Jerberee Jefferson v. Sewon America, Inc.

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-11802
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-00078-TCB
JERBEREE JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SEWON AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 1, 2018)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and
CORRIGAN, * District Judge.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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This appeal presents the question whether the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of Sewon America, Inc., and against Jerberee
Jefferson’s complaint of employment discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin and of retaliatory termination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Jefferson, an African American, worked for Sewon as a clerk in its finance
department. While Jefferson was still in her probationary period of employment,
she approached a manager in the information technology department, Gene Chung,
and expressed interest in transferring to his department. Chung told Jefferson that
he supported the transfer and that Jefferson could soon switch departments. But he
later informed her that she was ineligible for the transfer because she lacked
experience and because a higher-ranked manager “wanted a Korean in that
position.” Jefferson immediately reported this statement to the human resources
department, and a week later, Sewon fired Jefferson. Jefferson then sued, and the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sewon. We reverse in part
because Jefferson presented direct evidence that Sewon failed to transfer her on the
basis of her race and nationality and circumstantial evidence that Sewon fired her
in retaliation for her complaint, and we affirm in part because Jefferson failed to
present substantial evidence that Sewon fired her on the basis of race or national
origin. And we remand for further proceedings.
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I. BACKGROUND
We divide the background in two parts. First, we describe the facts by
viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to Jefferson. See
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2012). Second,
we describe the proceedings in the district court.
A. The Facts
In March 2013, Sewon hired Jefferson as a temporary clerk in its finance
department. In June 2013, Sewon promoted Jefferson to full-time, but
probationary, status in the same position. The next month, Jefferson learned of an
open position in the information technology department.
Jefferson had been taking technology classes at a local college and had the
“career goal” of working in information technology. She approached the
department manager, Gene Chung, who told her that “he wanted [her] to transition
to the department.” Chung interviewed Jefferson and told her that “he was willing
to transition [her] over” to the information technology department and that he liked
her “work ethic[.]” He also encouraged her to continue her coursework and told
her that “he would train [her in] anything [that she] didn’t know [from school] if it
was related to the job.” Chung explained that “the next steps” were for Jefferson to
“take a test” and for Nate Jung, a high-level manager, to approve the transition, and
Chung told Jefferson that she “would be transferred over to the [information
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technology] department by the end of the week.” After meeting with Chung,
Jefferson also spoke to Ken Horton, Sewon’s human resources manager, who told
her that “he would talk to [Chung] and work something out” so that Jefferson
could switch departments.
In August, Chung gave Jefferson a “basic knowledge” test about computers.
Jefferson admitted that she “didn’t do so [well] on [the test],” and Chung averred
that she “performed so poorly on [the] test that [he] had no interest in employing
her in the [information technology] [d]epartment.” But Chung told her that the job
was not “dependent on” the test and, after Jefferson finished the test, Chung went
“over the results with [her],” told her “to take it home, research it, [and] correct
[her] wrong answers,” and later reviewed her new research and responses.
Jefferson testified that it remained her “understanding that [Chung] still was going
to talk to . . . Jung about [the transfer].”
Around the same time, Jefferson had some difficulty with her managers in
the finance department: Esther Kim and Jenny Hong. Kim was Jefferson’s
immediate supervisor and Kim reported to Hong. Both supervisors told Jefferson
that “they wished [that Jefferson] had come to them first [about the transfer] as
opposed to going to . . . Chung.” But Jefferson explained that the managers “didn’t
seem mad” and that there was “mutual[] agreement” that she could transfer.
Jefferson also had irritated the managers by “coming back [late] from lunch several
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times” and failing to silence her phone at work. Despite these issues, on August 16,
the managers decided to “figure out a way to make [Jefferson] continue working
for the company in a more productive way.”
Soon afterward, Jefferson’s employment took a turn for the worse. On
August 20, Hong completed a negative performance evaluation that awarded
Jefferson a total of 64 out of 200 possible points. Notwithstanding Hong’s earlier
assurance to Jefferson that she would not stand in the way of a transfer, even
though Jefferson had not first asked her permission, the evaluation underscored
that Jefferson “disregard[ed] policies and procedures” that required her to report to
“her direct supervisor” and that Jefferson did not “want to work with her direct
supervisor.”
