Lifaite Bardette v. U.S. Attorney General

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-13592
March 6, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
BIA Nos.
A95-905-405
A95-905-406
LIFAITE BARDETTE,
MAXIME ALPHONSE BARDETTE,
GETHRO BARDETTE,
NAAMA BARDETTE,
NEHEMIE BARDETTE,
JEMIMA BARDETTE,
NAOMIE BARDETTE,
HADASSA BARDETTE,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(March 6, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lead petitioner, Lifaite Bardette, her husband, Maxime Alphonse, and their
children, Gethro, Naama, Nehemie, Jemima, Naomie, and Hadassa, through
counsel, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order,
summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision denying their
applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), INA §§ 208, 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231.1 The
petitioners argue that the IJ’s determination that they failed to establish statutory
eligibility for this relief from removal was not supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth more fully below, we deny their petition.
On December 20, 2000, Gethro Bardette (“Gethro”), a native and citizen of
Haiti, entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor for pleasure, with
authorization to remain in the United States until June 19, 2001. In February 2001,
Gethro filed an application for relief from removal and supporting documents,
conceding that he had left Haiti by boat and had entered the United States in
1
Because the petitioners have not challenged on appeal the denial of their petition for
withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158,
1241(b)(3), 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c), they have abandoned our review of this claim. See Sepulveda
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, “[w]hen an appellant
fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned”).
2
August 2000, without authority.2 Gethro contended in his application that, if he
returned to Haiti, he would be persecuted by the Lavalas Party on account of his
political opinion and his membership in the “Association des Jeunes du Millenium
pour une Haiti Milleure” (“Youth Group”), which was organized to help young
people “stay out of [] wrongdoing[s].” On July 24, 2001, the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”)3 denied Gethro’s application and referred it to
an IJ for further removal proceedings.
On February 19, 2002, Lifaite Bardette (“Bardette”) last entered the United
States as a non-immigrant for pleasure, with permission to remain until August 18,
2002.4 In June 2002, Bardette filed an application for relief from removal and
supporting documents,5 asserting that she would be persecuted by the Lavalas
Party, based on Gethro’s and her husband’s membership in the Youth Group and
2
Gethro conceded during the evidentiary hearing in these proceedings that, in addition to
including other false information in his February 2001, asylum application, he used a false name,
“Githo Mike Bardette.”
3
On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. This legislation created a new Department of
Homeland Security, abolished the INS, and transferred its functions to the new department.
4
Bardette included in her application for relief from removal that she previously had
entered the United States on March 19, 1978, October 22, 2001, and July 14, 2001.
5
These supporting documents included (1) birth certificates and passports for each
family member, and (2) a certificate of marriage.
3
their political opinion.6 On August 22, 2002, the INS also denied Bardette’s
application and referred it to the IJ for further proceedings.
The INS subsequently served the petitioners with notices to appear
(“NTAs”), charging them with removability for either remaining in the United
States for a period longer than permitted, pursuant to INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), or for being present in the United States without having been
admitted or paroled, pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). In September 2002, on Gethro’s request, the IJ consolidated
his case with his family’s pending removal proceedings. Moreover, in November
2002, Bardette and her family appeared before an IJ and conceded the petitioners’
removability. Bardette, however, stated that she intended to renew her application
for relief from removal based on political asylum and withholding of removal.
On February 24, 2004, at a hearing on the petitioners’ consolidated
applications for relief from removal, Bardette and Gethro, who were the only
witnesses, offered the following testimony. Bardette, who was self-employed and
owned a fabric shop in Haiti from 1983 through 2000, entered the United States six
times before her last entry in February 2002. After initially stating that she, her
husband, and Gethro were active in the Youth Group, Bardette conceded that she,
6
Bardette included as riders in her application for relief her husband and her minor
children, who also were natives and citizens of Haiti.
4
herself, was not a member, and that the Youth Group’s purpose was to help “youth
do what was right,” including avoiding drugs and prostitution. Gethro joined the
organization in 1999. In March 2000, Gethro started hosting a weekly radio
program on Radio Caraibe in downtown Port-au-Prince, through which he
addressed the youth and told them that “the government wasn’t there to help them,
that some of them were armed.”
