Lifang Lin v. U.S. Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 14, 2005
No. 04-14337 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency Docket No. A97-670-212
LIFANG LIN,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
__________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(July 14, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Through counsel, Lifang Lin petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
decision denying her asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
On appeal, Lin argues that we should not defer to the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination, which was the basis of the IJ’s determination that Lin was not
eligible for asylum, because it “was based on inferences and presumptions not
reasonably grounded in the record.” Lin claims that she should be granted asylum
because she fears persecution based on her religion, Falun Gong. She contends
that the IJ based the adverse credibility determination solely on the inconsistencies
that existed in her testimony, her airport statement, and her credible fear interview.
We review the IJ’s decision in this case, not the BIA’s, because the BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion, thereby making the IJ’s decision the
final agency determination. See Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney. Gen., 327 F.3d 1283,
1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003). An IJ’s adverse credibility determination alone may be
sufficient to support the denial of an asylum application. D-Muhumed v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2004).
2
It is the duty of the fact finder to determine credibility, and we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the IJ with respect to credibility findings.
Vasquez-Mondragon v. INS, 560 F.2d 1225, 1226 (5th Cir. 1977). An adverse
credibility determination must be upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272
(3rd Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Once an adverse credibility
finding is made, the applicant bears the burden of showing that the IJ’s credibility
decision was not supported by specific, cogent reasons or was not based on
substantial evidence. Forgue v. U.S. Attorney General, 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th
Cir. 2005).
We readily conclude that the IJ’s credibility decision in this case was
supported by specific, cogent reasons and was based on substantial evidence. The
IJ noted several serious inconsistencies in Lin’s various statements. The IJ stated
that Lin had “submitted no evidence that she is a Falun Gong other than her own
testimony and a statement from her parents in China.” The IJ further noted that
Lin’s story warranted skepticism because she claimed she was Falun Gong for less
than a month, could not adequately explain what Falun Gong was, and was not
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really detailed as to what she did to practice Falun Gong. We find that these
reasons provide substantial evidence for the IJ”s credibility determination.1
Upon review of the record on appeal and upon consideration of the parties’
briefs, we discern no reversible error.
PETITION DENIED.
1
We decline to address Lin’s challenge to the IJ’s alternative finding that the
mistreatment that she suffered did not rise to the level of persecution because we find that substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s credibility determination. We find Lin’s other challenge, that the IJ denied
her due process rights, to be wholly without merit.
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