Michael Wade Nance v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-15361
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-04279-WBH
MICHAEL WADE NANCE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC PRISON,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 30, 2019)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
ED CARNES, Chief Judge:
Michael Wade Nance, a convicted murderer under sentence of death in
Georgia, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. There
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are two claims before us. One involves the use of a stun belt security device at his
resentencing trial. The other is a sentence stage ineffective assistance claim
involving mitigating circumstances, which is a type of claim common in federal
habeas challenges to death sentences. What is uncommon about this claim is that
the petitioner does not contend that his trial counsel were deficient in any way in
uncovering mitigating circumstances. Nor could petitioner credibly do so, given
the effort that went into that part of the defense by the time of the resentencing
trial. Instead, the claim is one of those rare ones that concedes enough was done to
discover mitigating circumstances and questions only the strategic decisions trial
counsel made about which circumstances to present and how.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case have already been thoroughly set out by the Georgia
Supreme Court in Nance v. State, 526 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 2000), Nance v. State, 623
S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 2005), and Humphrey v. Nance, 744 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2013).
There is no point in our repeating all, or even most, of those facts. It is enough to
note here that Nance robbed a bank, and in the process threatened to kill some of
the tellers. Nance, 526 S.E.2d at 563. They were not killed, but Gabor Balogh, an
innocent driver who was backing his car out of a parking spot at a nearby store,
was not as fortunate. Id. at 563–64. In order to steal Balogh’s car Nance shot him
to death as he was pleading “No, no.” Id. at 564.
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After a three-week trial in 1997, the jury returned a verdict finding Nance
guilty of malice murder and five other crimes and sentenced him to death for the
murder. Id. at 562 n.1. The trial court entered a judgment pronouncing him guilty
of the crimes and imposing a death sentence. Id. On direct appeal, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed Nance’s convictions but reversed his death sentence “due
to a prospective juror being improperly qualified to serve on the jury.” Nance, 623
S.E.2d at 472. A new sentencing trial in 2002 resulted in a new death sentence,
which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Id.
Nance then filed a petition for collateral relief in the state trial court. That
court granted him relief from the death sentence after concluding that Nance had
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the resentencing trial. The State
appealed, and in 2013 the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. Nance, 744 S.E.2d at
709. At the end of 2013, Nance filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in federal district
court. In 2017 the district court denied relief but granted a certificate of
appealability on two of Nance’s claims: “(1) his claim that his trial counsel [were]
ineffective in presenting his case in mitigation and (2) his claim that the trial court
erred in requiring [him] to wear a stun belt during the [resentencing] trial.”
II. DISCUSSION
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Nance’s ineffective assistance claim
when it reversed the state trial court’s grant of collateral relief, and it rejected his
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stun belt claim when it affirmed the sentence on direct appeal from the
resentencing trial. Nance, 744 S.E.2d at 720–31; Nance, 623 S.E.2d at 473.
Because both rejections were on the merits, federal habeas relief is barred unless
the rejection of one or both claims (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
It was meant to be, and is, difficult for a petitioner to prevail under that
stringent standard. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786
(2011); see also Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013)
(“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose
claims have been adjudicated in state court.”). Section 2254(d) reflects Congress’
decision to restrict federal courts’ authority to grant habeas relief to cases in which
the state court’s decision unquestionably conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102, 131 S. Ct. at 786. To justify federal habeas relief, the
state court’s decision must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error
. . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Burt, 571 U.S. at 19–20,
134 S. Ct. at 16 (quotation marks omitted). “[I]f some fairminded jurists could
agree with the state court’s decision, although others might disagree, federal
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habeas relief must be denied.” Meders v. Warden, 911 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012))
(quotation marks omitted).
A. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
As we have mentioned, Nance does not contend that his trial counsel should
have, or profitably could have, done more to investigate and discover mitigating
circumstances evidence for use at his resentencing trial. And it is no wonder that
he doesn’t.
