Helen Lientjewas v. U.S. Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Oct. 6, 2009
No. 08-16680 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A099-639-376
HELEN LIENTJEWAS,
MOCHAMAD RIZAL NASUTION,
RENANTA AULIA NOVANDA,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(October 6, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Helen Lientjewas appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) final
order of removal. We see no reversible error; we affirm.
Petitioner contends that the BIA erred when it affirmed the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision that the petitioner was not credible. Petitioner also believes
that the BIA erred when it determined that it is unlikely that the Petitioner, as a
Chinese, Christian woman, would suffer future persecution in Indonesia.
We review the BIA’s credibility decision under the substantial evidence test.
D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). We must
affirm the decision “if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id.
Petitioner believes that the BIA, in adopting the IJ’s ruling, erred. We
examine the facts as presented to the IJ, and sufficient discrepancies support the
IJ’s ruling. Petitioner’s story and evidence contains too many seeming
contradictions. Although the IJ’s determination was not limited to the problems
with the affidavits submitted by Petitioner, we note the problem Petitioner had in
testifying consistently about where the affidavits had been translated. It is
certainly within the IJ’s discretion, in making a credibility determination, to decide
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that the affidavits undermined Petitioner’s credibility.*
On the IJ’s determination that there was no well-founded fear of future
persecution, sufficient evidence in the record supports the finding that, objectively,
there should be no fear of persecution. In examining the fear of persecution, the IJ
must look at both objective and subjective fears. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the IJ noted that the Petitioner moved to
another part of Indonesia and experienced no attacks over the course of a year. At
the end of that time, the Petitioner moved back to Jakarta, where she received no
threats for at least two years. This evidence is sufficient evidence that there was no
objectively reasonable fear of persecution.
We give much deference to BIA rulings. Petitioner does not provide us with
sufficient evidence to compel reversing the BIA.
Petition DENIED.
*
Petitioner’s due process claims were not raised before the BIA, and so are not before us
on appeal. Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003).
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