On August 23, Chung met with Jefferson and told her, for the first time, that
she could not transfer to the information technology department. He explained that
the open position required “five years of experience” and that “Jung said that he
wanted a Korean in that position.” Jefferson immediately complained about this
alleged racial discrimination to Horton, the human resources manager. Horton told
her not to “take it personal[ly]” and to “brush it off.”
On the same day that Jefferson complained about racial discrimination
underlying the denial of her request to transfer, Kim filled out a performance
evaluation that gave Jefferson a score of 68 out of 200. The evaluation underscored
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that Jefferson “disregard[ed] policies and procedures and d[id] not inform her
direct supervisor [of problems],” and it concluded that “there [was] no room for
improvement.” Despite these deficiencies, the review also stated that Jefferson
“c[a]me to work on time every day” and “work[ed] well and complete[d] her tasks
in a timely manner.” Kim testified that she had never “filled out this type of
[evaluation] for anyone else” or “reprimanded anyone else for” the same kinds of
issues cited in her evaluation of Jefferson.
Horton collected Hong’s and Kim’s evaluations, averaged the scores, and
“applied a pre-established minimum threshold number.” Jefferson received a score
of 32.5, “below the pre-established threshold [for termination] of 35.” Horton
averred that this method “was used for other introductory employee evaluations in
the past and was not a threshold applied only to . . . Jefferson’s average score” and
that he “never advised . . . Kim or . . . Hong of this pre-established score before
they completed [the] evaluations.”
One week later, on August 30, Sewon fired Jefferson. Jefferson received no
written warning or final warning before her dismissal, despite a “progressive
discipline policy” that uses a system of “verbal warnings, . . . [a] written warning,”
and a “final warning” before an employee is terminated. At a later deposition,
Horton testified that “it [was] important to follow that [particular discipline] policy
at [Sewon],” but that the company might depart from the policy in cases of sexual
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harassment, violence, illegal conduct, or other egregious misconduct. James Dye, a
human resources specialist, met with Jefferson after she was fired. He told her that
“[she] didn’t pass [her evaluations]” but that “[h]e didn’t know [why]” she had
failed. Dye later represented Sewon in state-level unemployment proceedings
regarding Jefferson’s termination.
B. The Proceedings in the District Court
Jefferson filed a complaint that Sewon discriminated against her on the basis
of race and national origin when it refused to transfer and later fired her and that
Sewon fired her in retaliation for her complaint to Horton, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981. During discovery, Jefferson submitted an affidavit from
Dye, the human resources specialist. One paragraph of the affidavit stated that
“Jefferson was terminated because of her complaint of discrimination.” But Dye’s
affidavit failed to describe a basis for any personal knowledge of this fact. Indeed,
other portions of the affidavit took the contrary position that “Jefferson was
terminated after failing to score high enough on her 60-day evaluation” and stated
that Dye specifically recalled that Jefferson fell “just short of the minimum
requirement.” Dye’s affidavit also asserted that Sewon subjected “American
employees” to stricter discipline than “Korean employees,” but it again failed to
offer specific examples of this disparity or to explain how Dye formed this
knowledge.
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Sewon moved for summary judgment and objected to the paragraph of
Dye’s declaration that alleged retaliation. A magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation that granted the objection to this paragraph on the ground that a
declaration must be based on “a witness’s personal knowledge” and that “no
portion of the declaration establishe[d] the foundation for Dye’s opinion.” The
magistrate judge then recommended granting summary judgment in favor of
Sewon.