For the first trial, in addition to consulting with the attorneys who had
represented Nance on the related federal bank robbery charges, and reviewing all
of their files, Nance’s two counsel hired multiple investigators and mitigation
specialists to help them conduct their investigation. As part of their investigation,
counsel traveled to Nance’s hometown in Kansas to interview witnesses about his
childhood, mental development, history of drug and alcohol abuse, and the abuse
that he suffered at the hands of his adoptive father. They also consulted with two
mental health professionals who evaluated Nance before his federal bank robbery
trial, retained a toxicologist to calculate the concentration of tear gas in Nance’s
car after dye packs that had been hidden in the stolen currency exploded,
interviewed at least four individuals with expertise in dye packs, subpoenaed
information from the dye pack manufacturer, interviewed the state microanalyst
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who tested Nance’s clothing, inspected the physical evidence in the case, visited
the crime scene, examined the material the State provided during discovery, and
interviewed the State’s experts. Not only that, but Nance’s counsel also obtained
the state’s forensic report, emergency medical technician records, the murder
victim’s autopsy report, police records, records from federal agencies, prison
records, marriage and divorce records, birth and death certificates, medical records,
school records, and probation records, among other documents that might be
relevant to Nance’s case. It is as thorough an investigation into mitigating
circumstances as we have ever seen.1
Then, in preparing for the resentencing trial, Nance’s counsel reviewed their
performance in the original trial. Once again, they hired multiple investigators and
a mitigation specialist to help them conduct their investigation. One of them
traveled to Nance’s hometown in Kansas and spent several days interviewing
mitigation witnesses. They met with the psychologist who had testified in
mitigation at Nance’s original trial and, after reviewing his testimony, they
concluded that his testimony had not been helpful. Instead of using that
psychologist again, with the help of the mitigation specialist, they retained an
expert on prison adaptability who conducted neuropsychological and intellectual
1
Given the excellent job that they did, Nance’s two trial counsel deserve to be named
here. They are Johnny R. Moore, a sole practitioner from Lawrenceville, Georgia, who is now
retired, and Edwin J. Wilson, who is a sole practitioner from Snellville, Georgia.
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testing on Nance, interviewed his mother and siblings, and reviewed his records.
They believed that this expert’s testimony about Nance’s prison adaptability would
be especially important to the jury because, in their experience, jurors deliberating
between a life sentence or death “look into whether or not they think this person is
going to be a danger to other prisoners and prison guards.” In that vein, they also
located several deputies to testify about Nance’s good behavior in prison. Over
several nights just before the resentencing trial, they met individually with all of
the mitigation witnesses to prepare their testimony.
Faced with the impossibility of finding fault with the investigation trial
counsel conducted, Nance’s present attorneys have claimed that trial counsel were
ineffective in how they used or failed to use all that they learned in their extensive
investigation. More specifically, his present attorneys fault counsel for deciding
not to present more of the mitigating circumstance evidence, especially more
expert witnesses, than they did.2
2
Nance also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective at the resentencing hearing for
failing to adequately present evidence of remorse. The district court denied that claim because it
was unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Nance did not contend otherwise in the district
court, and he did not contest the district court’s ruling on that claim in his initial brief to this
Court. It has been abandoned. See Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1353 (11th
Cir. 2005) (explaining that a petitioner’s failure to address a procedural bar in his initial brief
forfeits any argument against it); Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1008 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“The law in this circuit is clear that arguments not presented in the district court will not be
considered for the first time on appeal.”).
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It is especially difficult to succeed with an ineffective assistance claim
questioning the strategic decisions of trial counsel who were informed of the
available evidence. Even a dozen years before there was any AEDPA deference,
the Supreme Court noted that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984);
accord, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1088 (2014)
(per curiam); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420
(2009).
