United States v. Quincey Lemond Jones

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 26, 2005
No. 05-10556
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00034-CR-CG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUINCEY LEMOND JONES,
a.k.a. Dettic Lee Whittic,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(September 26, 2005)
Before BLACK, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quincey Lemond Jones was sentenced to 235 months imprisonment for
armed bank robbery and abduction during a bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and (e). On appeal, Jones contends that the district court
erred in departing upward from criminal history category V to category VI
pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.3 because (1) the court
failed to compare Jones’ criminal history with the criminal history of other
defendants in category VI, and (2) the court did not properly take into account the
nature and circumstances of the offense or consider Jones’ history and
characteristics.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 allows a district court to depart upward during sentencing
“[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category
substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history
or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” When departing
upward under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, the district court must first look to the next
highest criminal history category. United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1137, 1142
(11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds that the higher category adequately reflects the
defendant’s past conduct, the court must state its finding and sentence the
defendant within that higher criminal history range. Id.We review “de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the
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facts to decide whether the departure is based on a factor that (a) advances the
objectives of federal sentencing policy, (b) is authorized under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b), and (c) is justified by the facts of the case.” United States v. Pressley,
345 F.3d 1205, 1209 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003).
We have held that “[t]he amount by which a district court departs from the
Guidelines need only be reasonable.” United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 734
(11th Cir. 2002). Even if the defendant’s prior offenses do not meet the definition
of “career offender,” the defendant’s criminal record can justify an upward
departure if his prior crimes were substantial in number and serious in character.
See United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78–79 (11th Cir. 1989).
We conclude that the district court’s upward departure was reasonable.
The court properly took the guidelines into account in determining the degree of
departure. The district court explained that Jones had repeatedly committed
criminal offenses since he was fourteen years old and found that criminal history
category VI more adequately reflected Jones’ criminal history than category V.
Specifically, the court found that category V inadequately represented the
likelihood that Jones would commit other offenses when he was released from
custody. Furthermore, the district court properly considered the sentencing factors
found in § 3553(a)(2), stating that she based the sentence on the seriousness of the
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offense, deterrence, and incapacitation. The district court did not err by imposing
the upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. The amount of the upward
departure was appropriate under the circumstances.
For the same reasons that the district court’s upward departure pursuant to
the guidelines and the amount of that departure were appropriate, the resulting
sentence was not unreasonable under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738(2005).
AFFIRMED.
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