Lawson Cattle & Equipment, Inc. v. Pasture Renovators LLC

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 20, 2005
No. 04-14939
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00211-CV-ORL-22JGG
LAWSON CATTLE & EQUIPMENT, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PASTURE RENOVATORS LLC,
a Texas limited liability company,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 20, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Lawson Cattle & Equipment, Inc. (“Lawson”) appeals the district
court’s order granting the Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss of defendant Pasture
Renovators LLC (“Pasture Renovators”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. After
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lawson is a Florida corporation, engaged in the business of selling
implements for agricultural use. Plaintiff Lawson has a business office in Florida.
Since 1983, Lawson has regularly utilized the mark “Aerator” in its business
dealings, selling “Aerator” agricultural implements. The Aerator design is
distinguished by its plurality of individual blade segments disposed around a drum
in a spiral formation.
The defendant, Pasture Renovators, is a Texas corporation located in Texas.
In March 2000, Keith Hedemann, the current President of defendant Pasture
Renovators, received a price list, which he had previously requested, for various
Aerators from plaintiff Lawson. In August 2000, Charles Haymore, the current
Chairman of defendant Pasture Renovators, purchased two 16' x 42" Aerators from
plaintiff Lawson for use on his two Texas ranches, the Rudy Ranch and the Cedar
Springs Ranch.
In 2003, the Rudy Ranch and the Cedar Springs Ranch needed additional
equipment, and Haymore located Aceros y Maquinados Nacionales, S.A.
2
(“AMNSA”), a Mexican manufacturer that sold similar equipment at a
significantly lower price. Upon locating AMNSA, Haymore explored the
possibility of opening an AMNSA distributorship in the United States. To that
end, in April 2003, Hedemann once again contacted plaintiff Lawson by sending a
fax to Lawson in Florida in which he requested a price list. Two days later,
Lawson faxed a price list to Hedemann for the Aerators.
Recognizing a viable business opportunity, in June 2003, Haymore formed
defendant Pasture Renovators, as a Texas limited liability corporation and
subsidiary of Cedar Ranch, and Pasture Renovators then engaged in the business of
distributing agricultural implements. In addition, defendant Pasture Renovators
and AMNSA entered into an exclusive distributorship for Pasture Renovators to
sell AMNSA products.
Defendant Pasture Renovators, located in Texas, began running
advertisements regularly in three national trade magazines — Livestock Weekly,
Cattleman Magazine, and Texas Wildlife Extra — for the AMNSA products it
intended to sell. Suspicious of the new competition, in January 2004, Willard
Palmer, a Florida resident and an associate of Lawson’s owner, called defendant
Pasture Renovators and posed as a potential customer, requesting information
about Pasture Renovators’ products. Defendant Pasture Renovators mailed to
3
Palmer a letter, brochure, photographs, and a price list. Palmer’s secretary in
Florida subsequently contacted defendant Pasture Renovators and requested a
Texas A&M study on the effects of aeration. Defendant Pasture Renovators faxed
a copy of a Texas A&M study on the effects of aeration, which had been conducted
using Lawson equipment.
On February 20, 2004, plaintiff Lawson filed a complaint against defendant
Pasture Renovators for trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, unfair
competition, and false advertising. Pasture Renovators filed a Rule 12(b) motion
to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and
improper venue. On August 20, 2004, the district court granted defendant Pasture
Renovators’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Lawson appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
After review, we conclude that the district court properly granted Pasture
Renovators’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.1
An analysis of whether personal jurisdiction exists requires a court to
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with both the forum state’s
long-arm statute, here Fla. Stat. § 48.193, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v.
1
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meier
ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
4
Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004). “Under Florida law, a
plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction of the court
through the long-arm statute must do more than allege facts that show a possibility
of jurisdiction.” Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir.
1990). “A defendant wishing to contest the allegations of the complaint
concerning jurisdiction or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file
affidavits in support of his position. The burden is then placed upon the plaintiff to
prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained.” Acquadro
v. Bergeron, 851 So.2d 665, 671 (Fla. 2003) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v.
Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)).
