Monaco v. Tanning Research Laboratories, Inc.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 13, 2007
No. 06-15058 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-01785-CV-ORL-22-JGG
VITO MONACO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TANNING RESEARCH LABORATORIES, INC.,
d.b.a. Hawaiian Tropic,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 13, 2007)
Before BIRCH, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Vito Monaco, an employee over 40 years of age, appeals the summary
judgment in favor of his employer, Tanning Research Laboratories, Inc., and
against his complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634. Monaco argues that Tanning discriminated against him when it
reduced his salary and when it promoted a younger person instead of Monaco. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We describe the facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to Monaco.
Monaco worked for Tanning as a production maintenance engineer. He oversaw
plant maintenance and equipment purchasing, managed the filling department of
the production line, and earned a salary of over $74,000 per year.
In November 2003, when Monaco was 67 years old, company executives
called Monaco and the manager of the batching department of the production line,
52-year-old Tim Domescik, to a meeting. The executives told Monaco that, as part
of the company’s restructuring efforts, Monaco’s and Domescik’s departments
would be combined under the management of Domescik. Both men were told that
they were receiving lateral transfers and their pay would not change, but Domescik
received an increase in his salary. In his new position, Monaco’s management
responsibilities were limited to the maintenance and purchasing of plant facilities
and equipment, and his salary was decreased in April 2004 to $60,000. The
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company contends that Domescik was more qualified for the joint batching-filling
position because he had experience in batching, the more complicated process, and
Monaco’s salary was decreased because he had fewer responsibilities. Other
production line management positions were also eliminated during the
restructuring.
In June 2004, Monaco applied for a newly created plant manager position,
which involved overseeing the entire production line. The two candidates Tanning
considered for the position were Monaco and Steve Pursel, who was 46 years old.
Pursel received an initial interview and Monaco did not, which the company
explains was because Tanning executives already knew Monaco well. According
to the company, Pursel was hired because he was a stronger candidate and had a
master’s degree in business administration. Monaco had attended college for one
year and had no educational background in business.
After filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Monaco sued Tanning for reducing his salary and not promoting him to plant
manager. Tanning moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted
summary judgment against Monaco’s complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in
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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d
1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment should be granted if
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III. DISCUSSION
Monaco relies on circumstantial evidence to support his complaint of age
discrimination, and we will assume, without deciding, that Monaco established a
prima facie case of discrimination regarding both the salary reduction and the
promotion. If an ADEA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03,
93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25 (1973); Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. If the employer
articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption
of discrimination is rebutted, and the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to
offer evidence that “the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons
for the adverse employment decision.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. We will not
re-examine the company’s decisions about how to structure its business, and “[our]
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inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its
behavior.” Id. at 1030 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Tanning proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for both the pay
reduction and the promotion. With respect to the salary reduction, Tanning
presented evidence that Domescik was more qualified for the batching-filling
position and Monaco had fewer responsibilities in his new position. With respect
to the plant manager position, Tanning presented evidence that Pursel was more
qualified for the job and received the additional interview because the Tanning
executive did not know Pursel.
Monaco’s argument that the reasons given for his reduction in
responsibilities and pay were pretextual fails. He argues that Domescik performed
poorly in the batching department and Monaco’s salary reduction was
unprecedented in the history of the plant. These arguments do not rebut the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the company for the reduction
in Monaco’s responsibilities and pay. See id. at 1030; Vessels v. Atlanta Indep.
Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must “reveal such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder
could find them unworthy of credence”). Monaco also argues that the salary
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decision was a discriminatory effort by Tanning to force him to resign, but he has
presented no evidence to support that theory.
With respect to his failure to promote claim, Monaco’s argument about
pretext also fails. Monaco argues that Pursel received an initial interview and
questionnaire but Monaco did not. Because Monaco does not dispute that the
company was already familiar with his background and qualifications, this
argument does not rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered by
Tanning. See Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.2. Monaco also
contends that the company failed to follow objective standards in its hiring
decision, but that bare assertion does not rebut the legitimate reason proffered by
Tanning.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment against Monaco’s complaint is
AFFIRMED.
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