Christopher F. Causey v. BP Exploration & Production Inc

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11548
____________________
CHRISTOPHER F. CAUSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC,
BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket Nos. 3:19-cv-02108-MCR-GRJ,
3:19-cv-00963-MCR-GRJ
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11548
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
With the benefit of oral argument and having reviewed the
record and the briefs, we affirm for the reasons given by the district
court in its well-reasoned decision, which is attached.
AFFIRMED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON Case No. 3:19cv963
BELO CASES
This Document Relates to: Judge M. Casey Rodgers
CHRISTOPHER F CAUSEY, Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones
Case No. 3:19cv2108
ORDER
Pending is the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Election
of Remedies under the MSA (the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement), ECF No. 35, arguing Causey released his BELO claim by having
elected to pursue a workers’ compensation claim, and Plaintiff’s response in
opposition, ECF No. 41. On consideration, the motion is granted.
I. Background
This case arises out of the April 20, 2010, blowout, explosions, fires, and
subsequent oil spill involving the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit
at the Macondo well site on the outer continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico off the
coast of Louisiana. It is one of several hundred individual cases brought against
Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production
Company (collectively, “BP”) by clean-up workers and coastal residents of North
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Florida who claim to suffer various chronic medical conditions as a result of
exposure to crude oil and other chemical dispersants applied following the spill. The
cases were originally consolidated in the Eastern District of Louisiana as part of the
Deepwater Horizon multidistrict litigation (MDL No. 2179). For personal injury
plaintiffs, the MDL resolved in the certification of a Medical Benefits Class and
approval of a comprehensive Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement
(“Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement Agreement provided a claims process
for eligible class members who were diagnosed with a specified physical condition
on or before April 16, 2012, and also a separate Back End Litigation Option
(“BELO”) for those with a physical condition diagnosed after that cutoff date,
categorized as a Later-Manifested Physical Condition (“LMPC”). 1 The Settlement
Agreement provides that a BELO plaintiff seeking compensation for a particular
LMPC must elect a remedy and may pursue either (1) compensation for that LMPC
through workers’ compensation law or (2) compensation from BP for that LMPC
1
The Settlement Agreement defines “Later-Manifested Physical Condition” as:
“a physical condition that is first diagnosed in a medical benefits settlement class
member after April 16, 2012, and which is claimed to have resulted from [the] class
member’s exposure to oil, other hydrocarbons, or other substances released [during
the oil spill], and/or exposure to dispersants and/or decontaminants used in
connection with the response activities, where such exposure occurred . . . on or
prior to April 16, 2012, for clean-up workers.
See ECF No. 1 at 2 n.1 (quoting Master Settlement Agreement, Section II.VV).
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pursuant to the BELO process. ECF No. 3-3 at 1-2 (Settlement Agreement
§ VIII.B.1). In other words, the BELO process entitles Medical Benefits Class
members who are diagnosed with a LMPC, and who do not pursue workers’
compensation benefits for that condition, to bring an individual lawsuit for damages
against BP.
Plaintiff Christopher Causey is a Medical Benefits Class member. He was
employed as a beach clean-up worker in Escambia County, Florida, in the aftermath
of the spill and was exposed to chemicals and dispersants while working. Causey
filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana on November 2, 2018, where he made
the necessary disclosures regarding his claim as a beach clean-up worker and was
permitted to proceed in a BELO suit for the LMPCs of chronic conjunctivitis and
chronic dry eye syndrome. In relevant part, the necessary disclosures required
Causey to state whether he had ever filed a workers’ compensation claim related to
his conditions or symptoms at any time after April 20, 2010, or in the last 10 years,
to which he consistently answered “No.”2 See ECF Nos. 35-1 at 13; 35-2 at 10; 35-
8 at 11. The case was then transferred to this Court on July 17, 2019.
2
Specifically, the Proof of Claim, signed on February 21, 2013; his Notice of Intent to Sue,
signed on September 13, 2016; and his Plaintiff Profile form, verified on January 21, 2019, each
filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana before transfer, Causey was asked this question and in
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In the Complaint, consistent with the Proof of Claim and verified Plaintiff
Profile Form, Causey alleged that he performed beach clean-up work for Plant
Performance Services (“P2S”), working 12 hour days, 7 days a week for four weeks,
in June and July 2010. His primary duties involved direct contact with harmful
chemicals, digging and picking up tar balls on shore and placing them in garbage
bags or buckets. Causey alleged that his conditions of chronic conjunctivitis and
chronic dry eye syndrome first appeared on July 8, 2010, and manifested within 24
hours of exposure, and that he was diagnosed on September 8, 2012. In his
deposition, Causey testified that he had not filed a workers’ compensation claim in
the last 10 years. ECF No. 35-10.
