Kathryn E. Boyce Camara v. Brinker Int'l.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-11226 JANUARY 9, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-80752-CV-DTKH
KATHRYN E. BOYCE CAMARA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRINKER INTERNATIONAL,
d.b.a. Chili's Bar & Grill,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 9, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kathryn E. Boyce Camara appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Chili’s Bar & Grill in her employment discrimination action
brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida Civil
Rights Act. Camara argues that the district court erred in (1) denying her motion to
compel discovery of employment evaluations of certain male managers and (2)
determining that she failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.
I. Background
Camara worked as a manager for Brinker International (“Brinker”), first at
the company’s West Boca Chili’s Restaurant and, later, at its Boynton Beach
location. Throughout Camara’s employment in West Boca, the restaurant’s
general manager received many complaints about her from other employees and
counseled her several times regarding employee relations. The general manager
noted that Camara could be harsh and abrupt and that she could overreact under
stress. In his evaluations of Camara, he rated her employee relations skills as
below expectations.
During her first few weeks at the West Boca restaurant, Camara worked with
Brian Marks, another manager. After she complained that Marks had engaged in
inappropriate sexual behavior with female employees, Marks was transferred to
another restaurant.
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On one occasion, Camara and other managers attended a conference in
Tampa. One evening, a group of managers who had been drinking engaged in
banter of a sexual nature with Camara and her roommate. Marks later joined the
group. When a general manager told the group to go to bed and the women began
to leave, Marks picked up the roommate and carried her over his shoulder until
Camara told him to put her down. Marks subsequently was terminated.
Camara was transferred to the Boynton Beach restaurant in response to
complaints from other employees at the West Boca restaurant. At Boynton Beach,
Camara reported to Tom Livoti, who was aware of past concerns regarding her job
performance. Livoti received similar complaints about Camara’s harsh treatment
of other employees and her abrupt manner. Camara received counseling and
warnings. Camara complained that Livoti was unduly critical of her, occasionally
swore at her, and gave her less guidance than other managers received. She also
complained that Livoti did not make her a kitchen manager.
In Livoti’s evaluation of Camara’s job performance, he noted that she was
below expectations in team development and professionalism. He again warned
her to improve and denied her a raise due to employee relations concerns. Camara
believed that Livoti disapproved of women in the workplace because he allegedly
once stated that a woman’s place is in the home.
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Almost immediately following this review, Camara became involved in a
loud altercation with a waitress, Heather Cannon. A few days later, Brinker
received an e-mail allegedly from a customer complaining that Camara had
insulted a waitress in front of him and other guests and that she had then asked him
if he knew anyone looking for a job. Camara first denied that the incident had
occurred and accused Cannon of fabricating the complaint to exact revenge. She
later admitted that she had made the comments to a guest hoping to lighten the
mood. Two days after Brinker had received the e-mail, Camara was terminated.
Stephen Scott, the area director, and Mark Gray, the new general manager, made
the decision, though Livoti was present for the meeting with Camara.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Patrick v.
Floyd Medical Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000), construing all facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982,
991 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(c).
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Compel Discovery
Camara first argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to
compel discovery of the personnel files of three other managers, Greg Barocas,
Bob Greene and Chris Villard. Although she deposed Barocas and Green, neither
could attest to the contents of their files. She argues that these managers had been
criticized for poor employee relations skills and yet had not been terminated.
Accordingly, she contends that the discovery sought was relevant to establish
proper comparators.
This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a discovery request for abuse
of discretion. Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Ed., 231 F.3d 821, 826 (11th
Cir. 2000). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Chi. Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). “Where a
significant amount of discovery has been obtained, and it appears that further
discovery would not be helpful in resolving the issues, a request for further
discovery is properly denied.” Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1580 (11th Cir.
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1991).
Here, Camara had already deposed Barocas and Green and had declined to
depose Villard. Nevertheless, she was unable to elicit any evidence supporting her
theory that Barocas, Green and Villard were comparators in that they had been
similarly reprimanded but not terminated. Barocas stated in his deposition that he
could not remember any complaint filed against him, and he denied that he had
received any discipline or counseling. Likewise, Greene stated that he had not
received any complaints or counseling. While Greene acknowledged having
received negative evaluations, he stated that he had been able to improve on those
areas identified in his evaluations. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Camara’s discovery request.
Moreover, even if the requested files would have been helpful to Camara in
establishing her prima facie case, they would not have rebutted the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination proffered by Brinker.
B. Prima Facie Case
Camara next argues that the district court erred in determining that she was
not treated differently than Marks based on gender merely because Marks was
ultimately discharged. Camara argues that although Marks’s behavior was worse
than hers, he was not terminated as quickly as she was. She also asserts that (1)
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she was not given as much guidance as male managers; (2) Livoti yelled at her,
was abrupt with her and stated on one occasion that a woman’s place is in the
home; (3) she was not assigned to the kitchen; and (4) she was denied a raise.
Camara argues that each of the above constitutes an adverse employment action
because each made her job undesirable.
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “‘to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Bass v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Where a plaintiff seeks to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, she must
show: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an
adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated employees
who are not members of her protected class more favorably, and (4) she was
qualified for the job or benefit at issue.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.,
232 F.3d 836, 842-43 (11th Cir. 2000). “[I]n cases involving alleged . . . bias in
the application of discipline for violation of work rules, the plaintiff . . . must show
either (a) that he did not violate the work rule, or (b) that he engaged in misconduct
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similar to that of a person outside the protected class, and that the disciplinary
measures enforced against him were more severe than those enforced against the
other persons who engaged in similar misconduct.” Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d
1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1998).
“Demonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous; it requires only that the
plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination.”
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant has the burden of
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094,
67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Here, contrary to the district court’s determination,
Camara established that she was the subject of two adverse employment actions –
the denial of a raise and her termination. See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212
F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An adverse employment action is an ultimate
employment decision, such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that
‘alters the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely
affects his or her status as an employee.’”). She failed to establish, however, that
similarly situated male managers were treated less severely. Despite Camara’s
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claims, Marks is not an appropriate comparator. Whereas Marks had made
inappropriate comments to female employees, arrived at work inebriated, and
fraternized with subordinates, certainly egregious conduct, Camara’s problems
were in a different category, the area of employee relations. She had been harsh
with staff, received numerous complaints from staff members, and criticized staff
in front of guests. Accordingly, Marks and Camara were not similarly situated in
all relevant respects, and the district court correctly held that Camara failed to
establish her prima facie case.
In any event, even if Camara had established her prima facie case of gender
discrimination, we would nevertheless affirm the district court because Camara
failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by Brinker for its
decisions to deny her a raise and ultimately terminate her employment.1 Brinker
proffered as its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons the following: that Camara
had difficulty with interpersonal relations; that she had been warned and counseled
regarding these problems yet showed no improvement; and that her conduct had
escalated to the level where a restaurant guest complained about her. Camara
offered no evidence that Brinker’s proffered reasons were pretextual. Although
1
This Court may affirm the district court on grounds that differ from those that form the
basis of the district court’s decision. Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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she contends that the guest complaint was fabricated by another employee, she
introduced no evidence that Brinker knew it was a hoax. Moreover, Camara’s
Termination Form indicated that the complaint merely confirmed the persistence of
her long-standing difficulties with employee relations. Accordingly, Camara failed
to rebut Brinker’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
employment decisions.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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