The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
granted summary judgment in favor of Sewon. With respect to Jefferson’s claim
that Sewon refused to transfer her for discriminatory reasons, the district court
reasoned that Jefferson failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
because she did not suffer an “adverse employment action” when Sewon refused to
transfer her to the information technology department. In the alternative, the
district court ruled that Jefferson failed to establish that the job qualifications for
the information-technology position cited by Sewon were pretextual. With respect
to Jefferson’s claim that Sewon fired her for discriminatory reasons, the district
court concluded that the termination was not discriminatory “under a holistic view
of the evidence.” Finally, it determined that Jefferson could not establish that
Sewon fired her in retaliation for her complaint: it approved the exclusion of Dye’s
allegation, ruled that Jefferson’s complaint was not “protected conduct,” and ruled
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that Jefferson failed to establish that retaliation was the but-for cause of her
termination because she “failed to rebut Sewon’s proffered reasons for her
termination.”
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review an entry of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Jones, 683
F.3d at 1291–92 (italics added). We examine claims of discrimination and
retaliation under the same legal framework regardless of whether the plaintiff
invokes section 1981 or section 2000e. See Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet,
Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2012) (discrimination); Goldsmith v.
Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (retaliation). And we
review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC,
843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion in four parts. First, we reject Jefferson’s argument
that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution bars a district court from granting
summary judgment against a claim of employment discrimination. Second, we
explain that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment against
Jefferson’s claim that Sewon refused to transfer her for discriminatory reasons.
Third, we explain that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment
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against Jefferson’s claim of retaliatory termination. Fourth, we explain that the
district court committed no error when it granted summary judgment against
Jefferson’s claim of discriminatory termination.
A. Summary Judgment Is Constitutional.
Jefferson contends that “summary judgment, as applied to discrimination
cases, violates the Seventh Amendment,” and an amicus curiae, Professor Suja
Thomas, advances the radical argument that summary judgment is always
unconstitutional. Nonsense. The Supreme Court made clear long ago that
“summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment.” Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States,
187 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1902)). And we have held that “[i]t is beyond question that
a district court may grant summary judgment where the material facts concerning a
claim cannot reasonably be disputed.” Garvie v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 366
F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 2004). “Even though [a grant of summary judgment]
prevents the parties from having a jury rule upon [the] facts,” a jury trial is
unnecessary “when the pertinent facts are obvious and indisputable from the
record[] [and] the only remaining truly debatable matters are legal questions that a
court is competent to address.” Id.; see also Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543
F.2d 1111, 1112–13 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which governs summary judgment,
applies with equal force to claims of employment discrimination. We have
repeatedly rejected arguments that “summary judgment is especially questionable
and should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they
involve examination of motivation and intent,” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376
F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration adopted) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), and we have explained “that the summary judgment rule
applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases,” Chapman v. AI
Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1026 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To be sure, “at the
summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of [a disputed] matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). But when the “facts are obvious and indisputable,”
Garvie, 366 F.3d at 1190, or when the district court considers disputed facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the district court does not intrude on
the constitutional role of the jury when it considers whether a complaint fails as a
matter of law. Settled precedent forecloses any argument to the contrary.
B. The District Court Erred when It Granted Summary Judgment Against
Jefferson’s Claim of Disparate Treatment that Sewon Refused To Transfer Her.
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) establishes that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This provision
forbids “disparate treatment” of, or “intentional discrimination” against, employees
on the basis of race or national origin. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To “support a claim [of discrimination],” an employee must show
“a tangible adverse effect” on her employment. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245
F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). She also must establish discriminatory intent
“through either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at
1085.
The district court erred in two ways in its evaluation of Jefferson’s claim
about her transfer. The district court ruled that Jefferson failed to establish that she
suffered an adverse employment action and that she failed to present substantial
evidence that Sewon declined to transfer her for discriminatory reasons. We
disagree with both rulings.
1. Jefferson Suffered an Adverse Employment Action.
An employee must establish an “adverse employment action” by proving
that a decision of the employer “impact[ed] the terms, conditions, or privileges of
[her] job in a real and demonstrable way.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This “impact cannot be speculative and must at least
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have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” Id. The “employee
must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” so that a “reasonable person in the circumstances” would find “the
employment action [to] be materially adverse.” Id.; see also Kidd v. Mando Am.
Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the “loss of
supervisory responsibilities” is not a material change absent a showing of
“significantly different responsibilities” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). In short, when an employee alleges that she was denied a different job
within the same organization, she must establish that “a reasonable person faced
with a choice [between the positions] . . . would prefer being transferred to [the
new] position.” Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cty. Sherriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013,
1032 (11th Cir. 2008). She may do so with evidence of improved “wages, benefits,
or rank,” as well as other “serious and material change[s] in the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment,” id. at 1033, such as the “prestige” of the position,
Hinson v. Clinch Cty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 2000).
The district court ruled that Jefferson failed to offer evidence that “the [new]
position . . . would have entailed greater skill and provided more specialized
experience, on-the-job education, and greater potential for career advancement,”
but we disagree. The position in the finance department had “significantly different
responsibilities” from the position in the information technology department. Kidd,
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731 F.3d at 1203 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For example,
Jefferson explained that the new job included “responsibilities and duties” such as
“setting up new hardware,” “problem-solving with respect to software glitches,”
and “working with the network server.” Indeed, that Chung administered a
preliminary test and that Sewon later insisted that the job required five years of
experience and that Jefferson was unqualified for the new work—even though she
was qualified for her old job—suggests that the position in the information
technology department had special responsibilities and carried additional
“prestige.” Hinson, 231 F.3d at 829.
Jefferson also articulated a strong basis for preferring a transfer. She
explained that she was enrolled in “[information technology] classes” at the time,
repeatedly expressed interest in this career path, and testified that Chung told her
that “he would train [her in] anything [that she] didn’t know [from school] if it was
related to the job.” This promise of education and experience in a specific skilled
position is a material benefit. And, again, Jefferson must show only that “a
reasonable person faced with a choice [between the positions] . . . would prefer
being transferred to [the new] position.” Webb-Edwards, 525 F.3d at 1032.
2. Jefferson Offered Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent.
An employee who alleges discriminatory treatment also must show “through
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence” that her employer acted with
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discriminatory intent. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1085. “Direct evidence is ‘evidence,
that, if believed, proves [the] existence of [discriminatory intent] without inference
or presumption.’” Id. at 1086 (first alteration in original) (quoting Burrell v. Bd. of
Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997)). In contrast,
circumstantial evidence only “suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory
motive,” id., and may be evaluated under the burden-shifting test established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “When a plaintiff
proves a case of discrimination by direct evidence, application of McDonnell
Douglas is inappropriate,” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Alton Packaging
Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc.,
131 F.3d 957, 961–62 (11th Cir. 1997), and the district court may not grant
summary judgment “[w]here the non-movant presents direct evidence that, if
believed by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial . . ., even where the movant
presents conflicting evidence,” Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189
(11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996)).
Because Jefferson presented direct evidence of discrimination, the district
court erred when it evaluated this evidence under the burden-shifting test for
circumstantial evidence established in McDonnell Douglas. We have explained
that “‘only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than
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to discriminate on the basis of’ some impermissible factor constitute direct
evidence of discrimination.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Rojas v. Florida,
285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir 2002)). Jefferson satisfied this standard when
she testified that Chung, the manager of the information technology department,
told her that “he could not offer [her] the job position” because Jung, a higher-
ranked manager, “said that he wanted a Korean in that position.” The district court
never excluded this “blatant” evidence, id. (quoting Rojas, 285 F.3d at 1342 n.2),
or made any other ruling that undercut its admissibility. Indeed, the magistrate
judge specifically acknowledged this statement in the report and recommendation.
Although Sewon denies this assertion, we must credit Jefferson’s sworn testimony.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (explaining that a party may establish a genuine
dispute “by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions” (emphasis added)).
To be sure, at least some of the blame for this error lies with Jefferson
because she repeatedly described her evidence as circumstantial, not as direct
evidence of discrimination. For example, her response in opposition to summary
judgment presented her allegation of discrimination using the test for
circumstantial established in McDonnell Douglas, even though she asserted in the
same filing that a plaintiff can establish a separate claim for retaliation “through
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Only in her objection to the
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report and recommendation did she dispute the “fixed formula or framework” of
McDonnell Douglas. But, even then, she presented her facts as “a convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence” and insisted that the district court should not
distinguish between “direct or indirect” evidence. On appeal, she advanced a
similar theory about circumstantial evidence. For example, she explained that
“evidence should [not] be treated differently from other evidence because it can be
labeled direct or indirect” and that this Court should weigh “the totality of the
evidence” as “circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the
discriminatory intent.”