Decisions about which experts to call and which issues to press during trial
are, without a doubt, strategic. See Hinton, 571 U.S. at 275, 134 S. Ct. at 1089
(“The selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example of the type of
‘strategic choice’ that, when made ‘after thorough investigation of the law and
facts,’ is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’”) (alterations and citation omitted); Waters v.
Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Which witnesses, if any,
to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one
that we will seldom, if ever, second guess.”); Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
827 F.3d 938, 956 (11th Cir. 2016) (same); see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540
U.S. 1, 8, 124 S. Ct. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (“When counsel focuses on some
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issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for
tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”).
In the post-AEDPA era, it is even more difficult to obtain federal habeas
relief on a strategy-questioning ineffective assistance claim, or any type of
ineffectiveness claim for that matter. Strickland mandated one layer of deference
to the decisions of trial counsel. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (“Judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”); id. (“Because of
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance . . . .”). When § 2254(d) was amended by AEDPA in 1996,
that added another layer. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (“The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and
when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.”) (citations omitted). Given
the double deference due, it is a “rare case in which an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in
a federal habeas proceeding.” Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 911 (11th
Cir. 2011). And, for the reasons we have already discussed, it is rarer still for
merit to be found in a claim that challenges a strategic decision of counsel.
This is not one of those rare, or “rarer still,” cases. At the resentencing trial,
Nance’s counsel called no fewer than 23 mitigation witnesses, whose testimony
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covered, among other things, his difficult family life; his adoptive father’s
alcoholism, aloofness, and occasionally abusive behavior; his long-term cognitive
difficulties and low IQ; his history with drugs and alcohol, particularly the bad
influence of his drug-using uncle; and Nance’s adaptability to prison life, including
both expert testimony that he was “very adaptable” and the testimony of seven
sheriff’s deputies that he had been a “model” inmate in jail while awaiting his
resentencing trial. Nance, 744 S.E.2d at 718–19, 720–21. Writing for the Georgia
Supreme Court, Justice Hunstein thoroughly and convincingly explained why the
strategic decisions that Nance’s counsel made regarding the resentencing trial did
not fall outside the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance” that the
Sixth Amendment requires. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S. Ct. at 787
(quotation marks omitted). Her opinion sets out in detail the evidence that trial
counsel elicited on Nance’s intellectual impairments and the effect of the dye
packs, and it explains why their decision not to call an expert about Nance’s
possible brain damage was reasonable under the circumstances. Nance, 744 S.E.2d
at 720–29. It also explains why, even if counsel’s performance was somehow
deficient, it did not prejudice Nance. Id. at 722–23, 728, 729–31. Having
reviewed Justice Hunstein’s thoughtful opinion, we cannot say that it was
objectively “unreasonable,” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S. Ct.
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1933, 1939 (2007), or that every fairminded jurist would disagree with it,
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Far from it.
B. The Stun Belt Claim
Nance also claims that the state trial court violated his constitutional rights
by requiring him to wear a stun belt under his clothes during the resentencing trial
without holding a new evidentiary hearing to determine whether the restraint was
necessary, and that the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary conflicts
with clearly established federal law set out by the United States Supreme Court. It
did not; and it does not.
A state court’s decision cannot be contrary to, or involve an unreasonable
application of, “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), unless there is a Supreme Court decision on point.
And there is none on this point. The Supreme Court has never addressed whether
and under what circumstances a trial court may require a defendant to wear a stun
belt. Although a petitioner need not have a Supreme Court precedent with
identical facts to succeed, see Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S. Ct.
2842, 2858 (2007), he does have to have one that is close enough to clearly
establish the law that he claims the state courts unreasonably applied. The
decisions Nance cites are not close; they are materially distinguishable. They do
not clearly establish the law that his claim needs. See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.
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415, 427, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706–07 (2014) (“[R]elief is available under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that
a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no
fairminded disagreement on the question.”) (quotation marks omitted).
