L.E. v. Superintendent of Cobb County School District

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13980
____________________
L.E.,
By and through their parent and
next friend, Sara Cavorley,
B.B.,
A minor, by and through their parent and
next friend, Elizabeth Baird,
A.Z.,
A minor, by and through their parent and
next friend, Jessica Zeigler,
C.S.,
A minor, by and through their parent and
next friend, Tarasha Shirley,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13980
SUPERINTENDENT OF COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
RANDY SCAMIHORN,
DAVID BANKS,
DAVID CHASTAIN,
BRAD WHEELER,
In their official capacity as members of
the Cobb County School Board,
COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04076-TCB
____________________
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and RUIZ, * District
Judge.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants L.E., B.B., A.Z., and C.S., are students
who have respiratory disabilities (“Students”). They appeal the de-
nial of their motion for a temporary restraining order and
* Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz II, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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21-13980 Opinion of the Court 3
preliminary injunction. The Students sued Defendants-Appellees
the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District, individual
members of the Cobb County School Board, and the Cobb County
School District (collectively, “CCSD”), in the wake of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The Students claim that CCSD’s refusal to provide
reasonable accommodations for access to in-person schooling con-
stitutes a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”).
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
we hold this claim presents a live controversy that survives moot-
ness and the district court erred in its review of the Students’ dis-
crimination claims.
I.
Each of the Students attends a Cobb County school and has
a disability recognized by both the ADA and Section 504. As a re-
sult of the global COVID-19 pandemic, CCSD enacted a 2020–2021
COVID-19 policy that included masking requirements, social dis-
tancing, frequent cleaning and sanitizing of classrooms, and strict
quarantine requirements. In the spring and summer of 2021, all
Cobb County students were given the option to attend school ei-
ther virtually or in-person for the 2021-2022 school year. The Stu-
dents chose to attend school in-person based on CCSD’s assurances
that the district would follow the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) guidelines and that the safety procedures in
the 2020–2021 COVID-19 policy would remain in place.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13980
However, after the Students elected to attend school in-per-
son but before the 2021-2022 school year began, CCSD ended
many of the COVID-19 safeguards previously imposed. The new
policy no longer included mandatory masking, did not mandate
COVID-19 vaccinations for students or staff, and lessened the quar-
antine and social distancing requirements. As a result, the Stu-
dents’ parents removed them from in-person schooling and filed
this lawsuit. They alleged that unless CCSD reimplemented cer-
tain safety measures, the Students would be unable to attend in-
person school and would suffer irreparable harm. The Students
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with their complaint. The district court denied the mo-
tion, and the Students timely appealed.
II.
The denial of a preliminary injunction “rests within the
sound discretion of the district court.” Cunningham v. Adams, 808
F.2d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1987). We will reverse only if the district
court abused its discretion or if the denial is contrary to a rule of
equity. Id. Underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error,
and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Transcon. Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must show (1)
a substantial likelihood that it will ultimately prevail on the merits
of the underlying case; (2) that the movant will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to
the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction
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21-13980 Opinion of the Court 5
may cause the opposing party; and (4) that if issued, the injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest. Osmose, Inc. v. Vi-
ance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010). Preliminary in-
junctions are considered “drastic remed[ies],” and the moving
party must satisfy the burden of persuasion as to all four elements.
Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2001).
III.
We begin by addressing CCSD’s assertion that this appeal is
moot due to changes in the COVID-19 landscape before turning to
the merits of the Students’ appeal.
A. Mootness
CCSD claims this appeal is moot because the CDC COVID-
19 guidelines no longer recommend mandatory masking, and the
Students argued for a mask mandate at the motions hearing. Be-
cause the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
live cases and controversies, we must first determine whether this
case is justiciable.
