Cassius Walker v. City of Riviera Beach

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16375 December 22, 2006
_____________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-80198-CV-WJZ
CASSIUS WALKER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant,
KEITH PATTERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________________________
(December 22, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellee Cassius Walker (“Walker”) filed suit against Defendants-
Appellants City of Riviera Beach (“City”) and police officer Kenneth Patterson
(“Officer Patterson”), alleging, inter alia, that Officer Patterson used excessive
force against him in violation of Walker's Fourth Amendment rights. Officer
Patterson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment
on the ground that he has qualified immunity from suit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
According to Walker, these are the facts.
On 8 December 2002, Walker was driving his vehicle home with a friend,
Juan Cabrera, who sat in the front passenger seat. Officer Patterson was sitting at
an intersection in his unmarked police car, and he observed Walker’s vehicle
going through the intersection. Officer Patterson pulled behind Walker and turned
on his blue flashing lights to pull over Walker.1 When Walker did not
immediately pull over, Officer Patterson pulled up alongside Walker’s vehicle
1
Officer Patterson testified that Walker’s vehicle was speeding and that Walker had run a red
light. Walker alleges he was not speeding at the time. But the initial traffic violations are irrelevant
because probable cause was established when Walker did not stop, which is a third-degree felony
in Florida. FLA . STAT . § 316.1935.
2
with his gun drawn. At that point, both vehicles’ windows were down, and
Officer Patterson shouted at Walker to pull over or Patterson would shoot Walker.
Walker did not stop his vehicle but continued onward, driving another four or five
blocks. Walker eventually slowed, turned into a parking lot, and stopped with
Officer Patterson behind him.
Officer Patterson exited his vehicle with his gun still drawn and shouted
profanities at Walker as he approached the driver’s window. Patterson then
“slammed” his gun against Walker’s forehead, dragged him out of his vehicle,
kneed him in the side, and kneeled on him. The gun-slap caused a half-inch
laceration to Walker’s head that was later closed with six stitches. No other
injuries were reported, but Walker claims his face and eyes were swollen and that
his back was sore.
Walker sued the City and Officer Patterson under section 1983 of Title 42,
alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 Officer Patterson
moved for summary judgment, in part contending he was entitled to qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion, and Officer Patterson appeals the
judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.
2
Walker also brought common law tort claims against the defendants.
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity on
summary judgment. Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1444-45 & n.3 (11th
Cir. 1997). We first resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and
we then answer the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity under that version of the facts. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190
(11th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
To be eligible for qualified immunity, a government official first must show
that he was performing a discretionary function at the time the alleged violation of
federal law occurred. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.
2004). Once the official has established that he was engaged in a discretionary
function, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the official is not
entitled to qualified immunity by showing these things: “(1) that the defendant has
4
committed a constitutional violation and (2) that the constitutional right the
defendant violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time he did it.” Id.
The district court ruled that summary judgment could not be granted in
favor of Officer Patterson on the basis of qualified immunity because “genuine
issues of material fact” existed as to whether Officer Patterson’s conduct was
unconstitutional. This application of the summary judgment standard was
mistaken because -- in resolving qualified immunity issues -- a “material issue of
fact” never exists. “When conducting a qualified immunity analysis, district
courts must take the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury.” Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005).
Consideration of the record in this light eliminates all issues of fact. Id. Although
the district court’s opinion contains errors, we nevertheless affirm the district
court’s decision to deny qualified immunity to Officer Patterson.
Walker does not dispute that Officer Patterson was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority. Patterson was driving to work at the police station
at the time of the incident, and he was fulfilling his duties as a police officer. And
we conclude that Walker’s version of the facts -- which we must accept to
determine whether Officer Patterson is entitled to qualified immunity and
5
summary judgment -- shows that Officer Patterson violated Walker’s clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights.
“The use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest constitutes a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.
2002). To establish such a Fourth Amendment violation, Walker must show (1)
that a seizure occurred and (2) that the force used to carry out the seizure was
unreasonable. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2005).