The first three decisions that Nance relies on all involve visible security
restraints and the unique constitutional problems they present — namely, the
impact that they have on the jury’s perception of the defendant and the public’s
perception of the judicial process. In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630–33, 125
S. Ct. 2007, 2013–14 (2005), the Court held that one reason state trial courts could
not routinely shackle defendants during trial is that it would undermine the
defendant’s presumption of innocence in the eyes of the jury, make the defendant
appear dangerous to the jury, and threaten the dignity of the judicial process and
the public’s trust in it. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S. Ct. 1340,
1346 (1986), the Court held that it was not presumptively unconstitutional to seat
additional uniformed officers in the front row of the courtroom because their
presence would not necessarily impact the jurors’ impression of the defendant.
The Court reasoned that because jurors “may just as easily believe that the officers
are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to
ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence,” the officers
“need not be interpreted as a sign that [the defendant] is particularly dangerous or
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culpable.” Id. And in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343–44, 90 S. Ct. 1057,
1060–61 (1970), the Court held that a disorderly defendant could be removed from
the courtroom and added in dicta that doing so was preferable to binding and
gagging him because “the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant
effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant” and “be something of an affront
to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.”
The visibility of the security measure at issue was central to the reasoning of
all three of those decisions, and the Court limited its holdings accordingly. See
Deck, 544 U.S. at 624, 125 S. Ct. at 2009 (“We hold that the Constitution forbids
the use of visible shackles during the penalty [and guilt] phase . . . unless that use
is justified by an essential state interest . . . specific to the defendant on trial.”)
(quotation marks omitted, first emphasis added); id. at 629, 125 S. Ct. at 2012
(“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints
visible to the jury absent a trial court determination . . . that they are justified by a
state interest specific to a particular trial.”) (emphasis added); id. at 632, 125 S. Ct.
at 2014 (“[G]iven their prejudicial effect, due process does not permit the use of
visible restraints if the trial court has not taken account of the circumstances of the
particular case.”) (emphasis added); id. at 633, 125 S. Ct. at 2014 (“[C]ourts cannot
routinely place defendants in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury
during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.”) (emphasis added); see also
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Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568–69, 106 S. Ct. at 1345–46 (“The first issue to be
considered here is thus whether the conspicuous, or at least noticeable, deployment
of security personnel in a courtroom during trial . . . should be permitted only
where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.”) (emphasis
added); id. at 569, 106 S. Ct. at 1346 (“[R]eason, principle, and common human
experience counsel against a presumption that any use of identifiable security
guards in the courtroom is inherently prejudicial.”) (citations and quotation marks
omitted, emphasis added); id. at 572, 106 S. Ct. at 1347 (explaining that federal
courts can only “look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what
they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to
defendant’s right to a fair trial”) (emphasis added). And in Allen the Court
explained that “the sight of shackles and gags” might affect the jury to the
detriment of the defendant as well as be an affront to the dignity and decorum of
the trial. 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S. Ct. at 1061 (emphasis added).
The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that Nance’s stun belt was not
visible to the jury or the public because it was worn under his clothes. See Nance,
623 S.E.2d at 473 (“Unlike shackles, [the stun belt] is worn under the prisoner’s
clothes and is not visible to the jury.”). And Nance has not pointed to any
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evidence to show that finding was “an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).3
The holdings in Deck and Holbrook, as well as the dicta in Allen, are not
applicable to security devices or measures that are not visible. And a federal
habeas court’s focus is on Supreme Court holdings, not potential extensions of
them. See Woodall, 572 U.S. at 426, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (“Section 2254(d)(1)
provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this
Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or
license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”); id. at 419, 134 S.Ct. at
1701 (“Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only
the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.”) (quotation marks
and alteration omitted); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76–77, 127 S. Ct.