Article III of the Constitution requires “a case or controversy
to exist at all times during the litigation.” Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th
1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “[A] case is moot when it
no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the
court can give meaningful relief.” De La Teja v. United States, 321
F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003). “If events that occur subsequent
to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability
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to give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is
moot and must be dismissed.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330,
1335–36 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). If a case becomes moot
while on appeal, this court will not consider the merits presented,
“but instead vacate[s] the judgments below with directions to dis-
miss even if a controversy did exist at the time the district court
rendered its decision.” Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohi-
bition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Students’ prayer for relief in their motion for prelimi-
nary injunction and temporary restraining order saves this case
from mootness. The Students ask the court to “[o]rder Defendants
to develop and implement policies, practices, procedures, and pro-
tocols for a multilayered COVID-19 mitigation strategy that fol-
lows CDC guidelines for COVID-19 Prevention in K-12 Schools
and maintain consistency with the CDC guidelines in the event of
subsequent changes, so that Plaintiffs can attend in-person
school[.]” The CDC guidelines have changed, as the motion antic-
ipated, but CCSD’s policies remain at odds with the current guide-
lines.
At the time the district court denied the motion, the CDC
guidelines required masking in all schools. Since then, however,
the CDC has updated its guidance. At the time the parties briefed
this appeal, the CDC recommended that schools base their mask-
ing policy on the corresponding COVID-19 risk-level in the com-
munity where the school district sits. See Transcript for CDC Me-
dia Telebriefing: Update on COVID-19, Centers for Disease
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21-13980 Opinion of the Court 7
Control and Prevention (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/t0225-covid-19-up-
date.html (“Since July 2021, CDC recommended universal masking
in schools, no matter what level of impact COVID 19 was having
on the community. With this update, CDC will now only recom-
mend universal masking in communities at the high level.”). If the
district was at a “low” or “medium” risk level, the CDC recom-
mended a mask-optional policy. At the time of this appeal, Cobb
County was at a “low” risk level, and its COVID-19 policy reflected
a mask-optional approach.
CCSD maintains that this appeal is moot because the Stu-
dents sought mandatory masking at the motions hearing. Since the
CDC guidelines no longer require a mask mandate, CCSD con-
tends that an order forcing them to follow CDC guidance would
not grant effectual relief. We disagree. This argument ignores cru-
cial facts in the record that illuminate the Students’ actual re-
quested relief.
Specifically, CCSD relies on the arguments put forth in the
motions hearing to support its claim that the Students are asking
solely for a mask mandate. In that same hearing, however, CCSD
undoubtedly stated that the Students sought additional relief:
“[The Students] are asking this Court for more than just a mask
mandate. They are asking this Court to order the district to strictly
comply with each and every one of the CDC’s recommendations.”
Part of those recommendations include (both now and at the time
of the hearing) guidance for schools on how to accommodate
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13980
students with disabilities. The Students argue that CCSD ignored
those recommendations and continues to disregard CDC guidance
in this respect. Therefore, this remains a live controversy. A judg-
ment in their favor would grant the Students meaningful relief by
requiring CCSD to follow the guidance on accommodating stu-
dents with disabilities under the ADA and Section 504 as it is up-
dated—a practice the Students claim CCSD refuses to do. 1 Thus,
this claim remains a live controversy.
1 CCSD asks us to follow the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Doe 1 v. Upper Saint
Clair Sch. Dist., No. 22-1141, 2022 WL 2951467 (3d Cir. Mar. 1, 2022) to find
this appeal moot. After reviewing the docket and assigning the appropriate
context, we decline to follow the Third Circuit because the facts are materially
distinguishable.
In Upper Saint Clair, the court compelled supplemental briefing on
why the pending appeal—an appeal from the grant of a temporary restraining
order forcing a school district to impose mandatory masking—was not moot
in light of new CDC guidelines only recommending mandatory masking at
high risk levels. Order, Doc. 26 at 1, Doe 1 v. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., No.
22-1160 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022) (consolidated with Upper Saint Clair, see Doc.
