United States v. Francisco Javier Almada Cruz

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 28, 2005
No. 05-11507
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00064-CR-FTM-29-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FRANCISCO JAVIER ALMADA CRUZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 28, 2005)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Francisco Javier Almada Cruz appeals his convictions for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c). The convictions were based on a guilty plea.
After pleading guilty, but before the sentencing hearing, Cruz wrote letters
to the district court, stating that his attorney had pressured him into accepting the
guilty plea, and he wanted to withdraw his plea and receive new counsel. The sole
issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by following a
local court rule and striking Cruz’s letters, which it construed to be pro se motions
to withdraw his guilty plea, without holding a hearing or making further inquiries
into the allegations Cruz made.
We review a district court’s refusal to hold a hearing only for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000)
(reviewing denial of hearing on issue of standing). We will, like other circuits, also
review only for an abuse of discretion a district court’s application of local rules.
See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C. 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir.
2005); Fox v. American Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Local rules “are effective ‘unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of
the relevant circuit.’” Brown v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1009 n. 10
(11th Cir. 1992)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1)).
2
In this case, the local rules that govern the appearance of both counsel and
parties before the district court specify that, once an attorney has made a general
appearance in a case, counsel cannot withdraw without permission of the district
court, and counsel, not the party, is the sole person who can file motions and be
heard in the case. M.D. Fla Rules 2.03(b),(d) 1. That means counseled defendants
cannot file their own motions. See M.D. Fla. Rule 2.03(b). The rules are clear,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying them.
Because the district court acted within its discretion in striking Cruz’s pro se
motions, there was no proper motion to withdraw a guilty plea before it.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing.
To the extent that Cruz is arguing the district court should have construed his
letters as a motion to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975), that argument is subject to the same fault: it should
have been made through counsel. Even if M.D. Fla Rules 2.03(b),(d) should not
have been applied to a Faretta motion because of its nature, the district court’s
failure to conduct a Faretta hearing in this case was still not an abuse of discretion
1
While the district court did not specifically rely on Rule 2.03 in striking the first of
Cruz’s two letters, as it did with the second one, we can affirm on any ground that finds support
in the record. See United States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 1996).
3
because Cruz never “clearly and unequivocally assert[ed] the desire to represent
himself.” United States v. Teague, 935 F.2d 1525, 1540 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal
marks and citation omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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