Ramsey L. Wright v. Rose Williams

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 05, 2007
No. 07-11471 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00075-CV-TWT-1
RAMSEY L. WRIGHT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
ROSE WILLIAMS,
Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 5, 2007)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ramsey L. Wright, a Georgia inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the sua
sponte dismissal of his habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a
certificate of appealability to decide the following issue: “Whether the district
court erred in sua sponte dismissing as procedurally barred appellant’s claim that
the state court improperly enhanced his sentence based on an uncounseled prior
conviction.” Wright argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his
habeas petition as procedurally barred because a sentence based on an uncounseled
prior conviction is void even if no objection was made at sentencing. We affirm.
We review de novo the dismissal of a habeas petition. See Sims v.
Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
District courts are required to dismiss a habeas petition summarily “[i]f it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 4. When a state prisoner fails to present
his claim in state court, the federal habeas court cannot hear the merits of the claim
absent a showing of cause for the default and actual prejudice or proof that the
failure to consider the claim would cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302–03, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). “A ‘fundamental
miscarriage of justice’ occurs in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
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violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent.”
Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003).
Wright’s argument that a void sentence is not subject to procedural default is
without merit. Wright cites our decision in Gonzalez v. Abbott, 967 F.2d 1499,
1504 (11th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that a void conviction cannot be a legal
cause of imprisonment, notwithstanding any procedural default, but Wright has not
argued that either his conviction is void or he is actually innocent. Wright argues
that his sentence is void, but an illegal sentence is not a recognized exception to a
procedural default.
The dismissal of Wright’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.
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