9). Plaintiffs sought mandatory masking “for as long as the risk level is classi-
fied as ‘substantial’ or ‘high.’” Id. Though not explicitly stated by the Third
Circuit, we conclude that the prayer for relief in that case was conditioned on
the community’s level of risk. Since the health landscape had drastically im-
proved by the time the appellate court heard the case, such that the county
was no longer at the required level of risk, the court found the claim moot.
See Upper Saint Clair, 2022 WL 2951467 at *1 (“[W]e agree with the parties
that . . . this matter is moot[.]”).
In contrast, here the Students’ prayer for relief is not conditioned on
the community’s risk level. Instead, it anticipates subsequent changes in CDC
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B. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The district court denied the Students’ motion, finding they
did not demonstrate substantial likelihood of success on the merits
under a failure to accommodate or disparate treatment theory of
discrimination. The Students contend that the district court
abused its discretion in evaluating whether their ADA and Section
504 claims had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits be-
cause the district court reframed the scope of the “service, program
or activity” the Students seek and did not consider each of the Stu-
dents’ theories of discrimination.2 To succeed on either claim, the
Students must show three elements: (1) that they are “qualified in-
dividual[s] with . . . disabilit[ies];” (2) that they were “excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s ser-
vices, programs, or activities, or [were] otherwise discriminated
against by the public entity;” and (3) “that the exclusion, denial of
benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the [plaintiffs’] disa-
bilit[ies].” Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 647 F.3d
1093, 1101 (11th Cir. 2011).
The district court held the Students are unlikely to establish
the second element listed above because there are two distinct
guidance and requests CCSD adhere to the guidelines as they change, no mat-
ter the level of risk.
2 ADA and Section 504 claims are governed by the same legal standard. J.S.,
III ex rel. J.S. Jr. v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir.
2017) (per curiam).
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categories of disability discrimination claims under the ADA—
failure to accommodate and disparate treatment—and the Stu-
dents’ arguments fall short of proving either. In so holding, the
district court did not consider the Students’ unjustified isolation
claim under Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Rather, the district court held that the Students’ attempt to allege
disparate treatment was not persuasive because CCSD’s policy was
facially neutral. The district court rejected the Students’ assertion
that additional restrictions were necessary to reasonably accom-
modate them and provide meaningful access to in-person school-
ing. Instead, it adopted CCSD’s view that the school district’s
COVID-19 policy and, specifically, the availability of virtual school-
ing, sufficiently accommodated the Students’ disabilities and pro-
vided them with meaningful access to education. The district court
found that while the Students may prefer stricter policies, CCSD is
not required to provide them; what is required is simply meaning-
ful access to education. L.E. v. Ragsdale, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1369
(N.D. Ga. 2021). 3
1. Reasonable Accommodation
On appeal, the Students argue that the district court imper-
missibly broadened their claim and redefined the scope of the pro-
gram at issue in this case. We agree. The district court erred by
misconstruing the Students’ argument as a right to education
3 Chris Ragsdale is the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District and
a named defendant in the proceedings below.
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generally, despite the record clearly establishing that the Students
are alleging a denial of access to in-person education—a specific
“service, program, or activity” that CCSD provides to all students.
The Supreme Court instructs courts to focus on narrow pro-
grams and benefits offered by a public entity when evaluating
claims under the ADA and Section 504. See Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 301 & n.21 (1985) (citing the government’s statement
that “[a]ntidiscrimination legislation can obviously be emptied of
meaning if every discriminatory policy is ‘collapsed’ into one’s def-
inition of what is the relevant benefit”). In addition to the record
below plainly establishing that the Students seek in-person educa-
tion, CCSD also conceded at the motions hearing that they under-
stand the complaint to request access to in-person education, ra-
ther than education generally. 4 Given the Supreme Court’s direc-
tion and the parties’ agreement on the relevant claim, we hold that
the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the scope
of the program at issue.
Nevertheless, CCSD maintains that the district court was
correct because a public entity need only provide a reasonable ac-
commodation—not the Students’ preferred or requested accom-
modation. See Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc.,
117 F.3d 1278, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1997). Because CCSD made a
virtual schooling opportunity available, they argue, they have
4 Further, CCSD confirmed at oral argument that it must provide reasonable
accommodations for access to in-person schooling.
