John J. Jacobs, Jr. v. Emilio Estefan

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15732
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-22393-JEM
JOHN J. JACOBS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EMILIO ESTEFAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 7, 2017)
Before ROSENBAUM, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Plaintiff-Appellant John J. Jacobs, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his fourth
lawsuit concerning a proposed business project that he presented to Estefan
Enterprises, Inc., in 1999. Each of his lawsuits has been a repeat of the prior
lawsuit, with minor alterations. Sometimes the lawsuits have alleged different
damages or different causes of action, but they have always pertained to the same
subject matter and have always named Emilio Estefan, the founder of Estefan
Enterprises, as a defendant.
After taking judicial notice of the relevant court filings in the three prior
lawsuits, the district court found that the fourth lawsuit is barred by the statute of
limitations and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 1 The district court also
prohibited Jacobs from filing future lawsuits related to the same subject matter,
with limited exceptions.
On appeal, Jacobs challenges only the statute-of-limitations finding. He
argues that the district court erred because the applicable statute-of-limitations
period began to run on October 23, 2007, when he received an email from a
representative of Estefan Enterprises. Using that date, he concludes that his first
lawsuit was timely filed on August 12, 2011. But because Jacobs did not meet the
1
The district court adopted the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge.
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statutory deadline for filing his claims in this case, the district court’s ruling is now
ours, too. 2
“Statutes of limitations serve important purposes in promoting the fair
administration of justice.” Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir. 2006).
Their primary purpose is to assure fairness to defendants by preventing surprises
and minimizing spoliation of evidence. Id. Statutes of limitations also relieve the
courts of “the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.”
Id. at 1260–61 (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965)).
In this case, the district court dismissed Jacobs’s complaint with prejudice
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) upon a motion to dismiss. We
review the district court’s decision de novo, accepting all of the factual allegations
in the complaint as true. See Foudy v. Indian River Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 845 F.3d
1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017); Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195,
1197 (11th Cir. 2013). We are also mindful that Jacobs is proceeding pro se, so we
liberally construe his complaint. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir.
2007). Under this standard, Jacobs’s complaint attempts to allege claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and libel.
2
Apart from the statute-of-limitations issue, we decline to comment on the district court’s
other decisions because they are not properly before us. Nor is addressing them necessary to
resolve this case.
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“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate
‘if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.’”
Gonsalvez, 750 F.3d at 1197 (quoting La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d
840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)). In diversity actions, such as this one, the court must
follow the statute of limitations determined by state law. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. City of Claxton, Ga., 720 F.2d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 1983). In Florida, a
claim of negligence must be brought within four years, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), and
a claim of libel within two, id. § 95.11(4)(g).
Coincidentally, Jacobs’s first lawsuit was dismissed on statute-of-limitations
grounds as well. In that case, filed August 12, 2011, Jacobs appeared to allege
claims for breach of an implied oral contract. Based upon the allegations in the
complaint, the district court found that the latest breach of the “implied contract”
occurred in 2005, meaning that under the applicable four-year limitations period,
Jacobs was required to file his complaint in 2009. See id. § 95.11(3)(k). On
appeal, we affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating that “Jacobs should have
filed his complaint by 2009 or 2010,” Jacobs v. Estefan, 531 F. App’x 1004, 1005
(11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2146, reh’g denied, 135 S.
Ct. 19 (2014).
In the instant case, it is apparent from the face of the complaint that Jacobs’s
claims, though relabeled as negligence and libel claims, are still time-barred. In
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his complaint, Jacobs again alleges injury occurring “in 2005.” No other dates are
referenced in the complaint. In his response to Estefan’s motion to dismiss, Jacobs
adds that October 23, 2007, is the relevant limitations date. But Jacobs filed his
complaint on June 25, 2015—well over four years after his causes of actions
accrued using either date. And as in the first lawsuit, he has failed to allege any
facts that would toll the statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat. § 95.051. So it is clear
that Jacobs’s claims were filed after the applicable limitations period. See id. §
95.11(3)(a), (4)(g).
Although Jacobs appears to raise some form of relation-back argument in an
attempt to save his claims, we decline to revisit our earlier decision from the first
lawsuit. For statute-of-limitations purposes, the instant claims were commenced
by the filing of the instant complaint, not the first complaint filed in a prior lawsuit.
In a case premised on diversity jurisdiction, state law governs when, for statute-of-
limitation purposes, the action began. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740, 753 (1980). And under Florida law, “an action is ‘commenced’ for
limitations purposes, when a complaint is filed.” Totura & Co. v. Williams, 754
So. 2d 671, 679 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Frew v. Poole & Kent Co., 654 So. 2d 272,
275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); Szabo v. Essex Chem. Corp., 461 So. 2d 128, 129
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“Since 1955, an action is commenced in Florida by the
filing of a complaint.”). Finally, even if we were to find that the limitations period
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was tolled while the prior lawsuits were pending, the filing of the instant complaint
would still fall outside the applicable limitations period. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
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