Bardette further testified that, on March 31, 2000, after Gethro criticized the
Haitian government, six police officers arrested him and two other persons and
detained them for two weeks. During this detention, Gethro was beaten and a
female colleague allegedly was raped. Upon Gethro’s release, Bardette and her
family, other than Gethro, moved to another residence, where they resided from
2000 to 2003. Gethro, on the other hand, moved in with a family friend in the
neighborhood of Saint-Marc.
One month after Gethro’s arrest, four men dressed in civilian clothing came
to Bardette’s residence and asked about Gethro’s whereabouts. Although Bardette
did not recognize these men, she believed that they were police officers because
“they mentioned it.” When Bardette refused to disclose Gethro’s address to these
men, they entered her residence, looked around, held her at gunpoint, hit her leg
with a baton, and took documents relating to the Youth Group. Additionally, in
November 2000, when Bardette’s husband and Gethro were driving to Gethro’s
5
school, an unidentified group of persons stole their vehicle at gunpoint and stated
that they knew that Bardette’s husband did not like the Lavalas Party. Despite this
statement, however, Bardette believed that these persons stole the vehicle because
they “needed the car.” Bardette did not report this theft. Instead, Bardette
arranged for Gethro to travel to the United States in December 2000.7
In January 2001, after Gethro’s departure and one day after Bardette gave
birth to her youngest son, she arrived home and found a note accusing her family
of being against the Lavalas Party. In February 2001, Bardette’s husband was
attacked in their fabric store by men whom she believed belonged to the Lavalas
Party. In June 2001, Bardette’s husband traveled to the United States with a
visitor’s visa. Bardette, however, did not leave Haiti with the rest of her children
until February 2002, after she was robbed by persons whom she believed were
supporters of the Lavalas Party. Bardette further testified that she (1) feared that, if
she and her family returned to Haiti, they would be attacked by members of the
Lavalas Party; and (2) did not believe that she could relocate within Haiti because
her house was in Port-au-Prince.
7
Bardette also testified that, prior to Gethro traveling to the United States in December
2000, he had applied for a visa on April 14, 2000, and had entered the United States on July 10,
2000, after which he had stayed for two months and had not sought asylum, purportedly due to
his mother’s initial wish that he complete his studies in Haiti.
6
Gethro also testified, stating that, in 1999, he joined the Youth Group, which
sought to educate young people about the social, economic, and political situations
in Haiti, and which was supported by the International Republican Institute
(“IRI”). As an assistant to the Vice President of the Youth Group, Gethro was in
charge of public relations. Additionally, on Fridays from February 2000 through
March 31, 2000, he hosted a radio show on Radio Caraibe, which covered the
social, political, and economic aspects of Haiti. On March 31, 2000, immediately
after Gethro finished his radio show, police officers arrested him and detained him
in the national penitentiary for two weeks, during which time he was severely
beaten. He ultimately was released due to his parents’ efforts. Because he was
told that he was mistreated due to his radio show and that his life was in danger, he
stopped hosting the radio show after his arrest. He, however, resumed attending
his school classes and received unspecified threats.
Gethro further testified that, in July 2000, he left Haiti and came to the
United States with his father on vacation, during which visit he did not request
asylum or any other form of protection. However, after he returned to Haiti in
September 2000, and after witnessing persons steal his father’s car at gunpoint and
receiving more threats on his way to school, he realized that the situation in Haiti
had not changed. Moreover, although he had attempted to live with another family
in Saint-Marc, this family ultimately asked him to leave their home because the
7
family believed they were in danger. Gethro also stated that (1) he feared returning
to Haiti because of general civil violence against students; and (2) he lied in his
February 2001 asylum application because another person actually prepared the
application for Gethro to sign.
The government submitted for the IJ’s review the U.S. State Department’s
2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Haiti (“2001 Country
Report”). The 2001 Country Report included that, although Haiti is a republic with
an elected president, a bicameral legislature, and a constitution, many of the
constitution’s provisions are not respected in practice, and the political impasse
and violence stemming from the May 2000 election, whereby the Lavalas Party
maintained controlled of the Senate, and the November 2000 election of President
Aristide, continued in 2001. Although the Haitian National Police (“HNP”) had
received substantial international assistance and made some initial progress, it had
remained a “fledgling institution with inadequate resources,” with “[a]llegations of
corruption, incompetence, and narcotics trafficking affect[ing] all [of its] levels,”
and with some members committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial
killings. The HNP and local officials illegally arrested at least 50 persons in 2001,
with some of those persons being beaten. Additionally, radio stations continued to
receive anonymous threats, including death threats, and the government proved
unable or unwilling to provide adequate security to them.
