Torchia v. State of Florida Office of Financial Institutions & Securities Regulation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 05-15287 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 27, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00110-CV-4-SPM-AK
JAMES A. TORCHIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA OFFICE OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 27, 2006)
Before DUBINA, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James A. Torchia appeals the district court’s dismissal of his declaratory
judgment action on Rooker-Feldman doctrine grounds, as well as the district court’s
denial of his motion to amend his complaint. Because we agree that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars Torchia’s claim, we affirm.
The State of Florida’s Office of Financial Regulation (the “State”) brought
Torchia before an administrative court to answer for his selling, as an unregistered
dealer, unregistered securities, in violation of Florida Statutes § 517. The
administrative hearing officer found that Torchia had violated the statute multiple
times, and recommended fining him $120,000. Torchia appealed to Florida’s Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the administrative hearing officer’s findings.
Torchia then sought discretionary review from the Florida Supreme Court, which
declined to hear his case. Torchia did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Four months later, Torchia filed this declaratory judgment action, alleging that
“Chapter 517 as applied in light of Chapter 626 is unconstitutionally vague.” (R.-1
at 14 ¶34.); Torchia v. State of Fla., Office of Financial Regulation, 2005 WL
2007105 at *2 (11th Cir. 2005). The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, among
other things, that based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion. The court also denied
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Torchia’s request for leave to amend his complaint to substitute an individual party
for the State to avoid an Eleventh Amendment dismissal. Torchia now appeals.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine jurisdictionally bars federal district courts from
reviewing state court decisions. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., __
U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1522-23 (2005). This circuit has applied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to hold that district courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to
review claims not raised in state court, but “inextricably intertwined” with a state
court judgment. Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466 (11th Cir. 1996). This
application is limited by the further rule that a claim that the plaintiff had no
opportunity to raise in state court cannot be barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 467.
In this case, as in Powell, Torchia’s as-applied constitutional claims are
inextricably intertwined with the state-law litigation that resulted in his fines. See id.If we decide that Section 517 of the Florida Statutes was unconstitutionally applied
to Torchia, as he claims, we necessarily nullify the state court judgment that resulted
in his fine under that section. It is clear that, under Florida law, Torchia should have
brought his as-applied constitutional challenge as part of his state court litigation.
See Key Haven Assoc. Enter. v. Board of Trustees, 427 So. 2d 153, 158 (Fla. 1982).
Our conclusion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
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of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine moots the other issues presented by Torchia on this
appeal.
AFFIRMED.
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