The record reflects, however, that Causey signed a Release and Waiver of
Workers Compensation Claim on October 14, 2013, in which his employer, P2S,
agreed to pay him $4,343.06 as full compensation for all injuries or illnesses incurred
on or about July 4, 2010, and also for any other injuries or illnesses he incurred while
employed by P2S, even if the effects were not immediately apparent. ECF No. 35-
6. The release further states that it “constitutes an election of remedies and
each instance, he checked a box stating he had not made a workers’ compensation claim for any
related condition.
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constitutes a complete release of all actions against the Released Parties[ 3] arising
out of any Workers’ Compensation accident in any way related to . . . personal
injury while Claimant was employed by [P2S] including, but not limited to personal
injury claims asserted or that could be asserted in” the Deepwater Horizon MDL.
Id. at ¶26. The release did not list any specific injuries or illnesses but released all
claims for personal injury, asserted and unasserted, against P2S.
Several documents related to the workers’ compensation claim referenced the
nature of Causey’s symptoms and injuries prior to his execution of the workers’
compensation release. An attorney letter dated April 17, 2012, regarding Causey’s
workers’ compensation claim, indicated the firm was representing Causey in his
claim for benefits based on his beach clean-up work for P2S in the summer of 2010,
and stated that his symptoms included “breathing problems, rash on hands and feet,
nausea, sinus problems, hair loss, headaches, staph infection and poor vision.” 4 ECF
No. 35-3. Causey’s First Report of Injury Form for his workers’ compensation
3
The Released Parties are defined as the “Employer [P2S] and anyone acting on
Employer’s behalf, including, but not limited to, past, present and future shareholders, parent
companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, management, divisions, directors, officers, partners,
employees, attorneys, adjusters, agents, independent contractors, successors, and assigns.” ECF
No. 35-6 at ¶1.
4
In a “P2S Client Questionnaire,” Causey listed the following medical issues: “Breathing,
hand and feet breakage, nauseous, sinus mucus, night sweats, short breath, hair loss, aching joints,
bowl movement problems, staff [sic] infections, eyesight bled [sic], redness, headache.” ECF No.
35-5.
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claim, dated May 1, 2012, reported an injury date of July 4, 2010, described the
injury or illness as resulting from “a toxic poisoning as a result of exposure to oil
and dispersant,” and listed symptoms of “breathing problems, rash on feet and hand,
nausea and sinus problems.” ECF No. 35-4. A law firm memo dated April 2, 2013,
memorialized a conference with Dr. Harbour discussing workers’ compensation
claims the firm was representing. The memo noted that Causey was one of the firm’s
clients with a workers’ compensation claim against P2S and that he had been
diagnosed with “Optic Atrophy, dry eye syndrome, visual field loss, toxic optic
neuropathy.” ECF No. 35-7.
In opposition to summary judgment, Causey provided some evidence that P2S
was not his only employer during his beach clean-up work.5 He presented the
deposition testimony of Dr. David Dutton, who was BP’s lead industrial hygienist
and toxicologist for the Unified Area Command, which coordinated the spill
response. ECF No. 41-3 at 5. Based on his review of the records, Dr. Dutton
observed that Causey was a beach worker who received safety training from P2S but
was actually employed by a different company, TL Wallace, during his beach clean-
up work, from July 21, 2010, through November 9, 2010. Consistent with this
5
Causey’s Complaint, Proof of Claim, Plaintiff Profile Form, and Notice of Intent to Sue
all list only P2S as his employer.
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testimony, Causey agreed, during his deposition, that he had worked for a couple of
different companies, including TL Wallace, which he said “rang a bell.” ECF No.
41-4 at 4. He added, “Yes. I . . . worked with them for the remaining.” Id. at 4-5.
When asked whether his “four or five days” of training were all with P2S, Causey
answered “yes.” Id. at 5. There is no evidence that he filed a workers’ compensation
claim against TL Wallace.
II. Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986) (“The
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”). The moving party
bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the
plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of the claim. See Allen v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
then go beyond the pleadings and “designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal marks omitted).
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The terms of a settlement agreement are given their “plain and ordinary
meaning” and enforced as a contract, according to their terms. Waters v. Int’l
Precious Metals Corp., 237 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the
unambiguous terms of the court-approved Settlement Agreement, a Medical
Benefits Class member must elect a remedy by pursuing either a workers’
compensation claim or pursuing a claim through the BELO process––not both. See
ECF No. 3-3 at 1 (Settlement Agreement § VIII.B.1). And, a class member who has
filed a workers’ compensation claim “for a particular [LMPC] may not seek
compensation for that [LMPC] through” the BELO process. See Id. at 2 (Settlement
Agreement Section VIII.B.2).
BP contends it is entitled to summary judgment based on the Settlement
Agreement’s election of remedies provision because Causey previously elected to
pursue a worker’s compensation claim that included injuries or medical conditions
related to his eyes from exposure due to his beach clean-up work. BP argues that
Causey thereby released his right to bring this BELO suit.