8
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the IJ found all of the
petitioners removable, denied their applications for asylum and withholding of
removal under the INA, and ordered them removed to Haiti. The IJ first discussed
that, although Gethro had not attempted to hide his February 2001, asylum
application, it did not contain his real name or date of birth, and it fraudulently
stated that he had entered without inspection seeking asylum, instead of with a
visa. The IJ also noted that, although the alleged persecution had occurred within
the past four years and Radio Caraibe still was in existence, Gethro had not
produced documentary evidence that corroborated his testimony that he (1) was a
leader in the IRI, (2) had a radio show on Radio Caraibe’s air waves in 2000, and
(3) had been arrested immediately following a radio broadcast. The IJ discussed
that it had found “somewhat implausible” and “not particularly credible” Gethro’s
testimony that, at age 17, he was interviewing political candidates on a large radio
broadcast in Port-au-Prince. Moreover, the IJ noted that, although Bardette
testified that Gethro had been arrested on March 31, 2000, beaten, and released two
weeks later, a photograph that was taken for his visa during that same time period
did not reflect that he received numerous and severe beatings.
Additionally, the IJ discussed that, although Bardette had testified that
persons with the HNP had beaten her and taken things from her son’s room, as well
other people stealing her husband’s car and robbing her at gunpoint, she did not
9
otherwise provide identification about the persecutors, she did not identify what
items were taken from her son’s room, and the robbery was for the purpose of
taking her money. The IJ explained that, although the political situation in Haiti
was “particularly tumultuous,” these events involved thefts, instead of activities
showing a connection with the family’s political activities. The IJ also found either
“somewhat odd” or inconsistent the facts that (1) Bardette testified she did not
know how Gethro was released from jail but that it was pursuant to a court order,
while Gethro testified that his parents had orchestrated the release and made no
mention of a judge; (2) Bardette did not know if her husband or Gethro filed a
police report relating to the theft of the vehicle; and (3) she did not know whether
her husband knew the identity of any of the persons who had beaten him in the
fabric shop and accused him of being anti-Lavalas.
The IJ further explained that the petitioners’ traveling back and forth to Haiti
on different occasions following the onset of the alleged persecution was not “the
behavior of individuals who are genuinely in fear of their lives on account of past
persecution.” The IJ noted that, even if the petitioners had been harassed by
members of the Lavalas Party, their reasons why they did not attempt to relocate
within Haiti were not compelling. The IJ, then, found as follows:
[A]lthough the [petitioners] have provided testimony which is for the
most part consistent with the statements in the [asylum application],
the [c]ourt does not find that they have sustained their burden of proof
10
to present detailed, specific, and credible testimony regarding their
claims for the aforementioned reasons. The fact that the testimony is
consistent is not dispositive. Rather, the [c]ourt looks to the failure to
present corroborating documentation as well as failure to present
detailed and specific information regarding their so-called political
activities. The [c]ourt also, as noted above, finds certain salient
features of the claims to be somewhat implausible at best and suspect
at worst.
The IJ, therefore, concluded that the petitioners had failed to meet their burden for
asylum, as well as the higher “more likely than not” burden for withholding of
removal under the INA. Moreover, after the petitioners appealed this decision, the
BIA summarily affirmed it, without opinion.
The petitioners argue on appeal that, because the IJ either did not make an
explicit finding regarding credibility, or he based his findings on speculation and
conjecture, this Court should not conclude that the IJ reached an adverse credibility
determination that is dispositive on appeal. The petitioners also assert that the IJ
erred in finding that they failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution based on political opinion. The petitioners specifically assert
that the IJ erred in requiring them to produce corroborating evidence of past
persecution. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the IJ erred in relying on the
fact that they made return trips to Haiti, and in requiring them to establish that they
could not avoid future persecution by relocating within Haiti.
11
As a preliminary matter, when, as in this case, the BIA adopts the IJ’s
opinion in full, instead of rendering its own opinion, we review the IJ’s decision.
