Denorris Williams v. Alabama Department of Corrections

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15121 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 16, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:07-cv-00824-WKW-WC
DENORRIS WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RICHARD F. ALLEN, Individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(May 16, 2011)
Before WILSON, COX, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff DeNorris Williams is a former inmate of the Alabama Department of
Corrections (“the Department”). For seven months of his confinement, from
November 2006 through May 2008, he earned wages working for private employers
through the Department’s voluntary work-release program. Like all work-release
inmates, Williams did not retain all of his earnings. Pursuant to state statute, the
Department deducted forty percent of Williams’s earnings as costs incident to his
confinement. See Ala. Code § 14-8-6. And, the Department charged him an
additional $5.00 fee for transportation to and from the job site. See ADOC Admin.
Reg. No. 410 (Dkt. 47-1).
Williams filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit as a putative class action against the
Department and Commissioner Richard Allen in his individual and official capacity.
Williams alleges that he and other work-release inmates have a constitutionally
protected property interest in the funds deducted from their earnings for
transportation fees and that the assessment of transportation fees is a taking without
just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Williams also brings several state law claims.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department and
Allen. The district court determined that: (1) the Department and Allen (in his
official capacity) are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for the Fifth
Amendment takings claim; (2) Allen (in his individual capacity) is entitled to
qualified immunity for the takings claim because it was not clearly established in
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2006 and 2007 that deducting transportation fees in addition to Ala. Code § 14-8-6’s
forty-percent withholding was a Fifth Amendment taking; and (3) Williams’s claims
for injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer incarcerated and thus no longer
participates in the work-release program. After dismissing the Fifth Amendment
takings claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims.
Williams presents the following arguments on appeal: (1) the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar his claim against the Department and Allen in his official
capacity because the Alabama state courts have not provided a suitable remedy for
the takings claim in this case; and (2) Commissioner Allen (in his individual
capacity) is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the takings claim because he was
not acting in his discretionary authority when he implemented regulations governing
the deductions from the earnings of inmates who participate in the Department work-
release program. And, even if he was acting in his discretionary authority, Allen is
not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established in 2006 and 2007
that Ala. Code § 14-8-6 placed an absolute limit on the percentage amount the
Department could withhold from a work-release inmate’s earnings.1
1
Williams acknowledges that his claims for injunctive relief are now moot; he does not
challenge on appeal the dismissal without prejudice.
3
Williams did not make the first argument regarding the Eleventh Amendment
to the district court. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time
on appeal, and we decline to do so here. See Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc.
v. Manatee Cnty., Fla., 630 F.3d 1346, 1358 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Williams’s second argument lacks merit for the reasons stated in the district court’s
well-reasoned opinion. (Dkt. 58.)
AFFIRMED.
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