Albert Robinson v. Adventist Health System

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 17, 2007
No. 06-13828 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-01468-CV-ORL-22-JGG
ALBERT ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM,
d.b.a. Florida Hospital Orlando,
D. W. LEWIS,
an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 17, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Albert Robinson, a black male, appeals pro se the district court’s grant of the
defendant’s, Adventist Health System d/b/a Florida Hospital Orlando (“Florida
Hospital”), motion for summary judgment in his employment discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation action brought pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. Robinson’s claims involve several allegedly
discriminatory incidents that culminated in his termination in March 2003. Florida
Hospital asserted below that it had terminated Robinson’s employment because he
threatened to kill a co-worker. On appeal, Robinson argues that the magistrate
judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to compel discovery and in
denying his subsequent motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Robinson further
contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in Florida
Hospital’s favor.
I. Motion to Compel and Motion Under Rule 56(f)
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to compel discovery for an
abuse of discretion. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th
Cir. 2006). A “district court is allowed a range of choice in such matters, and [this
Court] will not second-guess the district court’s actions unless they reflect a clear
error of judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted). Likewise, a denial of discovery
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under Rule 56(f) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Cintas Corp.,
425 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005).
Rule 56(f) states,
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
[for summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated
present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Accordingly, a party opposing summary judgment must
provide the court with an affidavit justifying the need for additional discovery. See
id. Additionally,
[t]he party seeking to use rule 56(f) may not simply rely on vague
assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but
unspecified, facts, but rather he must specifically demonstrate how
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery
or other means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a
genuine issue of fact.
Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 862 F.2d 841, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1989)
(quotations omitted).
In this case, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
Robinson’s motion to compel discovery or in denying Robinson’s motion under
Rule 56(f). The magistrate judge held a hearing to address Robinson’s discovery
concerns and determined that Florida Hospital would comply with all of
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Robinson’s requests. Because all of Robinson’s discovery requests were satisfied,
the magistrate judge then denied the motion as moot. The magistrate judge’s
denial was not an abuse of discretion.
As for Robinson’s motion under Rule 56(f), Robinson did not file any
affidavits with this motion. Accordingly, Robinson did not comply with the
requirements of Rule 56(f), and thus, could not seek relief under this rule.
Therefore, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Robinson’s
motion under Rule 56(f).
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
We review a “district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.”
Holloman, 443 F.3d at 836. “Summary judgment is appropriate when the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no
genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the moving party.” Id. at 836-37 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In reviewing the
motion, we view the evidence and all factual inferences in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and all reasonable doubts about the facts are resolved in
favor of the non-movant. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2001). A party opposing a properly submitted motion for summary judgment
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). The district court is
required to enter summary judgment for the moving party “[i]f the non-moving
party fail[ed] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case
with respect to which [he] ha[d] the burden of proof.” Gonzalez v. Lee County
Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Pro se
pleadings and appellate briefs are entitled to liberal construction. Drew v. Dep’t of
Corrs., 297 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing pro se pleadings); Cofield
v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 515 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing
pro se appellate briefs).
A. Claims barred as outside the statutory limitations period
Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), to challenge an employment
practice, a person must first file a timely charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) . Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., Inc., ___ U.S.____, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166-67 (2007). In a “deferral state,”
such as Florida, an administrative charge must be filed within 300 days of the
offending act. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir.
2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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In this case, all of Robinson’s claims, except for his claim of retaliation
based on the termination of his employment, are time-barred.1 Robinson filed his
charge of discrimination with the local state agency, on September 22, 2003. Thus,
all claims relating to acts of discrimination, retaliation, or failure to promote
occurring before November 26, 2002, 300 days earlier, are time-barred. Because
the only incident listed in Robinson’s complaint that occurred within this period is
his termination, all of his other claims are time-barred. Thus, the only claim that
we will address on the merits is Robinson’s claim of retaliation based on the
termination of his employment.
B. Retaliation claim
In order to prove retaliation under Title VII, a “plaintiff must show that
(1) [he] engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action
occurred, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected
activities.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir.
2004) (quotation omitted). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the
employer “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
employment action.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th
1
Robinson’s hostile environment claim arguably is not time-barred because one incident
alleged in the his complaint allegedly occurred within the 300-day limit. However, Robinson
adduced no evidence with respect thereto. Moreover, the claim was not exhausted.
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Cir. 2001). We have held that this burden is “exceedingly light” and that the
employer “need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the
defendant’s burden is merely one of production, not proof.” Cooper v. Southern
Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). If the defendant
meets its burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the reason provided by the employer” was
pretext for discrimination. Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266. A plaintiff may not
meet his burden of showing pretext “merely by questioning the wisdom of the
employer’s reason as long as the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable
employer.” Id. at 1267 (quotations omitted). A reason is not pretext for
discrimination “unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.” Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson
County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
As an initial matter, we assume, without deciding, that Robinson established
a prima facie case because the district assumed this, Florida Hospital does not
contest this on appeal, and as discussed below, Robinson fails in the later stages of
this burden-shifting analysis. In this case, the district court did not err in granting
Florida Hospital’s summary judgment motion as to Robinson’s retaliation claim
because Robinson failed to show that Florida Hospital’s legitimate, non-
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discriminatory reason was pretextual. Florida Hospital explained that it fired
Robinson because a co-worker alleged that Robinson had threatened to kill him, an
HR representative investigated the claim, and upon the conclusion of that
investigation, the HR representative found that the incident warranted Robinson’s
termination. Florida Hospital’s proffered reason is a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason that would “motivate a reasonable employer” to terminate
Robinson’s employment and meets its “exceedingly light” burden of production.
Robinson’s claim of retaliation fails because he did not show that Florida
Hospital’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. Robinson did not
allege below and does not contend on appeal that the person who made the ultimate
decision to terminate Robinson’s employment, the HR representative, failed to
base that decision on a real allegation or that he had a discriminatory motive. All
of Robinson’s alleged material, disputed facts relating to past incidents, his job
title, and promotions are irrelevant because they were not part of the HR
representative’s decision-making process. Accordingly, Robinson failed to show
that the decision to terminate his employment based on his alleged threat to kill a
co-worker was pretext for discrimination. Therefore, after carefully reviewing the
parties’ briefs and the record, and taking all the facts in the light most favorable to
Robinson, we hold that there are no material, disputed facts, and we affirm the
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district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Robinson’s claim of retaliation.
AFFIRMED.2
2
The appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.
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