States v. Freddie Lara

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-10394
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-20242-WJZ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FREDDIE LARA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 20, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2007 Freddie Lara was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
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841(a)(1), and sentenced to serve 216 months in prison. The sentence was slightly
above the middle of his guideline range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. In
2014, Lara, proceeding pro se, filed a 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence
reduction based on Amendment 782, which reduced the offense levels for certain
drug-trafficking offenses. The district court granted the motion and reduced Lara’s
sentence to 188 months of imprisonment, the high end of his amended guideline
range of 151 to 188 months.
Lara appealed the district court’s order, arguing that the order was
insufficient to allow for meaningful review because the court gave no explanation
of its reasons for the partially reduced sentence. We agreed, finding that “the
court’s order gives no indication of the court’s reasoning for its chosen sentence or
its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Lara, 626 F. App’x
799, 801 (11th Cir. 2015). We noted a discrepancy between where Lara was
sentenced within his original guideline range (near the middle) and where he was
sentenced within his amended guideline range (at the top). Because we “lack[ed]
any detail, however minute, as to what was considered by the district court when it
reduced Lara’s sentence of imprisonment to 188 months,” we vacated the district
court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 801–02.
On remand, Lara filed a brief in support of his request for a sentence of 151
months of imprisonment, the low end of his amended guideline range. In his brief,
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Lara detailed his post-sentence rehabilitation while in prison, asserted that reducing
his sentence would pose no threat to the community because he was 49 years old
and he faced an undischarged state prison sentence and deportation upon his
release from federal custody. Lara also argued that society’s evolving
understanding of drug crimes indicated that his sentence was longer than
necessary.
The district court issued a seven-page order granting Lara’s motion and
again reducing his sentence to 188 months of imprisonment. In contrast to the
court’s original order, which was silent about the court’s reasons and its
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court’s order on
remand contains an explicit discussion of the § 3553(a) factors and the court’s
reasons for resentencing Lara to the high end of the amended guideline range.
Lara again appeals the partial reduction of his sentence.
Lara challenges the district court’s order on two main grounds. First, Lara
asserts, the district court on remand violated the spirit of this Court’s mandate by
simply justifying its original decision rather than reconsidering the § 3553(a)
factors in an objective and unbiased way. Second, Lara contends, the court abused
its discretion by refusing to properly weigh and consider the § 3553(a) factors,
including his extensive post-sentencing rehabilitation, the fact that he would pose
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no danger to the community if released earlier, and a societal recognition that drug
sentences are excessive as a general matter.
We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce an eligible
defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion. United States
v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). A district court abuses its
discretion by failing to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper
procedures when making a determination under § 3582(c)(2). United States v.
Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2010).
In evaluating whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted,
the district court “must consider the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), as well as public safety considerations, and may consider the defendant’s
post-sentencing conduct.” Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256; see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B). The district court is not required to discuss each
§ 3553(a) factor as long as the record as a whole demonstrates that the pertinent
factors were taken into account.1 Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256; see also United
States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 927–29 (11th Cir. 2009).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by resentencing Lara to
188 months of imprisonment following our remand. As an initial matter, the court
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The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the history and characteristics of the defendant, the applicable guideline range, and the need for
the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect the public. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1)-(2), (4).
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did not violate the spirit of our mandate. See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,
1119 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The trial court must implement both the letter and the
spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion, and the
circumstances it embraces.” (citations omitted)). We remanded Lara’s case
because the court’s original § 3582(c)(2) order and the record as a whole were
insufficient to show what the court considered when it reduced Lara’s sentence of
imprisonment to 188 months, not because we disagreed with the substance of the
district court’s decision. Lara, 626 F. App’x at 801. Without any explanation
from the district court, we could not meaningfully review the sentence imposed.
Id. at 801–02; see Williams, 557 F.3d at 1257. In keeping with both the letter and
spirit of our mandate, the district court has now provided an explanation and an
explicit discussion of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court was not required
to reconsider the § 3553(a) factors or impose a different sentence on remand.
Turning to the merits of the district court’s decision, Lara has not shown that
the district court abused its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and
refusing to grant the extent of reduction sought by Lara. See Williams, 557 F.3d at
1257 (“[The court’s] decision whether to reduce the defendant’s sentence, and to
what extent, remains discretionary.”). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard allows a
range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a
clear error of judgment.” United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir.
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2005) (quotation marks omitted). Absent a clear error of judgment or mistake of
law, we must defer to the district court’s determination. See id.Here, the district court’s order is sufficient to show that it considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and had a reasoned basis for sentencing Lara to the high end of
the amended guideline range. The court’s order references numerous § 3553(a)
factors, including the nature and characteristics of the underlying offense, Lara’s
criminal history, and the amended guideline range. The court also stated that it had
considered Lara’s post-remand brief, which addressed his post-sentence
rehabilitation, public safety considerations, and other pertinent § 3553(a) factors.
See Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256. Thus, the record as a whole shows that the court
adequately considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See id. at 1256–57; Smith,
568 F.3d at 928–29. While the court was permitted to take into account Lara’s
post-sentencing conduct, it was not required to do so. See Williams, 557 F.3d at
1256. Finally, though Lara may disagree with how the district court weighed the
§ 3553(a) factors, he has not shown that the court committed a clear error in
judgment by resentencing him to the high end of the amended guideline range. See
Drury, 396 F.3d at 1315. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we
affirm, and reassignment to a different judge on remand is unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
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