Because we conclude that Pasture Renovators’ contacts with the State of
Florida were insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution, we do not reach the issue as to whether those contacts would satisfy
the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute.2
2
The Florida long-arm statute provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally
or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby
submits himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
...
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1). The district court concluded that § (1)(b) was satisfied. We need not
reach the Florida long arm statute issue because even if Florida’s statute is satisfied, plaintiff
Lawson fails to establish the second prong of the inquiry: showing that the exercise of
jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case comports with the Due Process clause. See Posner
5
“The exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process when (1)
the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the
forum . . . and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’” SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To satisfy the minimum contacts requirement for purposes of personal
jurisdiction, a defendant’s contacts (1) must be related to the plaintiff’s cause of
action or have given rise to it, (2) must involve some act by which the defendant
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum, and (3) the defendant’s contacts with the forum must be such that the
defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
We agree with the district court that defendant Pasture Renovators’ contacts
with Florida were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
First, Haymore’s purchase of the Lawson Aerators in 2000 was for use on
his two ranches and not to compete with Lawson. The 2000 purchase had no
relation to Lawson’s claims that Pasture Renovators later sold a product in 2003
v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Having concluded that
[Florida’s] long-arm statute creates jurisdiction over Salem with respect to Posner’s insurance
policy-related claims, we turn to the second part of the jurisdictional inquiry: determining
whether exercising jurisdiction in these circumstances comports with due process.”).
6
which infringed upon Lawson’s marks. In addition, it was Haymore (not a party to
this lawsuit) and not Pasture Renovators (party to this lawsuit) who purchased the
Lawson Aerators, and he did so in 2000, three years before defendant Pasture
Renovators was even formed. Thus, the district court properly accorded no
attribution from this 2000 purchase to the minimum contacts analysis.
Second, with respect to the two inquiries in April 2003 about Lawson’s
prices, those contacts occurred before Pasture Renovators entered into a
distributorship agreement with AMNSA. Determining the prices of Lawson
aerators was market research and part of the due diligence conducted by Pasture
Renovators in determining whether to reach an agreement with AMNSA to
distribute their products. Further, AMNSA, not Pasture Renovators, set the prices
for AMNSA’s aerators. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding
that these inquiries were insufficient to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.
Third, although Pasture Renovators advertises in national magazines, only a
small number of subscribers reside within the State of Florida.3 Further “merely
advertising in magazines of national circulation that are read in the forum state is
not a significant contact for jurisdictional purposes.” Charia v. Cigarette Racing
3
Livestock Weekly has over 19,000 subscribers, 115 of which (0.6%) reside within
Florida. Of Cattleman Magazine’s more than 15,000 subscribers, only 50 (0.3%) reside within
Florida. Texas Wildlife Extra has over 5,000 subscribers, but only 16 (0.3%) in Florida.
7
Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 1978) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Otherwise, a business that advertised in a national magazine would be
subject to jurisdiction in virtually every state. While these contacts count, they do
not count for much.
Finally, with respect to the brochures mailed to Palmer in Florida, and the
Texas A&M study faxed to him, we note that this isolated contact with a
“prospective Florida purchaser” was done at the behest of Palmer, plaintiff
Lawson’s agent, and does not constitute purposeful availment by the defendant
Pasture Renovators. See Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc.,
207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is important to remember that the
conduct at issue is that of the defendants. . . . Therefore, we must determine what
these defendants did to purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of doing
business in Alabama such that the notions of reasonableness and fairness are not
offended by requiring them to defend themselves in an Alabama court.”). The
district court did not err in concluding that defendant’s contacts with Florida in
response to Palmer’s unilateral requests did not constitute purposeful availment.
Accordingly, and taking account of all of the alleged contacts together, we
conclude that Pasture Renovators did not have the requisite minimum contacts with
the State of Florida to allow a court in Florida to constitutionally exercise personal
8
jurisdiction.4
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, this Court affirms the district court’s order
dismissing this action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
4
In addition to finding minimum contacts with the forum, an exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. In making this determination, the court looks at:
(a) the burden on the defendant, (b) the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, (c) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (d)
the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and (e) the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.
Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). Because we
conclude that there were insufficient minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Pasture Renovators, we need not address this additional requirement.
9