Despite Jefferson’s failure to appreciate the difference between direct and
circumstantial evidence, we must reverse this legal error. Although we ordinarily
will not “second guess the litigants before us and grant them relief they did not
request, pursuant to legal theories they did not outline, based on facts they did not
relate,” United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Adler v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1481 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997)), parties
cannot waive the application of the correct law or stipulate to an incorrect legal
test. To the contrary, we have explained that even “confessions of [legal] error do
not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function” because “[o]ur
judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the . . . law cannot be
left merely to the stipulation of parties.” United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185,
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1194 (11th Cir. 2015) (alterations adopted) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Jefferson presented Jung’s racial statement as a basis for her claim, and
the district court was obliged to heed our repeated admonitions that “application of
McDonnell Douglas is inappropriate” in the light of this direct evidence. Alton
Packaging, 901 F.2d at 923.
3. Jefferson Cannot Invoke Section 2000e-2(a)(2) for Her Claim of Disparate
Treatment.
Jefferson also urges us to examine her allegation of disparate treatment
under section 2000e-2(a)(2), but that provision, in contrast with section 2000e-
2(a)(1), applies not to discrete decisions made by an employer directed at an
individual employee, but to categorical policies that have a discriminatory purpose
or effect. The whole text of the statute supports this distinction. See Antonin Scalia
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)
(“The text must be construed as a whole.”). Section 2000e-2(a)(1) forbids an
employer from discriminating against individual employees, such as by “fail[ing]
or refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharg[ing] any individual” or by “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphases added). In
contrast, section 2000e-2(a)(2) takes aim at discriminatory policies of general
application when it prohibits an employer from “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or
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classify[ing] his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities.” Id.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphases added). Although both provisions have the same object
of curing discrimination in the workplace, they target different mechanisms of
discrimination. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2527 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining
that, under the plain language of the statute, “[t]he only difference between
[section] 2000e-2(a)(1) and [section] 2000e-2(a)(2) is the type of employment
decisions they address”).
The Supreme Court acknowledged this difference in Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440 (1982). It explained that an employment “examination, which barred
promotion and had a discriminatory impact on black employees, clearly [fell]
within the literal language of [section 2000e-2(a)(2)]” because “[t]he statute
speaks, not in terms of jobs and promotions, but in terms of limitations and
classifications.” Id. at 448. And the Supreme Court recently reiterated that “the
thrust of [section 2000e-2(a)(2)] [is] the consequences of employment practices.”
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2517 (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In short, section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers individual decisions, such as the
alleged decision not to transfer Jefferson on the basis of her race and national
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origin, and section 2000e-2(a)(2) covers policies of general applicability. Because
Jefferson’s complaint concerns an individual employment decision, it may proceed
under only section 2000e-2(a)(1).
C. The District Court Erred when It Granted Summary Judgment Against
Jefferson’s Claim of Retaliatory Termination.
To establish a claim of retaliation, Jefferson must prove that she engaged in
statutorily protected activity, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and
that the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity. Trask v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2016). An
employee’s complaint about discrimination constitutes protected activity if the
employee could “reasonably form a good faith belief that the alleged
discrimination existed.” Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861, 869 (11th Cir. 1999).
Termination is a materially adverse action. See, e.g., Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277.
As to causation, “Title [Seven] retaliation claims require proof that ‘the protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.’” Trask,
822 F.3d at 1194 (alteration adopted) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013)). Stated another way, a plaintiff must prove that
had she not complained, she would not have been fired. Further, we must respect
that an “employer [need not] have good cause for its decisions.” Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). To the contrary, it
“may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on
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erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for [an unlawful]
reason.” Id.