See D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). To the
extent that the IJ’s decision was based on a legal determination, our review is de
novo. Id. at 817. On the other hand, the IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed
under the substantial evidence test, and we “must affirm the [IJ’s] decision if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Id. at 817-18 (quoting Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001)). Thus, the IJ’s factual determinations will be
reversed “only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record
may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the
administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2245 (2005).
Also as a preliminary matter, if credible, an alien’s testimony may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration. Forgue v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005). “Conversely, an adverse
credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum
application.” Id. However, we have concluded that, when an IJ “says not that [the
IJ] believes the asylum seeker or [that] [the IJ] disbelieves her . . . the reviewing
Court is left in the dark,” and that an IJ must make a “clean determination[] of
12
credibility.” Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). Thus, we concluded in Yang that, although the IJ
made a reference to the petitioner’s claim as a “ridiculous fabrication” and stated
that his testimony was “extremely inconsistent and [made] absolutely no sense
whatsoever,” these statements did not constitute an adverse credibility
determination that was dispositive on appeal. Id.In the instant case, the IJ noted that Gethro had included false information in
his asylum application, as well as failing to produce corroborating evidence. The
IJ also discussed that he had found “somewhat implausible” and “not particularly
credible” Gethro’s testimony relating to his radio show on Radio Caraibe.
Similarly, the IJ discussed that (1) Bardette’s testimony relating to Gethro being
beaten was contradicted by Gethro’s visa photograph, and (2) her statements
relating to other alleged acts of harassment was either “somewhat odd” or
inconsistent. Additionally, the IJ found that the petitioners had not “sustained their
burden of proof to present detailed, specific, and credible testimony regarding their
claims.” Similar to the facts in Yang, however, the IJ did not clearly state that he
was making an adverse credibility finding. Indeed, the IJ discussed that the
petitioners’ testimony was consistent with their allegations in their applications.
The IJ, therefore, did not made an adverse credibility determination that is
dispositive on appeal.
13
An alien who arrives in, or is present in, the United States may apply for
asylum. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets
the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).8 A
“refugee” is defined as
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . . ..
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “The asylum applicant carries
the burden of proving statutory ‘refugee’ status.” D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818.
To establish asylum eligibility, the petitioner must, with specific and
credible evidence, demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily
listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause
future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. If the
petitioner demonstrates past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption that he
has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1). If he
8
Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), was amended
to add “The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General,” as if enacted on March 1,
2003. See Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005), Division B, Sec. 101, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1) and note (1).
14
cannot show past persecution, then the petitioner must demonstrate a well-founded
fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. The subjective component can be proved
“by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution,”
while the objective component “can be fulfilled either by establishing past
persecution or that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
An alien seeking withholding of removal under the INA similarly must show
that his “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The burden of proof for
withholding of removal, however, is “more likely than not,” and, thus, is “more
stringent” than the standard for asylum. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232.
To the extent the petitioners are challenging the IJ’s determination that they
failed to establish past persecution on account of membership in a social
organization or political opinion, “[p]ersecution on account of . . . political opinion
. . . is persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the
persecutor’s.” Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 437-38 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482, 112 S.Ct. 812, 816, 117
L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (emphasis in original)). The applicant must present “specific,
15
detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he will be singled out for
persecution on account of such an opinion.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. Thus,
evidence that either is consistent with acts of private violence, or that merely shows
that a person has been the victim of criminal activity, does not constitute evidence
of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Sanchez, 392 F.3d at 438.
Bardette and Gethro asserted during the evidentiary hearing that, following
Gethro’s criticizing the government during a broadcast he gave on Radio Caraibe,
he was detained and beaten by police officers for two weeks. Moreover, Bardette
testified that (1) four men whom she believed were police officers entered her
residence, hit her with a baton, and took document’s relating to Gethro’s youth
group; (2) persons who stated that they knew that Bardette’s husband did not like
the Lavalas Party stopped Bardette’s husband and son and stole their vehicle; (3) in
February 2001, someone left a note at her home accusing her family of being
against the Lavalas Party; and (4) her husband was attacked in the family’s fabric
store by men whom Bardette believed belonged to the Lavalas Party.