Causey does not dispute that he signed the October 14, 2013, Release and
Waiver of Workers Compensation Claim but contends there is a dispute of fact over
whether the particular LMPCs involved in this suit (chronic conjunctivitis and
chronic dry eye syndrome) were the subject of his workers’ compensation claim.
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Causey points to the differing descriptions of his symptoms in the workers’
compensation claim materials and notes that they do not reference the “particular”
LMPCs at issue––“chronic conjunctivitis” and “chronic dry eye syndrome.” While
an attorney memo noted that Dr. Harbour diagnosed Causey with dry eye syndrome,
Causey maintains that is the only reference to a similar condition. Causey notes that
chronic conjunctivitis is not referenced at all in those materials and that the release
itself referred to neither condition.
Causey further argues that there is a dispute of fact as to whether the LMPCs,
which he contends resulted from beach clean-up work, were within the scope of his
prior workers’ compensation claim, which was limited to injuries or illness incurred
during his employment with P2S. Causey argues that, in light of Dr. Dutton’s
testimony, there is evidence that he only did safety training while employed by P2S
and did not perform any clean-up work for P2S.
The Court will enforce the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement, which
are unambiguous and act to bar Causey’s BELO suit unless the particular LMPCs
asserted were not within the scope of the workers’ compensation benefits he
pursued. The Court finds that on the undisputed record, Causey’s BELO suit is
barred.
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The LMPCs at issue in this suit are eye conditions. While the workers’
compensation release does not specify any conditions in particular, it alleges a date
of injury as July 4, 2010, and includes all injuries or illnesses incurred, whether
asserted or unasserted, while Causey was employed by P2S. Causey’s workers’
compensation report of injury or illness referenced “toxic poisoning as result of
exposure to the oil and dispersant that he helped to clean up on the beaches,” ECF
No. 35-4, and in his P2S Client Questionnaire, Causey referenced several medical
issues, including ocular, ECF No. 35-5. Despite there being no express reference
to “chronic conjunctivitis” and “chronic dry eye” in the workers’ compensation
report of injury or illness (submitted in May 2012, which was drafted before his
diagnosis in September 2012) or in the release dated October 14, 2013, the attorney
memo dated April 2, 2013, detailing workers compensation cases, referenced
Causey’s diagnosed ocular conditions as including dry eye. It would be
unreasonable without more to infer that these known conditions, which Causey states
manifested within 24 hours of exposure around July 8, 2010, were somehow
excluded. There is no dispute that the LMPCs at issue were diagnosed over a year
before the release was executed, and the record is devoid of any indication that
Causey sought to exclude those particular conditions from his workers’
compensation claim. They are within the broad scope of the release.
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Furthermore, the Court finds no genuine material dispute of fact arising from
Dr. Dutton’s testimony. His statement that Causey began working for TL Wallace
on July 21, 2010, does not contradict the dates of employment Causey documented
with P2S (from June through July 2010, ECF No. 35-8 at 4). Also, by Causey’s own
statements, the exposure causing his conditions occurred between June 7, 2010, and
July 16, 2010, ECF No. 35-8 at 6, and the conditions first appeared around July 8,
2010, within 24-hours of exposure, ECF No. 35-1, at 10. And P2S is the only
employer named in the Complaint, as well as in every other document Causey signed
on record in this litigation. 6
Time and again during these proceedings Causey indicated that he had not
filed any workers’ compensation claim, but as he now admits, this was not the case.
Such an attempt to game the system cannot be tolerated and runs completely contrary
to the express terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Court is not required to draw
unreasonable inferences, such as, that Causey’s express denial of any workers’
compensation claim was inadvertent on four occasions or that he was mistaken about
the name of his employer in every claim document and got all of the dates wrong. It
6
Even assuming a dispute about whether Causey was in fact employed by P2S during all
of his beach clean-up work, it is not material because it is undisputed that Causey is seeking
compensation for conditions that first appeared around July 8, 2010, and were diagnosed well
before he signed the workers’ compensation release on October 14, 2013.
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is undisputed that Causey was well aware of the LMPCs at issue at the time he
pursued and accepted workers’ compensation benefits for his beach clean-up work.
On the undisputed record, the Court finds that Causey’s active pursuit of a workers’
compensation claim including ocular conditions and his acceptance of a benefits
award constituted a voluntary election of the workers’ compensation remedy for
LMPCs of chronic conjunctivitis and chronic dry eye syndrome, allegedly caused
by his exposure to oil and chemical dispersants as a beach clean-up worker in July
2010 and diagnosed over a year before his workers’ compensation award.
Consequently, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Causey is now precluded from
pursuing a BELO claim for those same physical conditions.
Accordingly, BP Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on
Election of Remedies under the MSA, ECF No. 35, is GRANTED. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment accordingly, tax costs against the Plaintiff, and close the
file.
DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of April 2021.
M. Casey Rodgers
M. CASEY RODGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case No. 3:19cv2108-MCR-GRJ