The district court made three rulings when it granted summary judgment
against Jefferson’s claim of retaliatory termination. First, it approved the exclusion
of a paragraph of Dye’s affidavit that alleged that Jefferson was fired in retaliation
for her complaint. Second, it determined that Jefferson’s complaint was not
protected conduct. Third, it determined that Jefferson had failed to produce
sufficient evidence that Sewon’s purported reasons for terminating her were
actually a pretext for Sewon’s retaliatory motives. The last two rulings were
erroneous.
1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when It Excluded the
Paragraph of Dye’s Affidavit that Alleged Retaliation.
Jefferson contends that the district court should have admitted a paragraph of
Dye’s affidavit that stated that “Jefferson was terminated because of her complaint
of discrimination,” but the district court did not abuse its discretion. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) demands that an affidavit “be made on personal
knowledge.” And the district court determined that Dye’s affidavit did “not
provide any facts from which to conclude that Dye had personal knowledge about
the reasons for her termination.” Jefferson offered no evidence that Dye controlled
or participated in the termination decision, and we have explained that statements
of “non-decisionmakers” ordinarily are inadmissible unless the record “reflect[s]
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some kind of participation [by the affiant] in the employment decision or policy of
the employer.” Kidd, 731 F.3d at 1209 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, Horton’s uncontradicted testimony established that Dye learned
of the reasons for the termination “[a]fter the fact,” and Jefferson even testified that
Dye told her that “[h]e didn’t know [why]” she failed her evaluations. Dye also
failed to identify any other basis for his assertion, and “[t]his [C]ourt has
consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have
no probative value.” Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)).
In short, the exclusion of Dye’s allegation did not involve “a clear error of
judgment” or “appli[cation] [of] an incorrect legal standard.” Furcron, 843 F.3d at
1304 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Jefferson responds that, because Dye was a human resources specialist who
handled Jefferson’s state-level unemployment proceedings, he presumably would
have had insight into why Jefferson was fired, but the scant facts in Dye’s affidavit
entitled the district court to reject this presumption. Dye failed to identify the
source of his information or explain what facts led him to make this accusation.
2. The District Court Erred when It Determined that Jefferson’s Complaint
Was Not Protected Conduct.
The district court reasoned that Jefferson’s complaint about Jung’s alleged
statement was not “protected activity” because Jefferson could not have
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“reasonabl[y] believe[d] that Sewon engaged in [discrimination],” but we disagree.
A complaint about discrimination is protected if the plaintiff could “reasonably
form a good faith belief that the alleged discrimination existed.” Taylor, 175 F.3d
at 869. The district court reasoned that Jefferson’s grievance was baseless because
“she was [not] qualified for the [new] position” and because “the denial of that
position [did not] constitute[] an adverse action,” but an employee need not be
correct in her beliefs or consult a lawyer for expert analysis of her complaint—she
need only “reasonably form a good faith belief.” Id. Chung’s report that Jung
stated an intent to hire a Korean could have reasonably led Jefferson to conclude
that racial discrimination was at play. Indeed, we explained in Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., that an employee was entitled to complain when “her manager
told her that the [desired] position would not be filled by a black person.” 141 F.3d
1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998). Jefferson had a reasonable basis for her complaint.
3. The District Court Erred when It Ruled that Jefferson Failed To Produce
Sufficient Evidence that Sewon’s Reasons For Terminating Her Were a
Pretext For Retaliation.
Sewon asserts that it fired Jefferson because she received failing scores on a
pair of employment evaluations, and it contends Jefferson has offered no evidence
to undercut this neutral rationale. It points out that these evaluations were tied to
Jefferson’s probationary status, that Jefferson knew she was “subject to termination
at any time during this [period],” and that Jefferson has not produced evidence that
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other employees kept their jobs after receiving failing scores. And Sewon
highlights that Horton testified that neither evaluator knew what number
constituted a passing score, so neither evaluator could have intentionally issued a
failing report.