649, 653–54 (2006) (holding that a state court did not unreasonably apply clearly
established federal law because the Court had not yet extended its existing
precedent to the conduct at issue in the petitioner’s case). At the very least,
3
In the final paragraph of his brief to this Court, Nance does argue that the Georgia
Supreme Court’s rejection of his stun belt claim was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts. But he makes no assertion that the stun belt was visible. Instead, he argues that a
factual error marred the reasoning that led the Georgia Supreme Court to affirm the denial of
another evidentiary hearing on whether he should be required to wear a stun belt. The Georgia
Supreme Court stated that “the only change in circumstance since the 1996 hearing offered by
Nance was the passage of time and this was obvious to the trial court without the need for a
second hearing.” Nance, 623 S.E.2d at 473. Far from being unreasonable, this determination
was accurate; Nance never identified, much less proved, any substantial change in circumstances
in support of his request for a new hearing.
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fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the holdings of the three decisions
that Nance primarily relies on clearly establish that it was constitutional error for
the state trial court to require Nance to wear a stun belt that was not visible to the
jury.
The other Supreme Court decision that Nance points to is Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). The holding of that decision is
irrelevant to Nance’s case. In Riggins the Supreme Court held that a state trial
court could force a mentally ill inmate to continue taking prescribed antipsychotic
drugs during the course of his trial if there was an overriding justification and the
drugs were medically appropriate. Id. at 134–35, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. The Court
did not address security restraints and did not purport to establish a broader rule
about court practices that might otherwise interfere with an inmate’s ability to
participate in the trial. Indeed, the Court noted that its decision was limited to the
facts in the record of that case. Id. at 133, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (“The record in this
case narrowly defines the issues before us.”).
Finally, Nance cites this Court’s own decision in United States v. Durham,
287 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002), where we held that the “decision to use a
stun belt must be subjected to at least the same close judicial scrutiny required for
the imposition of other physical restraints.” (Quotation marks omitted.) Unlike
the Supreme Court decisions Nance relies on, our Durham decision actually does
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involve stun belts. If Nance were a federal prisoner, § 2254(d)(1) would not apply
and Durham might require us to vacate his sentence. But he is not a federal
prisoner and § 2254(d)(1) does apply. As a result, the “clearly established Federal
law” is limited to that which has been “determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has implied that it is
getting a little tired of reiterating that directive “time and again.” See Lopez v.
Smith, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized,
time and again, that [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying
on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is
‘clearly established.’”) (citations omitted); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48–
49, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam) (“[C]ircuit precedent does not
constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’
It therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.”) (citation
omitted); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (per curiam)
(same); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778–79, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1865–66 (2010)
(same); Putnam v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); see also,
e.g, Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 764 n.14 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“A federal court of appeals decision, even one with a holding directly on point,
does not clearly establish federal law for § 2254(d)(1) purposes.”).
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Nance argues that we should sidestep this non-side-steppable rule by holding
that Durham is enough because it “demonstrate[s]” the law that the Supreme Court
has clearly established. Under Nance’s “reasoning,” every circuit court decision
on any point would demonstrate the law the Supreme Court has clearly established
on that point, even if the Supreme Court did not yet know it. And § 2254(d)(1)
would be effectively rewritten to insert before the semicolon the words “or by any
federal court of appeals.” And we would need to overrule every one of those
decisions in which the Supreme Court has told us “time and again” that the
decisions of federal courts of appeals do not clearly establish federal law for
§ 2254(d)(1) purposes. All of that is beyond our authority. So we will follow the
Supreme Court’s instruction that circuit precedent may not be used “to refine or
sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal
rule that [the Supreme Court] has not announced.” Marshall v. Rogers, 569 U.S.
58, 64, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013).
The Supreme Court — the only Court that can clearly establish federal law
for purposes of habeas review — has not yet decided whether the use of stun belts
(or materially similar restraints) is constrained by the Constitution, nor has it
established a standard for evaluating such claims. For that reason, the Georgia
Supreme Court’s decision on this issue is not “contrary to” and does not involve
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“an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States” under § 2254(d)(1).
AFFIRMED.
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