However, assuming for purposes of argument that these acts constituted
persecution, instead of “isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation,”
see Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (explaining that “mere harassment does not
amount to persecution,” and that persecution is “an extreme concept requiring
more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation”), the
16
petitioners did not establish that this persecution was on account of membership in
a social group or imputed opinion, see Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. Bardette only
could speculate that members of the Lavalas Party were responsible for entering
her residence and assaulting her, stealing her purse, and attacking her husband in
their fabric store.
Bardette also conceded that she believed that, despite their statements
regarding the Lavalas Party, the persons who stole her husband’s vehicle did so
because they “needed the car.” See Sanchez, 392 F.3d at 438. Although Gethro
stated that he was detained immediately following his radio broadcast, he described
the message of his broadcasts as including general commentary that “the
government wasn’t there to help them, that some of them were armed.” The note
Bardette received in February 2001, also only generally accused her family of
“being against” the Lavalas Party. Additionally, the IJ, after determining that the
testimony was, at best, weak, did not err in considering the fact that the petitioners
failed to produce corroborating evidence. See Yang, 418 F.3d at 1201 (explaining
that, when the applicant’s testimony is weak, there is a greater need for
corroborating evidence). Thus, the petitioners did not present “specific, detailed
facts” that demonstrated past persecution based on a protected factor.
Additionally, the petitioners failed to demonstrate, in the alternative, a future
threat to their life or freedom in Haiti, based on a protected factor. To the extent
17
the petitioners are arguing that the IJ erred in relying on the fact that they made
return trips to Haiti following their entry into the United States in concluding that
they did not have a subjective fear, the record reflects that the IJ merely considered
this fact, in addition to its other factual findings, in reaching his decision. Indeed,
despite that Bardette entered the United States in July and October 2001, and
Gethro previously traveled to the United States in July 2000, neither of them
sought asylum relief during these visits. Additionally, despite that Gethro and
Bardette’s husband went to the United States in 2000 and 2001, she remained in
Haiti with their remaining five minor children until February 2002.
Moreover, the record does not compel a determination that the IJ erred in
concluding that the petitioners failed to establish a well-founded objective fear of
future persecution, as the last alleged act of persecution, that is, the theft of
Bardette’s purse, occurred in February 2002, two years before the petitioners’
applications for relief from removal were denied. Gethro also stopped hosting the
radio show after his arrest in March 2000, and did not testify that he subsequently
was an active member of the Youth Group.
Finally, to the extent the petitioners are arguing that the IJ erred in requiring
them to show that they could not avoid future persecution by relocating within
Haiti, we recently clarified that a “country-wide” requirement exists, such that “it
is not unreasonable to require a refugee who has an internal resettlement alternative
18
in his own country to . . . establish that such an option is unavailable. See
Arboleda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 04-13049, slip op. at 896 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2006)
(quoting Mazariegos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001)).
We also discussed in Arboleda that, since 2001, the regulations have codified the
country-wide requirement, and have instructed the IJ to consider whether “under
all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant [to relocate].”
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)).9 After examining the relevant country
reports for Colombia, we concluded in Arboleda that the FARC operates country-
wide in Colombia, and that the government, therefore, had failed to show that
relocation was a viable option for the petitioners, whom the BIA presumed had
suffered past persecution, to escape future persecution. See id. at 899-900.
Unlike the facts in Arboleda, however, the petitioners in the instant case
failed to establish past persecution. Thus, they had the burden of establishing a
well-founded fear of future persecution that was both subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. Moreover, as discussed
9
The regulations identify the following non-exclusive considerations that are relevant to
this “reasonableness” determination:
whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested
relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic
or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural
restraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).
19
above, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they will be singled out for
persecution on account of a protected factor. Thus, even if we were to conclude
that the 2001 Country Report for Haiti established country-wide persecution, a
contrary conclusion would not be compelled by this evidence. See Sepulveda, 401
F.3d at 1232 n.7 (affirming IJ’s denial of asylum, despite the inclusion in the 1999
and 2000 Country Reports for Colombia that guerillas exercised an influence
throughout the country, because the petitioner had failed to establish that she
would be singled out for persecution on account of a protected ground).
Accordingly, we conclude that the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of
removal was supported by substantial evidence. See Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1027;
see also Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1324-25 n.2 (explaining that, “if an applicant is
unable to meet the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for asylum, he is generally
precluded from qualifying for either asylum or withholding of [removal]”). We,
therefore, deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
20