Although the above explanation and supporting evidence support Sewon’s
assertion that it had a non-retaliatory basis for firing Jefferson, we agree with
Jefferson that a reasonable jury could nevertheless find that Sewon’s explanation
was pretextual and that Jefferson’s complaint was the “but-for cause” of her
termination. Trask, 822 F.3d at 1194 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). First, there is the suspicious timing of the termination, which closely
followed Jefferson’s complaint of racial and national origin discrimination to the
human resources manager. On August 23, Jefferson reported Jung’s alleged remark
that he wanted to fill the open position with a Korean. Kim filled out an evaluation
of Jefferson on the same day, and Sewon fired Jefferson exactly one week later.
We have cautioned that “mere temporal proximity, without more, must be very
close” to suggest causation. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364
(11th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“A
three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the
adverse employment action is not enough.”). But we have explained that an
employee’s termination within days—or at the most within two weeks—of his
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protected activity can be circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between
the two. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298
(11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the “close temporal proximity between [the
plaintiff’s] request for leave [under the Family and Medical Leave Act] and his
termination—no more than two weeks, under the broadest reading of the facts—is
evidence of pretext, though probably insufficient to establish pretext by itself.”).
Here, Jefferson’s termination occurred only one week after she complained about
discrimination.
Jefferson also offered evidence supporting her allegation of pretext. Kim,
who was Jefferson’s immediate supervisor, testified that she had never “filled out
this type of [evaluation] for anyone else” or “reprimanded anyone else for” the
same kinds of issues cited in her evaluation of Jefferson. And Kim’s evaluation
also stated that Jefferson was “work[ing] well and complet[ing] her tasks in a
timely manner.” Sewon also failed to follow its “progressive discipline policy” that
affords employees several warnings, including a “written warning” and “final
warning,” before termination. In short, and taking all the circumstances together,
the question whether Sewon fired Jefferson to retaliate for her complaint about
perceived racial discrimination, is a question for a jury.
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D. The District Court Committed No Error when It Granted Summary
Judgment Against Jefferson’s Claim of Discriminatory Termination.
Jefferson also contends that Sewon terminated her for racially discriminatory
reasons, but she offers no substantial evidence in support of this allegation. Instead,
she reasons that when her managers gave her low evaluation scores for “going
outside the chain of command,” they were actually punishing her for failing to
conform to “Korean culture” because “the chain of command” is inherent to
“Korean cultural norms.” Jefferson also points out that a portion of Dye’s affidavit
that the magistrate judge left intact alleged “that non-Koreans were targeted for
reprimands and harsher discipline than Korean employees.” She concludes that this
evidence supports both a claim of disparate treatment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
and disparate impact, id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
We reject Jefferson’s reasoning. With respect to the allegation that the
Sewon subjected Jefferson to disparate treatment when it insisted that she follow
the “chain of command,” we have explained “that an employer’s neutral policy”
that has “adverse consequences, without more, is not sufficient to state a claim for
disparate treatment.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt.
Solutions, 852 F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th Cir. 2016). We see nothing inherently
discriminatory about a policy that requires employees to respect corporate
hierarchy, and we are not in the business of determining, without more, whether
facially legitimate company practices are subtly linked to ethnic or racial groups.
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Jefferson also contends that Sewon enforced this policy against non-Koreans
in a discriminatory manner, and she points out that Dye’s affidavit alleges that
unspecified “American employees” were subject to stricter discipline than
unspecified “Korean employees” at unspecified times. But Dye’s affidavit says
nothing about the particular policy at issue—the “chain of command.” And even if
it did, the vagueness of his accusations prevents them from establishing that
Korean employees received lesser discipline for “nearly identical” behavior.
Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1340 (11th Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, we have
explained that “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no
probative value.” Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Evers, 770 F.2d at 986).
Nor can Dye’s allegations that nameless Korean employees received
favorable treatment in unspecified scenarios support a claim of disparate impact.
His vague accusations come nowhere close to establishing that the specific practice
at issue—the chain of command—had a “significantly discriminatory impact” on
non-Korean employees. In re Emp’t Discrimination Litig. Against State of Ala.,
198 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 446). We see no
reason to conclude that these “conclusory allegations without specific supporting
facts have . . . probative value.” Leigh, 212 F.3d at 1217.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, and REMAND for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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