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adequately provided the accommodations necessary to ameliorate
a disability’s effect of preventing meaningful access to the benefits
of, or participation in, the program at issue. CCSD’s argument
fails, however, because the district court did not analyze the correct
“program at issue.” The Students allege that CCSD refuses to con-
sider reasonable accommodations to allow them access to in-per-
son classes, not just education generally. The district court did not
consider whether virtual schooling can constitute a reasonable ac-
commodation to provide the benefits of in-person schooling. The
district court stopped short of the operative question, instead de-
ciding that “[s]o long as Plaintiffs are offered meaningful access to
education—and the Court finds that they have been—Defendants
have adequately accommodated Plaintiffs . . . .” Ragsdale, 568 F.
Supp. 3d at 1369.
To prevent the antidiscrimination legislation from being
emptied of its meaning through broad definitions of the program
at issue, we are compelled to reverse. 5 The district court’s re-defi-
nition of the public program was an abuse of discretion. On re-
mand, the district court must analyze whether virtual schooling is
a reasonable accommodation for in-person schooling, not educa-
tion in general. And if it is not, the district court must consider
5 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503–05 (4th Cir.
2016) (finding that because a specific method of voting was available to every-
one, that method of voting, not voting in general, was the “appropriate object
of scrutiny for compliance with the ADA and [Section 504]”).
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whether the multi-layered approach to COVID-19 precautions the
Students seek constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
2. Unjustified Isolation
The Students also argue that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in holding that the Students must show either failure to ac-
commodate or disparate treatment, without acknowledging the
Students’ discriminatory isolation theory under Olmstead. Relat-
edly, the Students argue that the district court wrongly concluded
that a facially neutral, uniformly applied policy cannot form the ba-
sis of a discrimination claim. We agree.
The Supreme Court, in Olmstead, held that “unjustified iso-
lation” is “properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.”
527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). That is because such isolation “perpetu-
ates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapa-
ble or unworthy of participating in community life.” Id. at 600. An
Olmstead isolation claim is separate and distinct from a disparate
treatment or failure to accommodate theory. In other words, the
Students need not show disparate treatment to be successful on the
merits of their Olmstead isolation claim.
Additionally, facially neutral, uniformly applied policies can
give rise to discrimination claims without evidence of disparate
treatment. The Supreme Court has explained that disability dis-
crimination “was perceived by Congress to be most often the prod-
uct, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and in-
difference – of benign neglect.” Choate, 469 U.S. at 295. The
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13980
various forms of discrimination against disabled individuals are fre-
quently facially neutral, but nevertheless effectuate discrimination
against disabled people.
Accordingly, the district court erred in holding the Students
must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on a
disparate treatment claim. Because the Students also bring their
ADA and Section 504 claims under an Olmstead theory of unjusti-
fied isolation, on remand, the district court must also analyze the
Students’ likelihood of success on the merits under this theory.
IV.
The Students’ claim is not moot because their prayer for re-
lief seeks an order requiring CCSD to comply with CDC guidelines
for COVID-19 precautions in schools. The CDC guidance recom-
mends that schools “must make reasonable modifications or ac-
commodations when necessary to ensure that all students, includ-
ing those with disabilities, are able to access in person learning”—
recommendations the Students allege that CCSD continues to ig-
nore. Operational Guidance for K-12 Schools and Early Care and
Education Programs to Support Safe In-Person Learning, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (Oct. 5, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/commu-
nity/schools-childcare/k-12-childcare-guidance.html. (emphasis
added). Additionally, the district court abused its discretion in re-
defining the scope of the program for which the Students are seek-
ing accommodations and failing to consider the Students’
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unjustified isolation theory. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
REMAND for analysis under the correct scope: access to the bene-
fits provided by in-person schooling.
REVERSED and REMANDED.