We make the reasonableness inquiry from the perspective of a reasonable officer:
the question then is whether Officer Patterson’s conduct is objectively reasonable,
in the light of the facts and circumstances confronting him,3 without regard to his
intent or motivation. Id. at 813 n.6. We think Walker’s version of the facts
demonstrate that Officer Patterson seized Walker and applied unreasonable force
in carrying out the seizure.
Officer Patterson seized Walker when Walker pulled over and stopped in
the parking lot. “A seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
3
We devote “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989).
6
liberty of a citizen.” United States v. Franklin, 323 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Officer Patterson first showed his
authority when he pulled behind Walker’s vehicle and flashed his lights. Officer
Patterson then pulled alongside Walker’s vehicle, drew his gun, and shouted
instructions for Walker to pull over. Walker yielded to Officer Patterson’s show
of authority when he stopped his vehicle in the parking lot. At that point, Walker
was seized.4
Assuming Walker’s allegations are true, we accept that Officer Patterson
applied unreasonable force when he hit Walker in the head with the gun.5 By the
time Walker had pulled over and Officer Patterson approached the car with gun
drawn, no threat or risk existed that would have justified Officer Patterson hitting
Walker in the head with a gun. Officer Patterson’s conduct was an unnecessary
4
We think no seizure occurred until Walker stopped. Officer Patterson did not effectuate a
seizure when he pulled alongside Walker’s vehicle with a gun drawn because Walker did not yield;
Walker continued onward for another four or five blocks. See Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d
1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that an attempt to seize the driver of a moving car by firing a
gun at the car’s tires is not a seizure because “neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an
attempted seizure a seizure”).
5
We express no view today on whether Officer Patterson's later acts as alleged by Walker (pulling
Walker out of the car, kneeing him in the side, and kneeling on his back to subdue him) are
necessarily -- by themselves -- constitutionally unreasonable or, if unreasonable, would be sufficient
to defeat qualified immunity. For background, see Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255, 1258 (11th
Cir. 2000); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1458 (11th Cir. 1997). But striking Walker's
head with the gun makes what happened during the seizure here clearly unconstitutional, given the
supposed facts.
7
and unreasonable use of force against Walker. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d
1270, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n determining if force was reasonable, courts
must examine (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship
between the need and amount of force used, and (3) the extent of the injury
inflicted.”).
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Walker, we conclude that
Officer Patterson unreasonably struck Walker’s head with a gun. Such excessive
force is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We also conclude that the violation
was clearly established at the time.
A plaintiff can show the law clearly established the officer’s use of force
was excessive in two ways: (1) “a controlling and materially similar case declares
the official’s conduct unconstitutional;”6 or (2) “the official’s conduct lies so
obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the
unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding
the lack of case law.” Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
6
A plaintiff can fulfill the first method by showing that “preexisting case law is sufficiently
similar in facts to the facts confronting an officer, such that we can say every objectively reasonable
officer would have been on ‘fair notice’ that the behavior violated a constitutional right.”
Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
8
We have no “ controlling and materially similar case” declaring Officer
Patterson’s strike to Walker’s head with the gun unconstitutional. But we accept
that Officer Patterson’s supposed conduct is obviously unconstitutional,
notwithstanding the lack of precedent. Officer Patterson first pursued Walker for
speeding, and Walker did not immediately pull over when Officer Patterson
flashed his lights and shouted for Walker to yield. Walker eventually pulled into a
parking lot, and Officer Patterson approached the vehicle on foot with gun drawn.
Walker turned off the car and did not resist arrest or attempt to flee again.
Nevertheless, Officer Patterson unnecessarily “slammed” his pistol into Walker’s
head. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Walker, “no
particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established
that what [Officer Patterson] did violated [Walker’s] constitutional right to be free
from the excessive use of force.” See id. at 927. Such an unwarranted pistol whip
lies at the core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits.
IV. CONCLUSION
9
On this record, we conclude that Officer Patterson is not entitled to
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Therefore, the district
court’s decision is,
AFFIRMED.
10